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Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). UHC 
forms part of the targets concerned with population health and well-being under SDG 3. This 
global call for UHC has led to a number of countries taking the initiative to transition towards 
UHC. Health financing plays an important role in ensuring the realisation of UHC goals. This 
calls for robust evaluation tools to inform the health financing policy options that countries 
embark on. In order for countries to implement effective health financing policies, there is 
need to understand the causal relationships between the factors that shape the UHC financing 
landscape. Such an understanding enables countries to develop and plan effective 
interventions aimed at achieving UHC. UHC, as an intervention to existing health systems, 
exhibits the complex properties of the health system. As a complementary intervention to 
health systems, UHC is also affected by contextual factors outside the jurisdiction of the 
health system. This implies that there is a need to also understand how health financing 
arrangements interact with the broader context within which the health system operates. 
These health financing arrangements that have to be considered are: (i) revenue raising; (ii) 
pooling; (iii) purchasing; and (iv) benefits design. 
The aim of this research was thus to identify causal pathways in the UHC financing landscape 
and their relationships with specific UHC goals This implies an understanding of the causal 
relationships between factors that shape the UHC landscape. In order to formulate the 
requirement specifications for selecting a method to assess causality to inform UHC financing, 
a literature review was conducted to: (i) identify the dimensions embedded in UHC; and (ii) 
to identify the key contextual factors affecting UHC, leading to the identification of the key 
properties that influnce UHC. This resulted in the four dimensions that define UHC, namely: 
(i) the right to healthcare; (ii) access to healthcare; (iii) universal coverage; and (iv) financial 
protection. The key contextual factors identified were: (i) governance; (ii) fiscal context; (iii) 
education; (iv) employment; (v) inequality; and (vi) poverty. From further literature analysis 
it was concluded that UHC exhibits the complexities found in health systems due to the fact 
that UHC is an intervention to existing health systems. This characterisation led to the 
development of a list of requirements that the method of causality assessment in the UHC 
financing landscape must adhere to. A literature, and subsequent comparative analysis, of  
complex causality methods resulted in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) - more 
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specifically the crisp-set QCA variant (csQCA), a mixed-method approach - being deemed an 
appropriate method to assess causal linkages between factors that influence UHC financing.  
QCA is both a research approach and an analytical method. The research approach 
perspective of QCA involves the identification of the causal conditions (input variables), 
outcomes (output variables) and scoring based on the performance of each of the conditions 
and outcomes. Three output variables were considered, namely: (i) health service coverage; 
(ii) quality of care; and (iv) financial protection. The input variables included: (i) health 
financing arrangements (i.e. revenue raising, pooling, and purchasing); and (ii) key contextual 
factors (i.e. fiscal space, education, employment, and inequality). For each variable, a 
subsequent literature search was conducted to identify indicators for measurement(s) for 
each of the identified variables. 17 cases were selected for this study, followed by data 
collection for each case. Composite indices for each of the variables were then created, by 
means of normalisation and aggregation techniques. Data for each variable was then 
calibrated and a scoring criterion was established in line with the csQCA variant. 
The analytical approach perspective of QCA involves the identification of necessary and 
sufficient conditions as well as the different causal pathways to achieving UHC outcomes. The 
results showed that no single condition was necessary nor sufficient to achieving each of the 
outcomes. However, outcomes are achieved by combinations of conditions. Central to these 
combinations are the availability of prepaid revenues and the management thereof. Meaning 
that relationships between health financing arrangements and contextual factors that 
guarantee sources of revenue are key to achieving UHC goals. The results suggest that it is not 
sufficient for countries to only focus on policies that view the health system in isolation of the 
broader context of the country. Rather, countries should address the politics that arise due to 
the complex nature of the health system and its dependence on the context of the country. 
Fiscal space and a lack of inequality along with the health financing arrangements are integral 
to achieving health service coverage. This shows that the existence of prepaid health revenues 
and the presence of sources of revenue are key factors to achieving health service coverage. 
Analysis of causal pathways to achieving quality of care showed that employment is a key 
consideration when attempting to improve the quality of care. Finally, to achieve financial 
protection, countries need to strengthen their revenue base, meaning that enhancing the 
sources of revenue and the collection and the management of the revenues, through effective 
pooling and purchasing practices. 
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UITTREKSEL 
‘Universal Health Coverage’ (UHC) is een van die Volhoubare Ontwikkelingsdoelwitte 
(Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)). UHC maak deel uit van die doelwitte met 
betrekking tot bevolkingsgesondheid en welsyn onder SDG 3. Hierdie wêreldwye oproep vir 
UHC het gelei tot 'n aantal lande wat die inisiatief geneem het om ‘n oorgang na UHC op te 
neem. Gesondheidsfinansiering speel 'n belangrike rol om die verwesenliking van UHC-
doelwitte te verseker. Dit vereis robuuste evalueringsinstrumente om die opsies vir 
gesondheidsfinansieringsbeleide wat lande ontwikkel, in te lig. Om te verseker dat lande 
doeltreffende gesondheidsfinansieringsbeleid implementeer, moet die oorsaaklike verband 
tussen die faktore wat die UHC-finansieringslandskap vorm verstaan word. So 'n begrip stel 
lande in staat om doeltreffende intervensies te ontwikkel en te beplan wat daarop gemik is 
om UHC te bereik. UHC, as 'n ingryping vir bestaande gesondheidstelsels, weerspiël die 
komplekse eienskappe van die gesondheidstelsel. As 'n aanvullende ingryping vir 
gesondheidstelsels word die UHC ook geraak deur kontekstuele faktore buite die jurisdiksie 
van die gesondheidstelsel. Dit impliseer dat daar ook 'n behoefte is om die interaksiete van 
gesondheidsfinansieringsreëlings met die breër konteks waarbinne die gesondheidstelsel 
funksioneer, te verstaan. Hierdie gesondheidsfinansieringsreëlings wat oorweeg moet word, 
is: (i) inkomsteverhoging; (ii) ‘pooling’; (iii) aankope; en (iv) voordele-ontwerp. 
Die doel van hierdie navorsing was dus om oorsaaklike roetes in die UHC 
finansieringslandskap te identifiseer, asook hul verhoudings met spesifieke UHC-doelwitte. 
Dit impliseer begrip van die oorsaaklike verwantskappe tussen faktore wat die UHC-landskap 
vorm. Ten einde die vereiste spesifikasies te formuleer vir die keuse van 'n metode om 
oorsaaklikheid te assesseer om UHC-finansiering te informeer, is 'n literatuuroorsig uitgevoer 
om: (i) die dimensies wat in die UHC ingebed is, te identifiseer; en (ii) om die sleutel  
kontekstuelefaktore wat UHC beïnvloed, te identifiseer, wat gevolglik lei tot die identifisering 
van die sleutel eienskappe wat UHC beïnvloed. Dit het gelei tot die vier dimensies wat UHC 
definieer, naamlik: (i) die reg op gesondheidsorg; (ii) toegang tot gesondheidsorg; (i ii) 
universele dekking; en (iv) finansiële beskerming. Die sleutel  kontekstuelefaktore wat 
geïdentifiseer was, is: (i) bestuur; (ii) fiskale konteks; (iii) onderwys; (iv) indiensneming; (v) 
ongelykheid; en (vi) armoede. Vanuit verdere literatuuranalise is daar bevind dat UHC die 
kompleksiteite wat in gesondheidstelsels voorkom vertoon as gevolg van die feit dat UHC 'n 
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ingryping is vir bestaande gesondheidstelsels. Hierdie karakterisering het gelei tot die 
ontwikkeling van 'n lys vereistes wat die metode van oorsaaklikheidsevaluering in die UHC-
finansieringslandskap moet nakom. 'n Literatuur- en daaropvolgende vergelykendeanalise 
van komplekse oorsaaklikheidsmetodes het gelei tot ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ 
(QCA) - meer spesifiek die ‘crisp set’ QCA-variant (csQCA), 'n gemengde-metode benadering, 
wat as 'n geskikte metode beskou word om oorsaaklike verband tussen faktore wat UHC 
finansiering beïnvloed te bepaal. 
QCA is beide 'n navorsingsbenadering en 'n analitiesemetode. Die navorsingsbenadering 
perspektief van QCA behels die identifisering van die oorsaaklike toestande (inset 
veranderlikes), uitkomste (uitset veranderlikes) en tellings gebaseer op die prestasie van elk 
van die voorwaardes en uitkomste. Drie uitsetveranderlikes is oorweeg, naamlik: (i) 
gesondheidsdiens dekking; (ii) gehalte van sorg; en (iv) finansiële beskerming. Die inset 
veranderlikes sluit in: (i) gesondheidsfinansieringsreëlings (d.w.s. inkomsteverhoging, 
‘pooling’ en aankope); en (ii) sleutel kontekstuelefaktore (d.w.s. fiskale ruimte, onderwys, 
indiensneming en ongelykheid). Vir elke veranderlike is 'n verdere literatuursoektog 
uitgevoer om aanwysers vir metings vir elk van die geïdentifiseerde veranderlikes te 
identifiseer. Daar is 17 gevalle vir hierdie studie gekies, gevolg deur data-insameling vir elke 
geval. Saamgestelde indekse vir elk van die veranderlikes is dan deur middel van normalisasie- 
en aggregeringstegnieke geskep. Data vir elke veranderlike is dan gekalibreer en 'n 
tellingskriterium is in lyn met die csQCA-variant bepaal. 
Die analitiesemetode perspektief van QCA behels die identifisering van die nodige en 
voldoende toestande, sowel as die verskillende oorsaaklike roetes om UHC-uitkomstes te 
bereik. Die resultate het getoon dat geen enkele toestand nodig is, of voldoende is, om elk van 
die uitkomste te bereik nie. Uitkomstes word egter bereik deur kombinasies van toestande. 
Sentraal by hierdie kombinasies is die beskikbaarheid van voorafbetaalde inkomste en die 
bestuur daarvan. Bedoelede dat, verhoudings tussen gesondheidsfinansieringsreëlings en 
kontekstuele faktore wat inkomstebronne waarborg, is die sleutel tot die bereiking van UHC-
doelwitte. Die resultate dui daarop dat dit nie voldoende is vir lande om slegs te fokus op 
beleide wat die gesondheidstelsel in isolasie van die breër konteks van die land beskou nie. 
Lande moet eerder die politieke kwessies aanspreek wat ontstaan as gevolg van die komplekse 
aard van die gesondheidstelsel en die afhanklikheid daarvan van die konteks van die land. 
Fiskale ruimte en 'n gebrek aan ongelykheid, tesame met die 
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gesondheidsfinansieringsreëlings, is 'n integrale deel van die dekking van gesondheidsdienste. 
Dit toon dat die bestaan van voorafbetaalde gesondheidsinkomste en die teenwoordigheid 
van inkomstebronne belangrike faktore is vir die dekking van gesondheidsdienste. Ontleding 
van oorsaaklike roetes vir die behaling van gehalte van sorg het getoon dat indiensneming 'n 
belangrike oorweging is in die poging om die gehalte van sorg te verbeter. Ten slotte, om 
finansiële beskerming te bewerkstellig, moet lande hul inkomstebasis versterk, wat beteken 
dat die inkomstebronne en die invordering en bestuur van inkomste deur middel van 
effektiewe ‘pooling’- en aankooppraktyke verbeter kan word.  
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Chapter 1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the research project. A brief background of the topic 
in question is presented, followed by a discussion of the problem statement of this research 
inquiry, which then informs the research aims and objectives. Lastly, the research design and 
the structure of the thesis are presented.  
1.1 Background  
In the year 2000, the United Nations (UN) established a global partnership with countries and 
developmental partners to establish eight developmental goals that were to be achieved by 
the year 2015. These goals were termed Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs). Below is a 
list of the MDGs (WHO, 2015a): 
i. Eradication of extreme poverty; 
ii. Achieve universal primary education; 
iii. Promote gender equality and empower women; 
iv. Reduce child mortality; 
v. Improve maternal health; 
vi. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
vii. Ensure environmental sustainability; and 
viii. Develop a global partnership for development. 
Three of the goals were health related. The accelerated development towards heal th, 
education and the general eradication of poverty since 2000 signifies the success brought 
about by MGDs. At the UN general assembly of September 2014, the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) were integrated into the post 2015 development agenda. The SDGs are 17 goals 
that integrate the three dimensions of sustainable development (i.e. economic, social and 
environmental dimensions); with the third SDG focusing specifically on “ensuring healthy 
lives and promoting wellbeing” (WHO, 2015a), with the proposal being to achieve this through 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC).”. UHC is, however, not a new concept for health systems. 
According to Wagstaff et al. (2016), a Google books search of “Universal Health Coverage” 
shows English books from 1945 onwards referring to UHC, and references to the term have 
increased rapidly in recent years.  





UHC forms part of the 13 sub-goals under the “good health and wellbeing theme” as goal 
number 3.8 (WHO, 2015a). According to the WHO (2010), UHC is defined as “access to 
promotive, preventative, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for the entire 
population at an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access. Kutzin (2013) states that, 
though UHC cannot be fully achieved, it is nevertheless imperative for countries to strive 
towards it. It is argued that UHC can be a tool to bring about equity, improve health outcomes, 
improve financial wellbeing, political stability and economic growth (Bump et al., 2016). 
Countries such as Germany, Australia, The United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, 
France, The Netherlands, Thailand and Finland have established a track record of progress 
towards UHC. Whereas countries such as Qatar, Rwanda, Tunisia, South Africa and Mexico 
have recently made positive steps towards UHC (Britnell, 2015a).  
 
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the definition of UHC has three 
objectives: (i) equity in the use and distribution of health services; (ii) quality health services; 
and (iii) financial protection (WHO, 2013a, 2016b). UHC is a complex policy subject that is 
aimed at improving access to quality health services without financially burdening the 
population (Boerma et al., 2014). This means that UHC is a complementary intervention to 
existing health systems, hence the starting point is the current situation of the health system 
in question. This starting point is influenced by the context of both the country and its health 
system (Thomson, 2010), and it is therefore important for countries to consider how 
contextual and other factors within the health system determinants affect the attainment of 
UHC goals.  
Contextual factors are factors outside the jurisdiction of the health system decision makers, 
with influence on the attainment of health system goals (WHO, 2016b). Examples of these 
contextual factors include a country’s education levels, fiscal context, employment and 
income levels (Kutzin, 2013; Steenekamp, 2016; WHO, 2016b). For countries striving towards 
UHC, it is important to understand how factors that shape the UHC landscape, including 
factors that fall within the jurisdiction of health system decision makers, and factors that do 
not, affect UHC goals. Kutzin (2013), refers to the interactions between the health system 
functions—i.e. the relationship between the broader contextual factors of the country (inputs) 
and the UHC goals (outputs)—as the “missing middle”. An improved understanding of these 
relationships can help shape the deliberate actions that governments make when moving 





towards UHC. According to de Savigny & Adam (2009), health systems comprise of a number 
of health system building blocks, namely: (i)service delivery; (ii) financing; (iii) human 
resources; (iv) governance; (v) information; and (vi) medical technologies. Although the other 
functions of a health system are important, researchers have argued that health financing is 
especially integral when attempting to move towards UHC (Kutzin, 2013; WHO, 2013a). 
The focus of this research inquiry is thus on the relationships between factors that  affect the 
financing building block of health systems, the context within which a health system operates, 
and the UHC outcomes that are achieved, in order to inform UHC financing policy. 
1.2 Problem statement  
The global community is faced with the challenge of providing access to health care for all 
citizens. Health financing is of fundamental importance when moving towards UHC. With 
that notion in mind, countries need to understand how specific health financing components 
affect UHC goals, taking account of the contextual factors that shape the country. In other 
words, there is need to understand the causal processes that are linked to specific UHC goals 
from a health financing perspective.  
Understanding the underlying causal processes can help to identify factors that contribute to 
the failure or success of UHC financing interventions. According to (Gopnik et al., 2004): 
"Causal knowledge is important for several reasons. Knowing about causal structure permits 
us to make wide-ranging predictions about future events. Even more important, knowing 
about causal structures allows us to intervene in the world to bring about new events⎯often 
events that are far removed from the interventions themselves”. 
It is undisputed that health systems are complex and dependent on context; therefore, 
methodological considerations to inform causality in the UHC financing landscape need to 
take account of these complexities. The two dominant research paradigms for causal inference 
are the qualitative and quantitative paradigms. The qualitative approach lacks systematic 
cross-case comparisons that are essential to causal inference (Maxwell, 2004b; Blackman, 
2013), whilst the quantitative approach often fails to take into account the open nature of 
complex systems (Bennett and Elman, 2006; Blackman, 2013). 





1.3 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to identify causal pathways in the UHC financing landscape and 
their relationships with specific UHC goals. To achieve this aim, below are the objectives of 
this study, accompanied with sub-objectives. The sub-objectives were used as a guide 
throughout the thesis. The research objectives and sub-objectives are: 
i. Objective 1—Review literature on UHC in order to develop a clear 
understanding of the construct and to identify the key requirements for 
causality assessment in the context of UHC. The sub-objectives defined under 
Objective 1 are: 
a. Determine the dimensions embedded in UHC; 
b. Determine key contextual factors affecting UHC; and 
c. Determine the requirement specifications for causality in line with UHC. 
ii. Objective 2—To identify methods and approaches for establishing complex 
causality and select an appropriate method for application in this research. The 
sub-objectives defined under Objective 2 are: 
a. Choose a research approach that meets the requirement specifications obtained 
in Objective 1; and 
b. Choose the most appropriate method based on the requirement specifications 
defined in sub-objective 1(c). 
iii. Objective 3—Identify UHC goals and indicators that can be used to assess 
performance in terms of these goals. The sub-objectives defined under 
Objective 3 are: 
a. Identify the UHC goals; 
b. Conceptualise the definition of each identified UHC goal; 
c. Identify the indicators for measuring performance in terms of each UHC goal; 
and 
d. Collect and sort relevant data for each indicator based on the requirements of 
the method selected under sub-objective 2(b). 
iv. Objective 4—Identify factors that shape the UHC financing landscape as well as 
contextual factors that affect UHC, including indicators that measure each 
factor. The sub-objectives defined under Objective 4 are: 





a. Identify health financing factors and contextual factors that affect UHC; 
b. Conceptualise the definition of each factor; 
c. Identify the indicators for measuring each factor; and 
d. Collect and sort relevant data for each indicator based on the requirements of 
the method selected under sub-objective 2(b). 
v. Objective 5—Identify causal linkages between factors that shape UHC financing 
landscape and contextual factors that affect UHC . The sub-objectives defined 
under Objective 5 are: 
a. Determine the relationships between factors shaping UHC financing, 
specifically in relation to each UHC goal; 
b. Determine the key relationships between factors that affect UHC, in association 
with each UHC goal; and 
c. Determine conditions that are necessary or sufficient to achieve each UHC goal. 
1.4 Research design 
 The research was conducted in the pragmatist research paradigm. In order to get a clear 
understanding of the concept of UHC and the contextual factors that affect the concept, a 
qualitative literature study was conducted. The aim was to identify the key properties of UHC 
that inform the choice of a method when assessing causality in UHC financing. A 
comprehensive literature review was then conducted on the three main research approaches, 
namely; qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research approaches to causality. Based 
on the requirements specifications for causality assessment in line with UHC, the mixed 
method approach was deemed appropriate. The choice of the research approach was followed 
by the choice of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as the method for the study.  
The research then followed the steps for conducting QCA. QCA involves three major steps; 
namely design, conditioning and analysis. Designing, involved the definition of conditions 
(variables), cases and outcomes for the research. For each of the conditions and outcomes 
(constructs), indicators were then identified through a comprehensive literature search on 
internationally reported indicators. Data availability and case diversity were the two main 
criteria for case selection. Data was then collected for the respective indicators for each 
condition and outcome of the study. 





Conditioning involves the conversion of raw data into formats applicable to QCA for analysis. 
Data from the respective indicators were then processed and converted to a format that is 
applicable to QCA.  
Finally, in the analysis stage, different causal recipes to UHC goals were identified. This 
included the identification of sufficient and necessary conditions when moving towards UHC 
and a subsequent discussion of the meaning and strength of the findings. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, the contents of each chapter is briefly summarised in 
the remainder of this section. 
Chapter 2: Contextualisation 
In this chapter, Objective 1 and partly Objective 4 of the study are addressed. An analysis of 
several articles that describe the concept of UHC is conducted. Four themes and the 
contextual factors that have been identified as shaping UHC are also described. The properties 
of UHC identified in this chapter then led to the definition of requirements for the method to 
assess causality in UHC financing. 
Chapter 3: Methods for causality  
In this chapter, the search for the appropriate method for causality assessment in the UHC 
financing landscape is discussed. This builds on the method requirements defined in Chapter 
2. Objective 2 is thus addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4: UHC landscape 
In this chapter, the UHC goals, UHC financing arrangements and contextual factors that affect 
healthcare are explored. The chapter thus entails the initial part of the application of QCA, in 
that it includes the identification of QCA causal conditions and outcomes. The focus is on 
identifying indicators that are used to measure each of the identified contextual factors. 
Objectives 3 and 4 are addressed in this chapter.  
 
 





Chapter 5: Cases and data collection 
The data collection process and the choice of cases that were applied in the study are 
discussed in this chapter. This work addresses sub-objective 3(d) and 4(d). 
Chapter 6: Results and analysis 
In this chapter, results obtained from the quantitative analysis component of the QCA 
method are presented and analysed with the aim of identifying causal linkages in the UHC 
financing landscape. Objective 5 is addressed in this chapter.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter concludes the document and includes recommendations on policy implications 
of the findings of this research and future work to be done.  
1.6 Conclusion: Introduction 
In this chapter, the research background, problem statement, aim, objectives, research design 
and the contents of each chapter were presented. The rest of the document discusses the 
topics as highlighted in this chapter. 
 
 




Chapter 2 CONTEXTUALISATION 
This chapter is dedicated to identifying properties of UHC, with the aim of informing the 
methodology to be applied to assess causality when moving towards UHC. First, the definition 
of UHC is conceptualised with the aim of identifying the key dimensions embedded in the 
concept and the key contextual factors that are drivers of UHC. This is followed by a 
discussion on the complexity of UHC, with the aim of identifying the requirements for 
selecting a methodology to assess causality in UHC financing. 
2.1 UHC definition and contextual factors 
According to the WHO (2010), UHC is defined as “access to promotive, preventative, curative 
and rehabilitative health interventions for the entire population at an affordable cost, thereby 
achieving equity in access”.  
 
The UHC concept is aimed at providing quality health services to all without exposure to 
financial adversities (WHO, 2012). UHC is, therefore, a multidimensional concept, which 
supports universal population health provision. Although UHC is generally aimed at 
improving population health, there are varied conceptualisations of the idea. In order to gain 
an understanding of UHC and context-specific factors that affect it, a semi-structured, 
systematic literature review that grappled with the meaning of UHC was conducted on the 
Scopus database. The review highlighted the main themes of the concept. The phrase 
“Universal Health Coverage” was used along with the supporting terms “definition”, 
“conceptualisation”, “meaning”, “interpretation”, “scope” and “views” on the Scopus database. 
The search involved keywords, abstracts and titles with inclusion and exclusion criteria based 
on the topics and scope of the papers and relevance to defining UHC. The search produced 
94 research papers, with 16 of these papers deemed relevant to the definition of UHC after 
manual abstract scanning. The 16 papers were then analysed with the aim of identifying their 
key themes in line with UHC. The section ends with a summary of the dimensions of UHC 
and the contextual factors that are drivers of UHC in Table 2.1. and Table 2.2. respectively.  
 
Ooms, Latif, Waris, Brolan, Hammonds, Friedman, Muluma & Forman  (2015) interpreted 
UHC as being embedded in the right to healthcare. This is as per Comment 14 of the 




International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and will be 
discussed in Section 2.1.1. After using a comparative normative analysis on various definitions 
of UHC and its relationship with the right to healthcare, Ooms et al. (2015) derived three 
themes to describe UHC, namely: universal population coverage, financial protection and 
access to needed care. In their analysis, the major difference between the right to healthcare 
and UHC is the lack of clarity on the part of UHC, which is a direct confirmation that 
international support is essential and not optional. Furthermore, UHC is a “practical 
expression of the concern for health equity and the right to health” (Ooms et al., 2015). 
 
Allotey, Verghis, Alvarez-Castillo & Reidpath (2012) take an equity-based approach in defining 
the concept of universal coverage. Universal coverage is a vital social factor, and health 
services and goods that support health have to be accessible to all. The choice of essential 
health services to be offered and funding mechanisms to be employed is therefore based on 
context and is of high importance to ensure equity.  
According to Noronha (2013), universal coverage is an expression of the extent to which a 
health intervention reaches the population and is associated with the provision, access, and 
the use of the health services offered. They argue that coverage means access to effective and 
quality health services, whenever needed, and that it is not simply an entitlement. To achieve 
full coverage, systematic barriers to access should then be fully removed, based on the right 
to healthcare.  
 
O’Connell, Rasanathan & Chopra (2014a) highlight the different names referring to universal 
health coverage namely, “universal health care”, “universal health-care coverage” and 
“universal coverage”. In their discussion, they use the phrase “universal health coverage” and 
describe the meaning of each of the terms separately to come up with a conceptualised 
meaning of the phrase. The term “universal” refers to the legal obligation for states to provide 
healthcare to their population with precedence given to disadvantaged groups. So “universal” 
has a particular focus on equity in access to care. Their description of “health” is based on the 
UN General Assembly’s resolution which calls for “equitable opportunities for the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health”. “Health” encompasses other social 
determinants, such as values and beliefs that are expressed in different sectors of the 




population. “Coverage” refers to access to appropriate, essential, quality care, without 
systematic exclusion and effective utilisation of those services (O’Connell et al., 2014a). 
 
In their effort to address rights issues in sexual and reproductive health, Fried, Khurshid, 
Tarlton, Webb, Gloss, Paz & Stanley (2013) explore the limitations of the rights-based 
approach to health in access to reproductive and sexual health. According to their definition 
of UHC, the phrase “universal coverage” means that nearly the whole population are covered 
for almost all of their health-care needs no matter the cost. Their definition of universal 
coverage emphasises that no country has ever achieved 100% coverage. Coverage is therefore 
primarily the removal of financial barriers by sustainable health financing to reduce out-of-
pocket payments for healthcare. Access to healthcare is dependent on varied factors, 
including service delivery points, equipment and health personnel. Fried et al. (2013) label 
UHC as “a means to an end”, with the end being the realisation of the right to healthcare.  
 
Abiiro & De Allegri (2015) synthesise the multiple perspectives on UHC and emphasise the 
need to pay close attention to the multidimensional nature of UHC, and the way the 
dimensions interact. The paper discusses four dimensions of UHC, namely as a human right, 
an economic concept, a humanitarian social concept and a public health concept. The human 
right dimension is based on the existence of international laws that mandate governments to 
provide essential healthcare for all. The economic dimension implies financial protection 
against the consequences of out-of-pocket payments, which can be curbed by pooled and 
prepaid financing systems. The humanitarian concept aims to achieve equitable coverage and 
access to health-related benefits. The public health concept is in line with the health packages 
that are offered/available to the population, and defines which diseases and interventions 
need to be prioritised. All of the components of health are part of a greater goal to pursue the 
right to health as per the international mandate.  
 
In their efforts to identify an indicator that can accurately capture the multiple dimensions of 
UHC, Ng, Fullman, Dieleman, Flaxman, Murray & Lim (2014) recommend measuring effective 
coverage, as it unites various distinct facets of UHC. They define effective coverage as the 
fraction of potential health gain that a health system in its capacity delivers to the population. 
Effective coverage comprises three components, namely need, use and quality. 





According to Shrivastava, Shrivastava & Ramasamy (2016), UHC is much more than achieving 
health goals by assuring quality essential services to a population without financial 
impoverishment, instead it represents a pursuit for equity and social cohesion.  
 
Bisht's (2013) conceptualisation of UHC is based on the Alma-Ata Declaration, which was 
instated to remove inequalities in healthcare. The Alma-Ata Declaration is a moral and 
intellectual declaration that views health as a fundamental right and advocates health for all. 
Its philosophy of health for all is backed by incorporating six key factors. Universalism forms 
the basis of the agreement and stresses the notion of comprehensive population coverage. 
Equality in healthcare is embedded in the theory of universalism, with emphasis on access to 
healthcare for everyone. Through government participation, financing mechanisms are put 
into place that fund healthcare so that the population can attain the needed health services. 
This plays a pivotal role in achieving healthcare goals Governments were also obliged to 
promote community involvement in the implementation and planning of health service 
delivery systems with the use of relevant local technology. The author concludes that 
contemporary conceptualisation of UHC only make passive reference to the Alma-Ata 
Declaration. Bisht also disregards the fundamental principles of it and the fact that this 
conceptualisation of UHC creates limited value in terms of health promotion.  
 
Waitzkin (2015) highlights the importance of differentiating between UHC and “healthcare 
for all” (HCA). HCA promises equal health services for the whole population, irrespective of 
their financial resources. UHC, on the other hand, is a financial reform to extend health 
insurance coverage to the greater part of the country in varying degrees, with primary focus 
on extending access to poor ethnic minorities and other marginalised groups. UHC advocates 
for a multifaceted financing system that will allow for the extension of some services to those 
who need them. UHC allows for mixed competition between the private and public health 
sectors, in which the private sector is mainly comprised of for-profit insurance corporations. 
Private healthcare and social security providers are then compensated for their services on a 
prepaid basis from public trust funds. HCA is based on the rights-based approach to 
healthcare. This approach supplies different groups with the same level of care and involves a 
single, public system that provides preventative inpatient and outpatient services. Waitzkin 
(2015) points out that UHC has received wide criticism from a number of progressive 




organisations such the Association of Latin American Social Medicine (ALAMES), the People 
Health Movement (PHM) and, Global Health Watch (GHW). Various authors, including 
Waitzkin (2015), label the concept of UHC as “hegemonic” in global health policy. Their 
criticism is directed at the following ideological assumptions on which UHC is based: 
i. Efficiency is enhanced if service delivery is separated from financing, implying the 
generalisation of competition among all subsectors. 
ii. Health costs are best regulated by the market. 
iii. Demand rather than supply is subsidised. 
iv. Efficiency is better in the private sector and the private sector is less corrupt. 
v. User freedom of choice is enhanced by the deregulation of health and social security 
trust funds.  
vi. Competition between providers in the marketplace ensures the quality of health 
services.  
 
Without engaging with the definition of UHC, Borgonovi & Compagni (2013) attempt to 
expand the concept of UHC to sustainability. This allows for the inclusion of additional 
dimensions to UHC, including the social and political aspects. The paper argues that the 
debate on UHC has been more focused on economic sustainability, neglecting political and 
social factors and how they contribute to UHC. The authors define sustainable systems based 
on the broader definition offered by the Hawke Research Institute in Austria, hence 
sustainable systems are “equitable, diverse, connected and democratic, and provide a good 
quality of life”.  
 
According to Jindal (2014), there are three basic prerequisites to achieving UHC, namely: 
adequate resources to support the requirements of the health services, reduction of financial 
and other barriers to optimal usage of health services, and a focus on increased capability of 
the population to utilise the health services. UHC is, therefore, a government-run scheme that 
is guaranteed to citizens and provides primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare services 
through a national health package. Packages are dependent on the context of the country, 
such as a country’s available resources and its healthcare needs. 
 
In their assessment of the future of UHC in Europe, and the global prevalence of UHC in the 
world, McKee, Balabanova, Basu, Ricciardi & Stuckler (2013) employ a definition of UHC that 




is based on Stuckler, Feigl, Basu & McKee (2010)’s five themes from their systematic review of 
the relevant literature. These themes are: access to care, coverage, the point of entry to the 
healthcare system, rights-based approach, and social and economic risk protection. The 
article argues that the definition offered by the WHO integrates these five themes.  
 
Evans, Martin & Etienne (2012) view UHC as a developmental issue in the sense that healthy 
individuals are more productive and can contribute to economic growth and that individuals’ 
ability to work lifts them out of poverty. The paper defines a good quality health system as 
one that offers universal access that protects individuals from illness, fights poverty, and 
enhances economic growth and social cohesion. A requirement for UHC is that everyone can 
use the health services they need without the need to pay out of pocket, which is a major 
cause of impoverishment. The link between sustainable development, health and economic 
growth is somewhat of a paradox and creates a reinforcing poverty cycle: Using health services 
impoverishes the poor, but the inability to access healthcare also impoverishes individuals, 
because they are unable to work (and therefore cannot afford the health services). 
 
Lefran (2015) conceptualise the definition of UHC based on two definitions from the WHO, 
stating that UHC is:  
 
‘[t]he ability of the health system to meet the needs of the population, including the availability 
of infrastructure, human resources, health technologies (including medicines) and 
mechanisms of organising and financing sufficient cover to the entire population ’ and ‘access 
to comprehensive health services at reasonable cost without financial risk by protecting against 
catastrophic health expenditures to all people who need essential quality health services 
(prevention, promotion, treatment, rehabilitation and palliation)’. 
 
Lefran (2015) further emphasises that the role of health systems is the realisation of UHC. This 
means that health systems must be able to meet the demands of the population’s health needs 
and should incorporate scientific and technological know-how. Health is a complex issue that 
requires careful consideration of the society, economy, leadership and technical ability of the 
health sector.  
 




Smith (2013) discusses the effects of user charges and suggests that the correct 
implementation of a user charge system is crucial to the success of UHC. With reasoning that 
echoes the poverty cycle mechanism described by Evans et al. (2012), Smith (2013) proposes 
that healthcare costs affect citizens in two ways: Citizens who have access to a health facility 
suffer a loss of wealth; and those who have no access due to financial reasons suffer 
catastrophic health losses. The paper suggests that the purpose of any social health insurance 
programme is three-fold: To enhance access to health services when needed, to promote 
equity in society through a system of transferring finances from the rich to the poor, and to 
reduce financial risk burdens for accessing health services.  
 
The literature describes UHC as a complex concept that involves various factors in it s 
conceptualisation. The preceding literature study reveals four related views of UHC, depicted 
in Figure 2.1, namely UHC as the right to healthcare, UHC as access to healthcare, UHC as 
universal coverage and UHC as financial protection. Beyond the four dimensions identified 
for UHC, are two fundamental UHC principles of equity in healthcare. First is the principle of 
access to health services according to need, rather than the ability to pay. The second principle 
is that receiving healthcare is not linked to ability to pay, but rather that payment for 
healthcare should be linked to ability to pay (Wagstaff et al., 2016). 
 
From the literature review, four dimensions of UHC emerged along with key themes as 
descriptors—these are presented in Table 2.1. Table 2.2 in Section 2.1.5, shows the context-
specific factor that have an effect on healthcare and UHC and were highlighted in the 














Table 2.1: Dimensions and key themes obtained from semi-systematic review. 
UHC dimensions Core themes of dimension References 
 The right to healthcare   
Government and international 
obligation 
Ooms et al. (2015); Abiiro & De 
Allegri,(2015); Bisht (2013); Noronha 
(2013); O’Connell et al. (2014b); Lefran 
(2015) 
Equity Bisht (2013); McKee et al. (2013) 
Transparency and accountability Allotey et al. (2012); Fried et al. (2013) 
Healthcare for all Bisht (2013); Waitzkin (2015) 
Social solidarity and public 
intervention 
Abiiro & De Allegri (2015); Bisht (2013); 
McKee et al. (2013) 
Access to healthcare 
Quality 
Shrivastava et al. (2016); Borgonovi & 
Compagni (2013); Evans et al. (2012) 
Equity 
O’Connell et al. (2014b); Abiiro & De 
Allegri (2015); Shrivastava et al. (2016); 
Bisht (2013); Waitzkin (2015); Smith (2013) 
Appropriateness Abiiro & De Allegri (2015) 
Affordability Evans, Marten & Etienne (2012) 
Availability 
Abiiro & De Allegri (2015); Fried et al. 
(2013) 
Absence of systematic barriers 
Fried et al. (2013); Jindal (2014); Allotey et 
al. (2012) 
Health resource mobilisation 
Fried et al. (2013); Jindal (2014); Lefran 
(2015) 
Acceptability 
 Evans et al. (2012); Abiiro & De Allegri 
(2015) 
Benefits package Lefran (2015); Jindal (2014) 
Population coverage 
Equity 
Ooms et al. (2015); Allotey et al. (2012); Ng 
et al. (2014); Abiiro & De Allegri (2015) 
Effectiveness Lefran (2015) 
Quality Noronha (2013); O’Connell et al.  (2014b) 
Comprehensiveness Lefran (2015); Bisht (2013) 
Social solidarity Allotey et al. (2012); Lefran (2015) 
Financial protection 
Prepayment 
Abiiro & De Allegri (2015); McKee et al. 
(2013) Bisht (2013) 
Social solidarity 
Shrivastava, Shrivastava & Ramasamy 
(2016); McKee et al. (2013);   Evans et al.; 
Smith (2013); Allotey et al. (2012). 
Governance and international 
assistance 
Lefran (2015); Ooms et al. (2015); Bisht 
(2013); Fried et al. (2013). 
Catastrophic and 
impoverishment expenditure 
Abiiro & De Allegri (2015); McKee et al. 
(2013);  Evans et al. (2012) 
 
Having identified the dimensions that shape UHC, Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 are dedicated to 
discussing each of the four views of UHC depicted in Figure 2.1. In the remainder of the 
chapter, some of the contextual factors affecting UHC and complexities in health systems 
are discussed in relation to UHC, with the aim of identifying the key requirements to inform 
the selection of an appropriate methodology in Chapter 3.  
 








2.1.1 UHC as the right to healthcare 
The right to health is supported by international human rights treaties, the first being the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) formulated in 1946. The right to healthcare 
was further elaborated in two covenants: The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).  Together, these three treaties make up the International Bill of Rights. Progress 
towards functions in the International Covenant is monitored by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The committee comments on country 
progress reports and also issues general comments, which are then used to tackle specific 
issues and to communicate the contents of the covenant. The CESCR General Comment 14 is 
such an interpretation of the right to healthcare (Melorose, Perroy & Careas, 2011; Ooms et al., 
2015).   
 
Article 12 of the ICESCR advocates for the recognition of the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standards of physical and mental health (Potts, 2007; United Nations, 2012). In 
support of the covenant, regional and national constitutions prioritised the right to health 
(Potts, 2007). All countries have given formal consent to the ICESCR and they are therefore 
morally bound to ensuring “the highest attainable standard of health, encompassing medical 
care, access to safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, education, health related information 
and other underlying determinants of health” (Stuckler et al., 2010; Abiiro & De Allegri, 2015).  





The right to the highest attainable health is supported by four interrelated components, 
namely availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality (Potts, 2007). “Availability” refers 
to the physical presence of health facilities and the resources that facilitate the operation 
thereof, for example health workers and medicines. “Accessibility” denotes that everyone, 
regardless of their economic, physical, or social conditions, should be able to access health 
facilities and health information. “Acceptability” entails the respectful and ethical treatment 
of all people at health facilities (Potts, 2007). According to Mainz (2003), health service quality 
is defined as “the degree to which health services for individuals increase the likelihood of 
desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge”.  
 
The CESCR General Comment 14 highlights six key legal principles that tie in with the right 
to healthcare (Melorose et al., 2011). According to Sridhar, McKee, Ooms, Beiersmann, 
Friedman, Gouda, Hill & Jahn (2015) the key legal principles are minimum core obligation, 
progressive realisation, cost effectiveness, shared responsibility, participatory decision 
making and prioritising vulnerable or marginalised groups. Governments are obliged to offer 
at least basic levels of primary care, provide essential drugs and ensure the delivery thereof, 
ensure access to available health facilities, and have a national plan that addresses health 
concerns (Melorose et al., 2011; Sridhar et al., 2015). Governments are bound to the principle 
of progressive realisation of the health goal by making maximum progress with available 
resources. This requires non-regressive measures for the health goal (Backman et al., 2008; 
Melorose et al., 2011; Fried et al., 2013; Sridhar et al., 2015). It is important for governments to 
ensure that available resources are utilised in a cost-effective manner. Expensive curative 
health services should not be a priority, as they are accessed by a privileged minority. 
Therefore, primary and preventative care should be prioritised (Sridhar et al., 2015). Countries 
are also obliged to assist one another in attaining the right to healthcare. This is in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter and other human rights treaties including the ICESCR. 
Developed countries have a duty to assist developing countries in realising the right to 
healthcare, while developing countries are responsible for seeking international assistance 
and cooperation (Potts, 2007; Melorose et al., 2011; Sridhar et al., 2015). The right to healthcare 
is strengthened by the obligation of governments to practise inclusive decision making and 
implementation in health systems (Potts, 2007; Melorose et al., 2011; Sridhar et al., 2015).  
 




The right to healthcare is not restricted to the health system but seeks to place importance 
on public information, cultural diversity and education (Backman et al., 2008). The rights-
based UHC is dependent on strengthened public health systems, good governance, attention 
to gender, age and geographical location (Fried et al., 2013). It is the state’s obligation to create 
accountability mechanisms to promote fairness and equity in access to high-quality 
healthcare (Potts, 2007; Backman et al., 2008).  
2.1.2 UHC as access to healthcare 
The aim of UHC is to provide the whole population with access to essential health services 
including health promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care of high 
quality, without causing a financial burden (WHO, 2010c, 2013a). Quality can be viewed in 
different ways, ranging from well-trained medical staff, availability of well-functioning 
equipment and tools, sufficient infrastructure and appropriateness of care (WHO, 2013b; 
Abiiro & De Allegri, 2015).  
 
Access, therefore, is related to people’s use of health facilities and the economic consequences 
of doing so (Stuckler et al., 2010). People’s use of medical facilities does not only refer to their 
experience at the health facility, but also to other factors that can hinder their access to 
healthcare. With the assumption of financial insurance, other factors that can deprive 
members of society from accessing health facilities include: gender, geographic location, age, 
sex, cultural or social status, income, disability, legality, education and power relations in 
society (Stuckler et al., 2010; WHO, 2010c, 2012, 2013b).  
 
The above notion brings about three dimensions of access, namely physical accessibility, 
financial affordability and acceptability. “Physical accessibility” is the availability of quality 
health services at the time of need within reasonable reach. “Financial affordability” does not 
only refer to the ability of people to use health facilities without incurring financial hardship; 
it also includes indirect costs, such as transportation to health facilities (implying restricted 
healthcare access due to geographical location). “Acceptability” is based on how people 
perceive the health facility. Factors such as language, age, gender, ethnicity and religion can 
discourage people from using certain health facilities (Evans, Hsu & Boerma, 2013).  




2.1.3 UHC as universal coverage 
Universal coverage is total coverage of the population under the current health plan. This 
definition alone fails to define the exact services, who will be covered by the services, as well 
as which services are necessary for coverage (Stuckler et al., 2010). Coverage can be 
understood in terms of the rights-based approach to UHC, which includes the absence of 
systematic exclusions in the healthcare system.  
 
Universal coverage can also be understood in terms of two dimensions, namely an aggregate 
measure in relation to the population, as well as in terms of equity in accessing healthcare. 
Central to the notion of equity, is the concept of cross-subsidisation between the rich and the 
poor, and between the healthy and the sick. The healthy subsidise the sick, and the rich do 
likewise for the poor (Abiiro & De Allegri, 2015). Inequity refers to unnecessary differences 
that can be avoided and are regarded as unfair or unjust. In other words, the concept of equity 
refers to justice and is quantified by indicators such as inequalities and inequities (Ooms et 
al., 2015). Equity is a contextual concept that requires addressing factors that systematically 
restrict access to certain groups (Allotey et al., 2012).  
 
Equity in access can be achieved when individuals are able to obtain good-quality health 
services, without suffering financial hardship as a result (WHO, 2012). Coverage cannot be 
viewed in isolation, as it is related to additional factors that shape UHC. Equity in coverage, 
coverage in financial protection and coverage of essential healthcare services should, 
therefore, be accounted for when defining coverage (WHO & World Bank, 2014). Access and 
universal coverage are two interlinked concepts. Coverage builds up from access and without 
universal access, universal coverage cannot be achieved (Evans et al., 2013).  
 
The concept of “effective coverage” refers to patients who need health interventions receiving 
them, and, in turn, to the health intervention achieving its purpose (Ng et al., 2014; Wagstaff 
et al., 2016). In reality, most citizens of a majority of the countries in the world have certain 
degrees of coverage. The question of coverage is thus not limited to the universalism of the 
coverage, but extends to the degree of the coverage (Wagstaff et al., 2016).  




2.1.4 UHC as financial protection 
According to WHO (2010b), health financing systems under UHC should be designed to allow 
individuals who need it access to health services of sufficient quality, without leading to 
financial impoverishment and catastrophic expenditure. Financial protection therefore refers 
to protection against two aspects: (i) impoverishment, thus expenditure on healthcare that 
pushes households below the poverty line; and (ii) catastrophic expenditure, thus expenditure 
on healthcare, as a percentage of total household expenditure (in other words, above a set 
threshold). Impoverishment expenditure therefore refers to out-of-pocket expenditure that 
results in financial hardship, while catastrophic expenditure measures the exposure to 
financial risk (Wagstaff, Cotlear, Eozenou & Buisman 2015; Wagstaff et al., 2016).  
 
Abiiro & De Allegri (2015) suggest that effective universal financial protection is in place when 
the population is insured from: incurring out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, borrowing money 
and selling valuables to pay for healthcare, fear of delays in the hospital or of detentions, and 
non-payment of bills because of financial hardships. The financing of UHC plays a central role 
in moving towards UHC, as it is aimed at improving coverage and has intermediate objectives 
linked to it, namely: equity in access to healthcare, accountability, efficiency and transparency 
(Kutzin, 2013; World Health Organization & The World Bank, 2013). Extreme cases of financial 
exclusion were found in 33, mostly low-income countries. In these countries, out-of-pocket 
payments for healthcare represented 50% of the health expenditure in 2007 (WHO, 2010c). In 
order to reduce the risk of direct payments for healthcare, the WHO (2010b) suggests risk 
pooling and prepayment for healthcare.  
 




Figure 2.2. Three dimensions considered when moving towards UHC. 
 
Source: Reproduced from WHO (2010c) 
 
Figure 2.2 shows two cubes. The cube labelled “current pooled funds” represents the amount 
of pooled revenue in a hypothetical country (WHO, 2010c). The population axis represents 
the population coverage with both financial protection and needed services. The cost coverage 
axis is pivotal to financial protection, because the more pooled funds are available, the less 
direct payments are required from the population. Context is important when interpreting 
cost coverage and care packages as capacity to pay differs between countries. The service 
coverage axis refers to the entire population’s ability to acquire high-quality, necessary health 
services (Kutzin, 2013). The outer cube represents the goal for UHC: The bigger the “current 
pooled funds” cube, the closer to attaining full UHC. Apart from protection against financial 
risk in accessing healthcare, the financial dimension of UHC plays an important role in the 
quest for equity and social cohesion. Financial protection, therefore, entails “access to 
comprehensive health services at a reasonable cost without financial risk by protecting against 
catastrophic health expenditures to all people who need essential quality health services 
(prevention, promotion, treatment, rehabilitation and palliation)” (Lefran, 2015). In order to 
ensure sustainable financing systems for UHC, government participation in organising 








2.1.5 Contextual factors affecting UHC 
UHC is a complex policy subject that is aimed at improving access to quality health services 
without financially burdening the population (Boerma et al., 2014). This means that UHC is a 
complementary intervention to existing health systems, hence the starting point is the current 
situation of the health system in question. This starting point is influenced by the historical 
context of both the country and its health system (Thomson, 2010). In this research inquiry, 
the phrase “contextual factors” is used to describe factors outside the jurisdiction of the health 
system that have an influence on the attainment of UHC goals (WHO, 2016b). Bearing in mind 
that health systems are complex, and that they comprise of interconnected aspects namely 
financing, service delivery, human resources, governance, information, medicines and 
technologies (De Savigny & Adam 2009), the implementation of UHC is bound by these 
complexities, as it is an intervention on the health system itself. Contextual factors emanate 
from political, social, economic, cultural and environmental factors.  
 
Central to the contextual factors presented in Table 2.2, are the social determinants of health. 
According to the (WHO, 2017c) ‘The social determinants of health are the conditions in which 
people are born, grow, live, work and age. These circumstances are shaped by the distribution of 
money, power and resources at global, national and local levels’. Social determinants of health 
not only affects health status that results from the health provision but have far-reaching 
systemic effects on the healthcare system. It is important to note that the contextual factors 
identified and presented in Table 2.2 form part of and are related to the social determinants 
of health. UHC as a concept is highly dependent on social determinants of health. Some of 
the social determinants include: sanitation, work security, water, nutrition housing and 












Table 2.2. Contextual factors that effect  healthcare 
Contextual factor Link to UHC References 
Governance States are obliged to offer the best 
possible healthcare services relative 
to their context. This then requires 
stewardship, transparency, 
accountability and strategic 
planning. Two important 
considerations for governance are 
structure of public administration 
and public sector financial 
management. 
Ooms et al. (2015); Allotey et al. 
(2012); O’Connell, et al. (2014b); Ng 
et al. (2014); Borgonovi & Compagni 
(2013); McKee et al. (2013); Lefran 
(2015); Fried et al. (2013); Abiiro & De 
Allegri (2015); Jindal (2014); Evans et 
al. (2012) 
Education  Here, general education and health 
education are differentiated. Health 
education is one of the social 
determinants of health, as it 
fundamental to achieving the right 
to healthcare. Better education is 
associated to better salaries, which is 
associated with the ability to 
contribute. 
Ooms et al. (2015); O’Connell et al. 
(2014b); Lefran (2015);  Evans et al. 
(2012); Borgonovi & Compagni (2013) 
Employment  This also formed part of the social 
determinants of health. Employment 
is highly associated with the 
availability of health revenues. 
Ooms et al. (2015); Noronha (2013); 
Fried et al. (2013); McKee et al. 
(2013); Abiiro & De Allegri (2015); 
Borgonovi & Compagni (2013) 
Poverty  UHC can contribute to poverty 
reduction. This is because healthy 
people are able to work and earn a 
living. Ill health can further put 
people into poverty, as they cannot 
work for themselves. 
Shrivastava et al. (2016);  Evans et al. 
(2012); Fried et al. (2013); McKee et 
al. (2013); Borgonovi & Compagni 
(2013); Lefran (2015);(Bisht, 2013) 
Inequality  Inequalities manifest themselves in 
and outside the jurisdiction of the 
health system, and across different 
social aspects, such as age, gender, 
race, income and geography.  
Allotey et al. (2012) ; Noronha (2013); 
O’Connell et al. (2014b); Fried et al. 
(2013);  Evans et al. (2012); Ng et al. 
(2014); Shrivastava et al. (2016); 
Jindal (2014); McKee et al. (2013); 
Lefran (2015). 
Fiscal context It is not, however, the only 
important factor to consider when 
moving towards UHC-financing also 
plays a key role. Governments are 
faced with choices on which sectors 
to invest in. In that regard, it is 
important to create capacity, which 
increases the ability to spend on the 
population. This includes 
investments in social services, such 
as healthcare. 
Noronha (2013);  Evans et al. (2012); 
Smith (2013); McKee et al. (2013). 
 
2.2 Requirements specification  
Causality involves the interaction of elements in a system (causes or inputs), affecting the 
future state of the system itself and other elements in the system. The effects of the individual 




behaviours of the system elements on the overall system can cause properties that are 
dissimilar to the individual system elements. This is called emergence and it is central to the 
notion of complexity (Blackman, 2013; Ross, 2013). Complexity evolves from the 
interconnected nature and adaptability (from the ability to change and interconnect 
according to experience) of system components (De Savigny & Adam, 2009). This implies that 
one cannot predict the behaviour of a complex system by merely considering separate 
components of the system (Ross, 2013). The relationship between outputs and causal factors 
is not fixed, but contingent (Bennett & Elman, 2006), meaning that contextual considerations 
are important when assessing causality. Central to contingency is path dependence, and over 
the length of history there is space for different feasible paths. Contingency is due to the 
influence of random, unaccounted for factors that impact the causal narrative. Alternative 
paths, therefore, become increasingly less feasible due to the random effect of contingency. 
Once a path is chosen, all of the actors need to be tied to the chosen path (Bennett & Elman, 
2006). This calls for effective, robust causal inference tools to set the right priorities. 
Transition of the causal potential to an outcome is dependent on the context in which the 
causal conditions exist (Sager, 2012). Outcomes are often a result of multiple causal conditions 
operating in combination with one another to effect a change. (Blackman, 2013).  
2.2.1 Complexity in health systems 
This section describes complexities that the health system generally possesses. These 
complexities will inform the choice of the method to assess causality in UHC financing.  
 
The WHO defines a health system as a system that ‘consists of all organizations, people and 
actions whose primary intent is to promote, restore or maintain health, with the goals of 
improving health and health equity in ways that are responsive, financially fair, and make the 
best, or most efficient use of available resources’ (WHO, 2007; De Savigny & Adam, 2009).  
 
Systems, in general, are groups of elements that are interconnected and interrelated, and are 
coherently organised to achieve something useful (Blackman, 2013; Ross, 2013). The word 
“interrelate” is central to this definition, as it describes how system components exist in 
relation to one another and how these relationships are subject to other relationships in the 
system. As hinted in the formal definition of health systems, a health system is a complex 




system that comprises different building blocks centered on serving the population (WHO, 
2007).  
 
The concept of health system building blocks was briefly introduced in Chapter 1. Each of the 
building blocks, as defined by the WHO (2007) and De Savigny & Adam (2009), can be 
described in slightly more detail as follows: 
i. Service delivery: This includes the delivery of good-quality, safe and effective health 
interventions to those who need them with efficient use of available resources. 
ii. Health workforce: This building block entails the availability of a sufficient number of 
appropriate health workers. The workers are to be responsive, fair and efficient. 
iii. Health information: The production/capturing, distribution and use of dependable 
and well-timed information on health system indicators for performance and status 
monitoring. 
iv. Medical technologies: Medical products and subsequent technologies of good-quality, 
that are safe, efficient, scientifically sound, and available at cost-effective prices. 
Central to this is the efficient use of the medical products and technologies.  
v. Health financing: Appropriate health financing techniques, including revenue raising, 
pooling, purchasing and benefit design. The primary aim is to provide the population 
with the health services they need without causing impoverishment. 
vi. Leadership and governance: This strategic policy formulation is backed by regulations, 
attention to system design, coalition building, effective oversight, transparency and 
accountability.  
 
The health system building blocks can be viewed as sub-systems of the health system, which 
each also constitute a host of other systems (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001; Golden, Golden & 
Martin, 2004). These different sub-systems and sub-sub-systems interact to varying extents.  
 
There are different levels of health system interventions. This is dependent on which building 
block and level of the system an intervention is aiming to influence. An intervention can be 
targeted at a single hospital or at the entire regional healthcare system. (Craig, Dieppe, 
MacIntyre & Mitchie, 2008; Grand & Machines, 2008). System level interventions are those 
that target a whole building block or multiple blocks (De Savigny & Adam, 2009).  
 




Similar to other systems, the health system exhibits the following characteristics: 
i. Self-organisation (De Savigny & Adam, 2009): Together, the components of the 
health system determine the nature of the system. This is through the dynamism 
of the interactions between the system’s components. For example, weakness in the 
health information building block affects the financing block, because information 
is pivotal for health finance strategy, and ineffective leadership and governance 
affects all the other building blocks.  
ii. Constantly changing (The World Bank, 2007; De Savigny & Adam, 2009): Health 
systems are dynamic rather than static, developing different behaviors and reacting 
differently to interventions. The changing nature of health systems makes the 
evaluation and understanding of new health interventions challenging. An example 
is an intervention in the hospital sub-system that leads to a reduction in the length 
of stay for patients but that may, over time, result in increased re-admissions. 
iii. Overseen by feedback (De Savigny & Adam, 2009): Health systems are dependent 
on feedback loops for monitoring purposes, evaluation and designing new 
interventions. 
iv. Tightly-linked (De Savigny & Adam, 2009): The connectivity of sub-systems in the 
health system means that a change in one system has an effect on the others.  
v. Non-linearity (Amorim, Edwards & Adam, 2005; De Savigny & Adam, 2009): System 
component relationships are complex rather than simple, unpredictable and non-
linear.  
vi. Counter-intuitive and resistant to change (De Savigny & Adam, 2009): Solutions 
that seem to be obviously suitable might fail or have different effects, which is due 
to the complexity of the health system.   
vii. Historical dependency (De Savigny & Adam, 2009): There are differences in the 
short-term and long-term effects of health system interventions. A community- 
based insurance scheme might fail to generate enough funds for the short term, but 
becomes effective in the long term. Interventions are also dependent on the current 
state of the health system, which is determined by the history of the health system.  
 
UHC can be viewed as a system-level intervention that involves all of the health system 
building blocks and seeks to increase coverage of good-quality health services without 
impoverishment. It is also important to note that the bounds of health systems apply to UHC 




policy and UHC interventions must therefore take into account the above-mentioned 
complex system properties. 
 
In order to understand complex systems, one needs to approach the system in a holistic 
manner. Systems thinking supports the understanding of the complexities of systems that 
cannot be understood through the use of conventional scientific methods that apply linear 
and reductionist thinking (De Savigny & Adam, 2009). Linear approaches view a system as a 
chain of step-by-step processes in which the next step is dependent on the previous one. Here, 
reductionist thinking involves the division of a complex system into smaller, understandable 
components and then combining the components to gain a holistic view. Linear and 
reductionist thinking are similar in that they involve breaking a system down into its 
components. Linear thinking is capable of uprooting some of the indirect causal relationships, 
as it has an undertone of cause and effect. The sequential step-by-step process of linear 
thinking does not, however, uncover multiple and non-linear causal linkages in complex 
systems (Ross, 2013). UHC financing is governed by the complex nature of health systems, and 
therefore needs to be informed by methodologies that consider these complexities.  
2.2.2 Specifications for methodology considerations 
Creswell (2003) outlines considerations that are necessary for choosing a methodology, 
namely the nature of the research problem, the researcher’s personal experiences and the 
nature of the audience that the researcher is addressing. In this study, the focus is on the 
nature of the research problem. For the purposes of causal inference when moving towards 
UHC governed by the nature of health systems and UHC financing, it is proposed that the 
methodology of choice should be able to: 
i. Capture multiple causal linkages between factors that shape the UHC landscape and 
respective outputs (Bennett & Elman, 2006). 
ii. Be deeply embedded in the context (Kwamie & Nabyonga-Orem, 2016) for a richer 
understanding of causal linkages. 
iii. Offer a systematic approach that is repeatable and reproducible to instil confidence in 
the outcomes (Maxwell, 2004b; De Savigny & Adam, 2009; Blackman, 2013).  
iv. View causality from multiple perspectives (numbers and words) to enrich meaning 
(Ragin & Rubinson, 2009; Blackman, 2013). 




v. Identify necessary and sufficient conditions for UHC, which contributes to priority 
setting in UHC policymaking.  
vi. Be transparent and adhere to current knowledge. 
vii. Allow for counterfactual analysis. 
 
The above-mentioned attributes act as guidelines for the discussion on approaches to 
causality, hence they inform the selection of an appropriate methodology.  
2.3 Conclusion: Contextualization 
In this chapter, the definition of UHC was conceptualised and the contextual factors that are 
related to the attainment UHC were identified. The complexities of health systems and, in 
turn, UHC were also discussed. This discussion then led to the identification of considerations 
when choosing methodologies to assess causality for UHC. In the following chapter, the 
different research methods and their applicability to assessing causality in the context of UHC 
are discussed, with the aim of identifying an appropriate method. 




Chapter 3 METHODS FOR ESTABLISHING CAUSALITY 
In this chapter, the requirement specifications for the methodology considerations 
established in Chapter 2 are discussed in more detail. Firstly, the different research 
approaches are discussed, namely qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approach, with 
the aim of identifying the best approach in relation to the requirement specifications. 
Secondly, a decision is made that leads to mixed method approach being deemed as the most 
appropriate approach. Through further qualitative review, Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) is, however, deemed to be the most appropriate method. Finally, there is a description 
of the fit between QCA and the research at hand, followed by a description of QCA and its 
properties. 
3.1 Method selection 
Three approaches to social research, namely the qualitative, the quantitative and the mixed 
method approach will be discussed with a consideration of their properties in line with 
causality inference.  
 
Qualitative studies aim at describing and understanding, as opposed to explaining and 
predicting phenomena (Babbie & Mouton, 2014). Case-oriented studies (an approach to 
qualitative studies) allow for detailed examination of each case (countries in terms of UHC), 
highlighting the uniqueness of each case (context) (Babbie & Mouton, 2014). Qualitative 
studies are well-suited to theory development, but are not well equipped for theory testing 
(Ragin & Rubinson, 2009), starting without a hypothesis, and then developing a theory 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2014). This approach puts emphasis on keeping the natural setting at 
which events, processes and actions under study occur, which helps in interpreting causality 
(Maxwell, 2004a, 2004b; Babbie & Mouton, 2014). Qualitative studies take into account 
context (Maxwell, 2004a), which is integral to causality, because they holistically analyse the 
sequence of historical events (Bennett & Elman, 2006). Central to qualitative research is a 
process-oriented approach, which analyses the processes that connect events, leading to 
conclusions on causality between events (Bennett & Elman, 2006). The researcher has control 
over the study as the observer and interpreter. This differs from quantitative studies in which 




there is systematic control (Babbie & Mouton, 2014). Qualitative case studies, however, fail to 
answer questions regarding causations in complex phenomena, and findings can fail to 
provide useful conclusions (Sager, 2012; Blackman, 2013). According to Bennett & Elman 
(2006), case studies are unable to provide indications of how changes in magnitudes of causal 
factors will affect the outcomes. Rich qualitative case studies give insight into how events 
occur. They are, however, limited in the sense that they cannot answer why events happen. 
Therefore, they lack a systematic cross-case comparison process, which is essential in 
establishing causal relationships (Maxwell, 2004b; Blackman, 2013). 
 
Quantitative studies (variable-oriented) produce numerical evidence, but can be difficult to 
interpret for practical use and are normally used to test theories (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). 
Unlike qualitative methods, quantitative methods focus on counting and quantifying 
patterns, and utilise that as proxies for understanding behaviour. They analyse variables and 
their relationships with other variables, detached from their context. This differs from 
qualitative methods that take an exact approach, preserving the natural setting. The variance 
approach to causation involves controlled experiments where causal factors assume di fferent 
values while others are held constant and the effect on the outputs is evaluated (Maxwell, 
2004b). For statistical significance of findings, quantitative studies depend on numerous cases 
and are differentiated from case-oriented studies by a focus on variables (Ragin & Rubinson, 
2009), asking questions as to which effects variables have on outcomes (Della Porta, 2008). In 
cases where homogeneity prevails, there might be strong correlations between cases, and 
results can be generalised. In order to understand complex causality, in-depth knowledge of 
cases is, however, more important than generalisations extracted from those cases. Many 
quantitative studies only examine the linear effects of individual variables on outcomes, 
without taking into account the open nature of complex systems (Bennett & Elman, 2006; 
Blackman, 2013). A variable can have different effects on the outcome, depending on the 
combinations it forms with other variables. Furthermore, these effects can vary between 
different cases. Variable-based methods are unable to detect, or take into account, the 
determinants that are on levels that operate beyond individual variables, as they commonly 
operate with averages (Kelly, 2010; Blackman, 2013) . The causal power of a variable is only 
valid in the contexts/cases in which it is embodied (Blackman, 2013). 
 




Qualitative and quantitative methods can be used together as a mixed method approach to 
research. Greene, Caracelli & Graham (1989) define mixed methods as approaches that include 
at least one quantitative method for collecting numbers, and at least one qualitative method 
for collecting text information. Mixed methods therefore have the intention of combining the 
strengths of qualitative and quantitative approaches (Meissner, Creswell & Klassen, 2011).  
 
Creswell (2003), outlines three distinct strategies for mixing methods, These strategies 
generally have several variations. The first variation is a sequential approach in which the 
researcher starts with either a qualitative or a quantitative approach before using another 
method to elaborate on findings. The second is concurrent procedures in which both 
qualitative and quantitative data are collected at the same time during the study; the two 
paradigms are then integrated during the interpretation stage of the study. Thirdly, 
transformative procedures require the researcher to use theory to create a framework for 
topics of interest, outcomes or methods of data collection The information contained in this 
framework then allows the researcher to choose between a concurrent or sequential approach.  
 
Comparative methods are a form of mixed methods, since as they bridge the gap between 
qualitative and quantitative methods. At the same time, they are dedicated to studying 
connections between outcomes and conditions, or combinations of conditions. Comparative 
methods offer a distinctive approach to understanding social phenomena and sometimes they 
are referred to as small-N comparison studies (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). Similar to case-
oriented methods, comparative studies are deeply embedded in the cases at hand, and, similar 
to variable-oriented methods, comparative studies unearth relationships between variables. 
Fundamental to comparative studies, and what truly makes them distinct, is their view of 
social phenomena in terms of sets, and set theoretic relations. This allows comparative 
methods to ask questions related to necessity and sufficiency of causal conditions (variables) 
in relation to outcomes, which helps to unearth unlikely connections between causal 
conditions. In quantitative studies, researchers are initially equipped with sensitising 
concepts about the research topic and then use them to develop theory. In quantitative 
studies, however, the researcher starts with a clear hypothesis of how variations in a variable 
affects others (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). In contrast, comparative researchers generally start 
with limited knowledge of the cases, concepts and variables that might be relevant to  the 




study. Research questions in comparative studies are answered by scrutinising the fit between 
cases, evidence and ideas. This powers comparative studies with the ability to develop, test 
and revise theory. The two dominant and formalised comparative methods are Mill’s methods 
of agreement and difference, and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin & 
Rubinson, 2009). 
3.1.1 Mill’s methods 
Fundamentally, Mill’s methods are designed to identify the cause to a certain outcome, which 
is occasionally termed “cause and effect”. This is done by considering a number of cases 
(“instances”) where the outcome of interest is present or absent. These cases contain 
conditions (“circumstances”) that are either present or absent. Mill’s methods will 
subsequently identify the reasons why certain outcomes happen. There are five different Mill’s 
methods that are based on the same fundamental principles. They are: the method of 
agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the 
method of residues, and the method of concomitant variation. The methods can also be 
combined, depending on the aim of the research (Van Heulveln, 2000).  
 
Mill’s methods are based on the following assumptions. The first is that the considered 
conditions hold the cause for the outcome under investigation. The second assumption is that 
the cases under consideration operate in similar contextual environments, and can be 
compared to one another (Van Heulveln, 2000). The third assumption is that only one 
condition triggers the outcome of interest (Van Heulveln, 2000; Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). The 
third assumption indicates that Mill’s methods are not suitable for identifying multiple 
pathways to producing an outcome. Table 3.1, shows a hypothetical situation in which there 
are cases of food poisoning amongst students. It can be seen that Thabo and Linda are the 
two students who experienced food poisoning. There are four conditions namely pork, 
chicken, beef and beans. Each of the above-mentioned Mill’s methods, or combinations 
thereof, can be used to determine which type of food caused the food poisoning.  
 
 




Table 3.1. An example to illustrate the basic principles of Mill’s methods  
Student Food consumed Outcome 
 Pork Chicken Beef Beans 
Food 
poisoning? 
Thabo No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Linda Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  
Ben Yes  Yes  No  No  No  
Mazwi No  Yes  Yes  No  No  
Source: Reproduced from Van Heulveln (2000). 
3.1.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
QCA is a methodology that is rooted in comparative social science and it builds on Mill’s 
methods in two crucial ways: (i) QCA allows for the analysis of multiple conjectural causation; 
and (ii) it allows for counterfactual analysis (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). 
 
 QCA applies set theory to study the relationships between conditions and outcomes, posing 
the question: What conditions or combinations of conditions are sufficient to produce a certain 
outcome? Set theory, on the other hand, is a mathematical approach that grapples with the 
nature of relations (Kane, Lewis, Williams & Kahwati, 2014). QCA can also be understood as 
both a research approach and an analytic tool. The research approach aspect of QCA refers to 
model specification, data collection, case selection, and the re-conceptualisation of the 
conditions and the outcomes. The analytical tool involves the identification of empirical 
patterns in the data, which is usually done with the aid of a computer (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010).  
 
QCA serves to explain how specific outcomes are produced, implying discovering the 
combination of conditions that activate a specific output (Jordan, Gross, Javernick-Will & 
Garvin, 2011). This is based on the assumption that outcomes are produced through complex 
causality between causal factors. The concepts of necessity and sufficiency can be explained 
using set theory, in particular the concepts of subsets and supersets. A condition is necessary 
for an outcome if it has to be present for the outcome to occur. In other words, the outcome 
is a subset of the causal condition—a superset relationship between the causal condition and 
the outcome. A condition/combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome, if it can 
produce the outcome by itself—in other words, it forms a subset relationship with the 




outcome (Ford, Duncan & Ginter, 2005; Weiner, Jacobs, Minasian & Good, 2012; Devers et al., 
2013; Kane et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions, 
and their combinations. Condition X is a superset of outcome Y; therefore, it is a necessary 
condition. That, however, does not mean that X can guarantee the outcome Y, because a case 
can contain X but still be outside the set Y. On the other hand, conditions A, D, and the 
combination of B and C are subsets of the outcome Y. Therefore, either A, D or B and C are 
sufficient to produce outcome Y. Neither A, D or the combination of B and C are necessary to 
produce outcome Y, but they are sufficient. According to Jordan et al. (2011): “Necessary causal 
conditions must be present, but alone may not be sufficient, to yield an outcome. Similarly, 
sufficient causal conditions (or, again, combinations thereof) are able by themselves, but may 
not be necessary, to produce the outcome of interest.” In other words, a condition is sufficient 
to produce an outcome if the condition being true is enough for the outcome to be true. A 
condition is also necessary to produce an outcome if the outcome cannot be true unless the 
condition is true. 
Figure 3.1. Necessary and sufficient conditions and set theoretic relationships.  
 
Source:Reproduced from Kane et al. (2014).  
Table 3.2 shows the ability of both Mill’s methods and QCA to satisfy the methodological 
requirement attributes for informing causality when moving towards UHC, as defined in 
Section 3.1, is contrasted. While Mill’s methods certainly show promise in terms of its ability 




to perform analyses that would be required to understand causality related to UHC, it lacks 
QCA’s ability to capture multiple causal linkages and cannot perform counterfactual analyses 
(Ragin & Rubinson, 2009).  
Table 3.2 . Compatibility of Mill’s methods and QCA to inform causality for UHC . 
Attribute Mill’s methods QCA 
Captures multiple causal linkages No Yes 
Is deeply embedded in the context Yes Yes 
Offers a systematic repeatable approach Yes Yes 
Views causality from multiple perspectives Yes Yes 
Identifies necessary and sufficient condition Yes Yes 
Is transparent and adheres to current knowledge Yes Yes 
Allows for counterfactual analysis  No Yes 
 
3.2 Compatibility of QCA and UHC  
As indicated Section 2.2.1, informing UHC requires methodologies that are capable of 
addressing the complexities and context dependency of the concept. In this section, the 
concord of QCA properties and UHC for the purposes of informing UHC financing causality-
related policies are discussed. The list of seven attributes for selecting methods to assess 
causality in complex systems, referred to in this section, was introduced in Section 2.2.1. 
 
QCA has the ability to capture multiple causal linkages by modelling equifinality and 
conjectural causation. Equifinality refers to the ability to identify more than a single causal 
link to an outcome. In some instances, it also refers to the unavailability of an outcome (Kane 
et al., 2014). Different combinations of causal conditions can lead to the same outcome 
(Rihoux, 2006), which implies that a causal linkage can be an alternative to an outcome 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). Many statistical methods, including both additive and linear 
regression models, have a strictly unifinal perspective on causality and can therefore not 
identify cases of equifinal causality (Kane et al., 2014). As indicated, health systems comprise 
different components, namely governance, information, financing, service delivery, human 
resources, medicines and technology. These systems are interconnected and interrelated (De 
Savigny & Adam, 2009). Different combinations of the systems can be formed in order to 
achieve UHC outputs, such as utilisation according to need, quality, and financial protection 
(WHO, 2016b). There is a need to study different causal pathways and mechanisms that may 




enable or hinder UHC (O’Connell et al., 2014b). A causal pathway is a process which brings 
about an outcome (Gold, Kennedy, Connell & Kawachi, 2002). 
 
QCA identifies conjunctural causation. Certain conditions may need to exist in combination 
with other conditions in order to exert an effect on the outcome. In fact, it is most often the 
case that outcomes are produced by combinations of conditions (Rihoux, 2006; Kane et al., 
2014). Health system components are tightly linked, implying that a change in a one 
component can prompt changes in sub-systems that are interlinked with it. UHC as a health 
system intervention requires systematic frameworks that consider these possible complex 
system interactions to identify positive and negative effects of components (De Savigny & 
Adam, 2009).  
 
QCA implies asymmetrical relationships between causal conditions and outcomes. This 
means that pathways to achieving and not achieving an outcome differ (Kane et al., 2014). 
This also implies that a causal condition can have a different effect on an outcome in a 
different context (Rihoux, 2006). QCA follows a generative approach to complex causality, 
and as a result a constant reference to QCA appears in the cases under study. This allows QCA 
to be deeply rooted in the context of the cases under study, taking into account the history 
and other important features of the context. With QCA, relationships between causal factors 
are not fixed but contingent (Sager, 2012). Blackman (2013) also states that QCA is well suited 
for bringing contextualised causal process explanations, uprooting reasons as to why 
interventions work or do not work in different contexts. UHC is a policy subject that does not 
have a universal formula for success. Rather, a country’s path is informed by context (Vega, 
2013), implying that contextual knowledge and understanding are key to the success of UHC. 
Boerma et al. (2014) state that UHC is dynamic and contingent, and that history plays a role 
in the path that a country takes.  
 
QCA allows for the use of multiple perspectives (in other words, numbers and words) for 
analysis. The unavailability of data for certain causal variables of health systems poses 
problems for analysis in variable-oriented methods. For example, measures such as 
transparency, accountability, cultural values and beliefs with regards to health and health-
seeking behaviour (Bradley, Curry & Devers, 2007) are not easily quantified. Yet, they could 




be represented in terms of their absence or presence using the csQCA variant (Bentahar & 
Cameron, 2015).  
 
Theoretical and deep empirical knowledge of the field under study plays a crucial role in QCA 
studies. This is evident from the various QCA decision-making processes (such a case and 
condition selection) that the researcher has to go through (Sager, 2012). This allows QCA to 
be rooted in the common standards of the health system. The method goes beyond basing 
policy practice on quantitative evidence alone. It also encompasses incorporating a mix of 
complex interpretations, opinions, evaluations and factual statements. This is achieved 
through the ability to identify the involved mechanisms using practical descriptors that can 
facilitate decision making (Blackman, 2013). 
 
QCA is a type of comparative method and it possesses the ability to test theories in a 
transparent and systematic fashion based on actual existing cases, not depending solely on 
variables (Blackman, 2013). By employing a counterfactual analysis, QCA is able to provide an 
in-depth analysis of relationships between causal factors (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009).  
 
Finally, QCA enables the identification of what is necessary and what is sufficient (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2010). This is particularly useful for a policy intervention such as UHC, as it 
links directly to priority setting (Blackman, 2013).  
 
However, QCA also has certain drawbacks and limitations. Firstly, the process of choosing 
cases and conditions for application in the QCA model comes with some downsides. Empirical 
knowledge and the discretion of the researcher, as well as several other aspects of the process,  
are key to this aspect of QCA. For example, omission of important variables may lead to the 
researcher drawing inaccurate conclusions (Jordan et al., 2011; Sehring, 2013). Secondly, QCA 
lacks a temporal dimension in the sense that analysis can only be done at one particular point 
in time, which results in a static comparison. This concern can, however, be addressed to 
some extent by a deep, qualitative analysis of the cases at hand (Jordan et al., 2011). Thirdly, 
the most popular variant, csQCA, has been criticised for the dichotomisation of data to zeros 
and ones, which might result in loss of relevant information. The dichotomisation process 
itself requires the researcher to clearly define thresholds for the absence or presence of 




conditions and outcomes (Kane et al., 2014). The validity of this type of QCA mostly relies on 
the transparency of the researcher during the dichotomisation process, as biases may result 
in unreliable results. Other QCA variants can be used: For example, fsQCA has the ability to 
take natural values, although the results from this variant are often difficult to analyse since 
they do not offer the decisiveness that is offered by csQCA (Blackman, 2013). In the fourth 
place, the results of the QCA analysis alone cannot be used as causality inference evidence; it 
is up to the researcher to possess a deep understanding of the cases under study in order to 
make plausible causality conclusions (Jordan et al., 2011). 
3.2.1 Variants of QCA 
As suggested in the previous section, QCA exists in three variations namely crisp-set QCA 
(csQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) and multi-value QCA (mvQCA). The first variant of QCA 
was the csQCA, which requires the conversion of qualitative data into binary variables with a 
“1” representing high presence and “0” depicting low presence (Jordan et al., 2011). As discussed 
previously, this variant has been critiqued for its susceptibility to data loss, as it is only capable 
of presenting total availability and unavailability. An extension of csQCA is the mvQCA, 
which allows for multi-value conditions where scores are represented by multiple natural, 
discrete numbers (0, 1, 2, 3…) (Haesebrouck, 2016), where each discrete value is dichotomous 
(Jordan et al., 2011). An example is a traffic light where “0” can be allocated to red, “1” to orange 
and “2” to green (Haesebrouck, 2016). 
 
The fsQCA variant allows for the representation of continuous variables between “0” and “1” 
(Jordan et al., 2011). fsQCA is therefore not based on binary algebra but on fuzzy algebra 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). One can choose a continuous representation or define anchor 
points, for example “0” meaning completely eliminated, 0.33 meaning 33% in the set and “1” 
depicting full-set membership. The selection of these anchor points is entirely dependent on 
the research in context, and should be motivated based on theory and cases. The fact that 
fsQCA keeps the general form of the data makes interpretation of the data more complex 
(Kane et al., 2014). Table 3.3 presents a summary of the different QCA variants and their 
properties. 
 




Table 3.3. Summary of the QCA variants. 
QCA Variant Variable range Useful 
csQCA Dichotomous Variables under research can be approximated in 
terms of binary values. 
mvQCA Multichotomous Conditions under study can be divided into a small  
number of discrete options 
fsQCA Continuous When the data is sensitive and each variable is 
assigned along a continuous range. 
Source: Adopted from Jordan et al. ( 2011). 
3.2.2 The QCA process 
Figure 3.2 shows the QCA research process, three major categories, namely design, 
conditioning, and analysis, can be seen. Before conducting a QCA study, a key consideration 
is to identify whether QCA is appropriate for the research question. Research questions that 
can be answered by QCA should put emphasis on identifying combinations of conditions 
leading to an outcome. Another up-front consideration is the unit of analysis of the research. 
This involves defining the case boundaries, examples of units of analyses are countries, regions 
or companies (Devers et al., 2013).  
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A brief explanation of the steps to conducting QCA: 
i. Identification of outcomes: This is the selection of the outcome(s) to be examined in 
the study. These can be assigned to dichotomous, multichotomous or continuous 
variables depending on the QCA variant applicable to the study (Jordan et al., 2011). 
ii. Selection of causal conditions: This is a very important part of QCA and it may be an 
iterative process that should be based on theory (Jordan et al., 2011). The ideal number 
of conditions is not set for QCA studies, and is mostly discovered through trial and 
error (Jordan et al., 2011). One should aim for as few causal conditions as possible, since 
a high number of conditions increase the complexity. This complexity is as a result of 
the manner in which the QCA method assesses every combination available and is 
dependent on the QCA variant. For csQCA, the complexity of the model increases by 
2k, where “k” is the number of conditions. For example, if three conditions were 
selected, a total of eight possible  combinations can be established (Kane et al., 2014). 
The number of cases and conditions should always be balanced. For intermediate-N 
practice (16-100 cases ), approximately 6-7 conditions can be used (Gross, 2010; Kane 
et al., 2014).Too many conditions may result in limited diversity, were the theoretically 
available number of combinations of conditions are more than the available 
combinations from the number of cases being evaluated (Devers, Lalleman, Burton, 
Kahwati, McCall & Zuckerman, 2013; Kane et al., 2014). There are six strategies that can 
be used to identify causal conditions, (Gross, 2010; Jordan et al., 2011). They are: 
a. The comprehensive approach. An iterative process that involves all possible 
factors that are available from existing theory. This process is often iterative. 
b. The perspective approach. Conditions representing two to three theories are 
verified using the same model. 
c. The significance approach. Conditions are chosen based on their significance. 
d. The second look approach. The researcher includes conditions that were rejected 
in a previous analysis. 




e. The conjectural approach. Conditions are selected based on their interactions 
with other theories. This suggests possible causal combinations for a certain 
outcome. 
f. The inductive approach. Conditions are selected in terms of case knowledge 
rather than existing theories. 
g. Selecting cases. Case studies with heterogeneity of conditions and outcomes allow 
for the most comprehensive explanation of phenomena. Two aspects to consider 
are the number and types of cases to be chosen. Cases that exhibit certain 
conditions and outcomes can be chosen. This does not create bias during the QCA 
process, since the method is not probabilistic, which means there is no 
consideration of the number of cases that exhibit certain characteristics. The 
number of cases is dependent on the QCA variant to be used. The QCA algorithm 
fills the data table with hypothetical cases (“logical remainders”), with the aim of 
representing unavailable variable combinations. A large number of possible 
conditions imply a larger number of cases, real or hypothetical. The problem of 
limited diversity manifests when the number of logical combinations surpasses the 
number of cases, implying a lack of richness in the data. This can be avoided by 
applying a limit in the ratio between cases and causal conditions. Case knowledge 
is fundamental to QCA studies. Therefore the researcher should always choose a 
number that sufficient knowledge could feasibly be gathered on, as the researcher 
needs to be able to detect any contextual sensitivity and crucial causal conditions 
in creating causal meaning (Gross, 2010). 
h. Populate raw data table. Raw data about the conditions and the cases is collected 
and compiled in a format that is suitable for QCA analysis. Key considerations in 
this step are the unit of analysis of the study and the QCA variant to be used (Devers 
et al., 2013).  
iii. Assigning values to conditions and outcomes. Expert knowledge (empirical or 
theoretical) is required in order to calibrate conditions and outcome scores for QCA, 
depending on the variant the researcher uses. A number of techniques are available for 
the purposes of creating anchor points in the data. For qualitative conditions, the 




researcher can draw cut-off points from literature-based knowledge of the context 
under study. Statistical approaches can be used for numerical data (Kane et al. 2014). 
This is regarded as the most time-consuming stage of the QCA process and, as 
discussed previously in this section, this step requires a high degree of transparency in 
order for the validity of the QCA findings to be evaluated (Jordan et al. 2011).  
 
iv. Creating truth table. Once thresholds are set, the truth table can be set up. 
v. Internal validity testing. QCA involves a series of decisions that require the 
researcher to be transparent in the determination of causal conditions, outcomes, 
cases, raw data sources, thresholds, the truth table and the interpretation of results, 
amongst others. These decisions include: 
a. Case diversity. The researcher should ensure diversity of cases to be used in the 
study.  It is therefore necessary to re-examine the case selection process. The 
existence of too many cases that exhibit similar configurations demonstrates lack 
of case diversity (Jordan et al., 2011). 
b. Contradictory configurations. These are configurations with the same causal 
conditions but different outcomes. Methods are available to fix these 
contradictions and if the methods do not work, the researcher can remove the 
contradicting configurations from the truth table or use a different QCA variant 
(Jordan et al., 2011). 
c. Inter-rater reliability. This assesses the clarity of the thresholds used in setting 
up the truth table. This also applies to qualitative data: the researcher has to be 
clear on the rules for the conversion of qualitative data into values. 
vi. Output, analysis and interpretation. Once the truth table has been reviewed, QCA 
software such as fsQCA, R or Tosmana is used to do the logical reduction (outcome by 
outcome), focussing on unique configurations rather than on the number of cases that 
exhibit the same configurations. The result is a formula describing the causal pathways 
that lead to outcomes, which is expressed in terms of Boolean algebra (Jordan et al., 
2011; Kane et al., 2014). 




vii. Assessment. Measures are calculated to determine and evaluate QCA outputs. The 
main measures for assessment are: 
a. Consistency. This measures the degree to which a causal condition is a subset of 
the outcome. In other words, it is the percentage of cases that contain the causal 
condition that reveals the outcome. 
b. Coverage. Coverage assesses relevance in the sense that it determines the 
importance of a combination of causes to produce the outcome (Gross, 2010). 
3.3 Conclusion: Methods and causality 
In this chapter, the different research approaches in terms of their properties were discussed, 
with the aim of identifying the most suitable method for the requirements described in 
Chapter 2. QCA, in particular the csQCA variant, was deemed the appropriate method for the 
purposes of causality assessment in UHC financing. Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are based on the QCA 
process highlighted in this chapter. 
 




Chapter 4  THE UHC LANDSCAPE 
In this chapter, the focus is on identifying the outcome and input variables that can be used 
in the study. In Figure 4.1, the QCA steps of defining outcomes and selecting conditions (the 
input variables) are highlighted. Furthermore, in Figure 4.2, the UHC goals that are 
considered in this research inquiry are utilisation/need, quality and financial protection. UHC 
goals therefore represent outcomes for QCA.  The input variables (causal conditions), 
constitute the health financial arrangements (as outlined in Figure 4.2) as well as contextual 
factors. Contextual factors are not part of the health system, but have an influence in attaining 
the goals of UHC. In line with the QCA process, the chapter focuses on the definition of 
outcomes and selection of conditions. The set of indicators presented at the end of each of 
the sections in this chapter, are the indicators selected to represent each condition (outcomes 
conditions and causal conditions) and are for the purposes of QCA analysis. 
Figure 4.1. The QCA flow diagram, which highlights the processes that are addressed 
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4.1 Methodology: Variable selection 
The first section of this chapter comprises a discussion of the three UHC goals with the aim 
of determining the indicators that describe each of these goals and ultimately selecting the 
indicators that will be used to represent these outcomes as variables in the QCA analysis.  
The second section of this chapter comprises a discussion of health financing arrangements 
(revenue raising, pooling, purchasing and benefits design) with the aim of identifying 
indicators that characterise each of these aspects of UHC structuring and delivery. This is 
followed by a discussion of various contextual factors that could be expected to influence 
UHC, such as the fiscal conditions in a country, and the levels of education and employment. 
These contextual factors are discussed briefly in Chapter 2 and specified in Table 2.2 in Section 
2.1.5 of the same chapter. Again, the aim is to identify indicators that characterise each of 
these contextual factors. The section concludes with a motivation for the selection of a set of 
indicators to be used as causal condition variables in the QCA analysis. The key considerations 
for selecting indicators include the conceptual meaning of the construct and the 
comprehensiveness of the indicators. The conceptual meaning takes into account the study’s 
unit of analysis (the unit of analysis for this study is country level). The comprehensiveness 
seeks to eliminate indicators of which the scope is limited to specific groups of countries or 
individual countries. This is in line with one of the QCA requirements that state that cases 
need to be as diverse as possible. Finally, the validity of the selected indicators was confirmed 

















Figure 4.2. UHC goals and objectives that are influenced by health financing. 
 
Source: Reproduced from WHO (2016b). 
4.2 Identification of outcomes 
In this section, the three UHC goals of utilisation/need, quality of care and financial 
protection are defined and discussed with the aim of identifying comprehensive sets of 
indicators that measure each goal/construct. These UHC goals are the output conditions for 
QCA application. 
4.2.1 Utilisation/need (equity in use of services) 
UHC, in part, refers to the use of health services according to need. Equity in the use of health 
services is closely related to the access dimension of UHC, as access refers to the use of health 
services according to need. Health status, distribution of resources, expenditures, utilisation 
and access can be used to assess equity in health systems (Waters, 2000). The challenge is to 
determine the use in relation to need across socio-economic groups of the population (WHO, 
2016b), although need can be measured in terms of self-reported morbidity (Waters, 2000).  
There are analytic tools available to assess the utilisation rates of health services from 
household survey data (WHO, 2016b). An example is O’Donnell, van Doorslaer,Somanathan, 
Adhikari, Harbianto, Garg, Hanvoravingchai, Huq, Karan, Leung, Ng, Pande, Tin, 




Tisayaticom, Trisnantoro, Zhang & Zhao (2007), who conducted research to determine the 
dominance of concentration curves and the Lorenz curves on assessing the equity in health 
service usage across 11 Asian countries. The results obtained using these tools are presented 
as either a percentage of health service utilisation or as concentration indexes. Concentration 
curves plot shares of a health system variable against quintiles divided according to household 
income (O’Donnell, Doorslaer, Wagstaff & Lindelow, 2008).  
O’Donnell et al. (2008) demonstrate different analytical methods that are used to assess 
health equity in four different variables. The four focal variables that define health equity are: 
health outcomes, utilisation, subsidies received from using health services, and the types of 
payments that populations use to obtain healthcare (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The ADePT 
software from the World Bank performs the distributional analysis of survey data from 
households, producing charts and tables for analysis. Several modules for ADePT are available 
and include modules applied in inequality, labour, social protection, gender and health. 
ADePT Health focuses on analysis of health outcomes and financing. The health outcomes 
module of the software is used in the analysis of inequalities in health, health subsides and 
patterns in healthcare utilisation in relation to socio-economic status. Analysis is done using 
the ADePT summary of inequalities using the concentration index, which is derived from 
concentration curves. As shown in Figure 4.3, the concentration curves are obtained by 
plotting the x-axis with the ascending order of cumulative living standards percentage 
rankings. The y-axis is the cumulative percentage of the rate of specific healthcare utilisation, 
for example inpatient care (Wagstaff, Bilger, Sajaia & Lokshin, 2011). There are extremes 
according to which the benefits of a health system can be distributed: Pro-rich utilisation, 
which represents a positive concentration index (maximum of positive 1), and pro-poor 
utilisation that is signified by a negative concentration index (maximum of negative 1). It is 
generally assumed that resource utilisation should be pro-poor to achieve equity (WHO, 
2016b). Figure 4.3, shows an example of a concentration curve. The line of equality in Figure 
4.3, shows healthcare utilisation that is not according to living standards (equity in use). If the 
concentration curve is below the equality line, it means that utilisation is pro-rich. On the 
other hand, if the concentration curve is above the equity line, it represents pro-poor 
utilisation. The concentration index is subsequently calculated as twice the area between the 
line of equity and the concentration curve (Wagstaff et al., 2011). 
 




Figure 4.3. An example of a concentration curve 
 
 
                                                        Source: Reproduced from Wagstaff et al. (2011). 
 
4.2.1.1 Discussion: Indicators of utilisation/need 
The global list of health indicators that are available to date (WHO, 2015b) does not cover the 
equity dimension of utilisation of health resources. Table A-1 in Appendix A shows access to 
care indicators from the global list of health indicators to date. These indicators do not 
address equity in access, since they only focus on the aggregate measure of access without 
addressing access according to different socio-economic groups. According to the WHO 
(2016b), the masking effect of aggregate data must be taken into account when dealing with 
equity. Data that relate to changes in socio-economic groups should also be taken into 
account.  
For this reason, indicators from other international organisations were considered. The World 
Bank and the WHO present the most international equity monitoring and reporting. The first 
set of indicators that were considered was the Health Equity Monitor (HEM) from the WHO. 
The HEM indicators are summarised in Table A-2 in Appendix A. The HEM forms part of the 
Global Health Observatory (GHO), which is the dominant statistics source of the WHO. The 
aim of HEM is to promote and enhance global health equity monitoring for low- to-middle-
income countries in particular. The HEM contains data that are presented with regards to 




population subgroups (which include education, economic status, place of residence, sex and 
subnational regions) in relation to specific health topics. At present, the HEM covers 34 
indicators relating to reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health, which are 
abbreviated as (RMNCH). Data for the HEM are collected from secondary data that are 
collected from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys (MICS) from the 94 countries that are included in the HEM. For the sake of 
comparability between different countries, the HEM only makes use of data from DHS and 
MICS. This is a limitation, because a number of countries do not partake in these surveys, 
especially upper-middle and high-income countries (Hosseinpoor et al., 2016).  
The second set of indicators that were considered is the Health Equity and Financial 
Protection datasheets from the World Bank. These data sheets assess the levels of equity and 
financial protection (collectively for the dimensions mentioned below) with specific attention 
to low- and middle-income countries. Progressiveness of healthcare financing, health 
inequalities, healthcare utilisation, health behaviour, financial protection and benefit 
incidence analysis are amongst the topics covered.  For these purposes, the World Bank uses 
the ADePT software, deriving data from DHS, MICS, World Health Surveys (WHS), Living 
Standards and Measurement Surveys (LSMS), as well as household data. Similar to the 
limitations of the HEM, the Health Equity and Financial Protection datasheets are limited to 
low-to-middle-income countries (World Bank, 2012a). This is a major limitation in case 
selection for QCA purposes, since cases are required to be diverse (Devers et al., 2013). 
Indicators considered by the World Bank for health equity are summarised in Table A-3 in 
Appendix A. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses a number of 
indicators for access to healthcare, although some of the indicators do not reflect inequalities 
in population subgroups. These indicators are summarised in Table A-4 in Appendix A. OECD 
indicators that reflect population subgroups fall under indicators of geographic distribution 
of doctors, inequalities in doctor consultants, inequalities in cancer screening, and 
inequalities in dentist consultations (OECD, 2013). With regards to the geographical 
distribution of doctors, the OECD only considers physical density of doctors and the 
comparison in density between urban and rural areas (OECD, 2015). For doctor and dentist 
consultations, the OECD uses income quintiles to measure equity in different dimensions of 
equity (OECD, 2013). For cancer screening, the OECD measures cancer screening relative to 




income and educational levels. These indicators, however, do not adequately address the 
equity in use of health resources and are limited to the 35 OECD member countries.  
Due to the lack of commonly agreed upon indicators for the measurement of equity in the use 
of health services, health service coverage1 was considered. Service coverage comprises two 
domains, mainly prevention and treatment (Wagstaff et al., 2016). In their effort to create an 
index to measure progress towards UHC, Wagstaff, Cotlear, Eozenou & Buisman (2015) 
proposed the indicators summarised in Table 4.1 for the measurement of service coverage 
using the themes of prevention and treatment.  
4.2.1.2 Variable selection: Indicators of utilisation/need 
Due to the lack of comprehensive indicators that measure utilisation/need, service coverage 
indicators were considered (as seen in Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1. Indicators for service coverage. 
Category Indicator 
Prevention  
Antenatal care (4+ visits). 
Child full immunization. 
Breast cancer screening (woman aged 40-49). 
Cervical cancer screening (woman aged 18-49). 
Treatment 
Skilled birth attendant at delivery. 
Child treated for acute respiratory infection. 
Child treated for diarrhea. 
Inpatient admission in the last year. 
Source: Adapted from Wagstaff et al. (2015). 
4.2.2 Quality of care 
“Health” is a result of various interdependent factors that include healthcare. This implies that 
health is a result of both healthcare and non-healthcare determinants. Some of the non-
healthcare determinants of health include lifestyle, environment, and human biology.  
 
According to Mainz (2003), health service quality is defined as “the degree to which health 
services for individuals increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent 
with current professional knowledge”. The definition does not provide guidelines for 
establishing health quality, therefore quality is assessed in terms of safety, efficiency, patient 
                                                 
1 Service coverage measures access to healthcare regardless of the ability to pay—rather, according to need 
(Wagstaff et al., 2015). 




centeredness, timeliness, accessibility and equity of health interventions. It is important to 
note that the efficiency and equity dimensions of quality of care are not  attributed to 
individual care, but to quality of care for populations (Campbell, Rowland & Buetow, 2000).  
 
Different views of quality of healthcare exist, depending on the stakeholders in the health 
system. An example is the view of the national health system, which takes interest in the 
aggregate outcomes of the health system rather than individual results (Campbell et al., 2002). 
Quality of care can be viewed on individual and social levels, with the social-level quality of 
care being an aggregate of individual quality of care. Quality can be assessed with a view on 
the health system structure, processes or outcomes depending on the stakeholders and their 
objectives for quality assessment. For example, it can be considered from the viewpoint of 
health professionals, managers and patients. The health professionals are concerned with 
health outcomes, efficiency and abiding to professional standards. Managers view quality of 
care in terms of patient satisfaction, efficiency, accessibility of care and outcomes. Lastly, 
patients are concerned with clinical performance, attitude and the level of communication 
(Campbell, et al., 2000; Campbell, Braspenning, Hutchinson & Marshall, 2002).  
 
Structure refers to the organisational characteristics that influence the ability of a health 
system to deliver for society (Mainz, 2003). Two domains form part of quality of care, namely 
staff and physical characteristics. The structural elements of quality of care facilitate 
opportunities for patients to receive quality care and do not necessarily guarantee it  
(Campbell et al., 2002). The indicators for the structural dimension of healthcare quality 
include physical and geographical access and effectiveness (Campbell et al., 2002), as well as 
availability of: required staff, essential drugs, policies related to care and functional equipment 
(WHO, 2016b).  
  
The process denotes the interaction of health system users within the structure of the health 
system, and is divided into clinical and inter-personal interactions, as relating to the extent of 
appropriateness of care to patients. Interpersonal care describes the interaction between the 
healthcare professionals and the patients (Campbell et al., 2002). Clinical care refers to the 
application of standard health procedures to the patients by the health professionals and the 
extent to which set healthcare targets are achieved (Campbell et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 
2002; Mainz, 2003).  





Outcomes are the consequences of healthcare, which is the change in health status as a result 
of acquiring healthcare. The indicators for health outcomes are consequences of the structure 
of the health system, as well as the healthcare provision and/or diagnostic process (Campbell 
et al., 2000). This implies that both the structure and the process have an effect on the quality 
outcomes of a health intervention or health system. An example of a manifestation of this is 
can be observed in the case of cervical cancer. The unavailability of screening services (a 
structural issue) or misreading a diagnosis report (a process problem), can both affect the 
quality of the intervention. The quality outcome constitutes both health status and use 
evaluation. Indicators for the quality outcome are of more interest to healthcare consumers 
and purchasers of care (Campbell et al., 2000). According to Campbell et al. (2002), the main 
objective of the care that is given to the patients is expressed in the form of outcome 
indicators, which measure patient satisfaction, morbidity, mortality, quality of life and health 
status.  
4.2.2.1 Discussion: Quality of care 
Quality of care measurement involves the use of available health system data with the aim of 
evaluating the performance of the health system. As highlighted, it is important to have a 
clear goal of quality attributes to be measured, as they can vary depending on the purpose of 
the health intervention and the stakeholder in question. Arah, Westert, Hurst & Klazinga 
(2006), distinguish between healthcare performance and health performance. The former 
refers to measurements related to the healthcare system, without taking into account the non-
health care system determinants of health. Health services are deliberate actions that are 
aimed at improving health potential, and the actions involve combinations of professional 
inputs, knowledge and technologies (Papanicolas & Smith, 2013). On the other hand, 
healthcare performance takes a broader perspective of health by taking into account non-
healthcare, healthcare and contextual determinants of health. Healthcare systems are 
designed to serve the population. With that perspective in mind, the value of healthcare can 
be defined in terms of health outcomes achieved in relation to costs, implying that value has 
an efficiency connotation to it. Although process measures are useful for the internal strategy 
of care providers, they cannot substitute outcome measures. Health outcome measures 
include both long- and short-term health (Porter, 2010). Porter (2010), describes a three-tiered 
hierarchy for health outcomes. The first tier represents the health status achieved as a 




consequence of care, which can be attributed to survival and level of health recovery. The 
second tier involves outcomes in relation to the recovery process, which is in the form of the 
time taken to recover, as well as unwanted consequences of care. The third and final tier 
represents the sustainability of health after receiving care. 
 
An important point to note is that the care for a medical condition involves varied layers. Each 
intervention is dependent on the effectiveness of the other interventions (Porter, 2010; 
Papanicolas & Smith, 2013). Examples include diabetes, which is a disease that involves care 
for conditions such as vascular disease, retinal disease and hypertension (Porter & Teisberg 
(2004), and stroke interventions, which include, general practitioner (GP) services, 
ambulance services, acute interventions, homecare, hospital stroke units and rehabilitation 
(Porter & Teisberg, 2004).  
 
As expected, there are various healthcare quality indicators from different organisations. In 
order to gain perspective, different indicators that reputable health organisations such as the 
OECD, WHO and the Commonwealth fund report on were evaluated as a starting point. 
These indicators differ significantly and for this reason, the global reference list of 100 core 
health indicators was singled out for more detailed consideration (WHO, 2015b).  
 
On the 24th of September 2013 in New York, United States of America, a meeting chaired by 
the director of the WHO, along with representatives from 19 agencies, was conducted to 
establish a global list of 100 health system indicators. The meeting concluded that there were 
a large number of uncoordinated indicators that are diverse and fragmented, which resulted 
in unnecessary, uncoordinated reporting and inefficiency in health information systems. For 
these reasons, the WHO collaborated with international, national and multilateral agencies 
in developing the global reference list of 100 core health indicators. The global reference list 
of 100 core health indicators is by definition “a standard set of 100 indicators prioritized by the 
global community to provide concise information on the health situation trends, including 
responses at national and global levels” (WHO, 2015b). These indicators are in line with the 
MDGs, SDGs, UHC and other issues that relate to the post-2015 developmental agenda. 
The quality of care indicators provided by the global reference list of 100 core health indicators 
of 2015 are summarised in Table 4.2 (WHO, 2015b). 




4.2.2.2  VARIABLE SELECTION: QUALITY OF CARE 
Table 4.2. Quality of care indicators from the global reference list of 100 core 
indicators. 
Indicator Description 
Perioperative mortality rate 
Deaths prior the discharge of patients that underwent 
one or more procedure(s) in the operating theatre 
during their admission time. This indicator is measured 
per total number of procedures. 
Obstetric and gynaecological 
admissions due to abortion 
This is determined by dividing the total number of 
abortion-related complications by all abortion-related 
admissions, without taking a planned abortions into 
account. 
Institutional maternal mortality ratio 
The ratio between maternal deaths and the total number 
of deliveries in health institutions. 
Maternal death reviews 
There is still a need to clearly define what "clear review" 
means. The indicator, however, measures the ratio of 
maternal deaths that occur in audited facilities. 
ART retention rate 
This is the percentage of adults and children who are on 
antiretroviral therapy (ART) at different times after 
starting treatment for a specified period of time. 
TB treatment success rate 
The percentage of successful tuberculosis (TB) 
treatments. The definition of treatment in this context is 
“cure” and “completed treatment”. 
Source: Adapted from WHO (2015b). 
4.2.3 Financial protection 
Financial protection plays an important role when moving towards UHC, and forms part of 
the four UHC dimensions identified in Chapter 2. As highlighted in Chapter 2, financial 
protection is linked to service coverage, access equity and social cohesion.the WHO (2016b), 
discusses two dominant indicators for assessing financial protection, namely: 
i. The number of households that incur catastrophic health expenditure on health 
services. Russell (1996), defines “catastrophic spending” as a situation where 
“households must sacrifice other basic needs such as food and education with serious 
consequences for the household or individuals within it”. There are two commonly 
used thresholds for catastrophic spending (Xu et al., 2003; WHO, 2016b) that include: 
a. Health expenditure that is out-of-pocket and 25% or more of the total 
household expenditure.  
b. Health expenditure that is out-of-pocket and is 40% or more of non-food-
related household expenditure.  
 
ii. The number of households that are impoverished as a result of healthcare expenditure. 
This indicator is much more difficult to track, as it relies on arbitrary reference points. 




A good example is neglecting people who are already below the poverty line yet face 
out-of-pocket fees or simply cannot acquire health services due to financial reasons 
(WHO, 2016b).  
The World Bank uses the ADePT software (as described in Section 4.2.1) to calculate both 
financial impoverishment and the levels of catastrophic expenditure. 
4.2.3.1 Discussion: Financial protection 
In the absence of calculated financial protection measures, high levels of out-of-pocket 
payments (OOPs) can indicate levels of catastrophic spending. This is evident from a multi-
country analysis on catastrophic health expenditure (Xu et al., 2003). According WHO 
(2016b), a high proportion of OOPs as a percentage of total health expenditure (THE)2 is 
indicative of the proportion of households incurring catastrophic expenditure. Out-of- pocket 
measurements, however, are not a good indication of the level of financial protection, because 
the proportion of the population that cannot pay OOPs is not accounted for. An example is 
the difference between Japan, which has one the best health outcomes with 13.9% of its THE-
paid OOP, and South Africa, which has an OOP proportion of 6.5% of THE (WHO, 2017b). A 
number of international health organisations, including the World Bank, WHO and the 
OECD use household catastrophic expenditure and impoverishment to measure financial 
protection. The global reference list of 100 core health indicators (WHO, 2015b) and the health 
financing diagnostics and guidance from WHO (WHO, 2016b) also recommend these two 
indicators (as summarised in Table 4.4) for measuring financial protection. Therefore, 
catastrophic and impoverishment expenditure indicators are selected to measure the level of 
financial impoverishment in this research. 
Table 4.3. The interpretation of changes in out-of-pocket payments in relation to 
health service utilisation. 
 Service utilisation 
Decreases Increases 
OOP spending 
Decreases Hard to interpret. (Lower 
financial burden, but lower service 
use.) 
Positive change. (Increased 
service use with lower financial 
burden.) 
Increases Undesirable result. (Lower 
service use and higher financial 
burden.) 
Hard to interpret. (Increased 
service use but higher financial 
burden.) 
Source: Adapted from WHO (2016b). 
                                                 
2 OOPs of more than 20% are considered high in some instances, there is however consensus that OOPs 
exceeding 30-40% are definitely considered high (WHO, 2016b). 




Table 4.3 shows the different relationships between service utilisation and the extent of out-
of-pocket payments. The desirable outcome would be a decrease in the amount of OOPs 
coupled with an increased health service utilisation. The undesirable outcome would be an 
increase in OOPs accompanied by a decrease in resource utilisation. A decrease in both 
service utilisation and OOP payments is much more complex to interpret, but could signal 
lack of access to health services. An increase in both service utilisation and OOPs also requires 
more analysis, but could mean low levels of prepayment in the health system.  
4.2.3.2 Variable selection: Financial protection 
The financial protection indicators from the global reference list of core health indicators are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Global reference list financial protection indicators. 
Indicator Description 
Headcount ratio of catastrophic health 
expenditure 
This is the proportion of the entire population or a sub 
population that faces catastrophic health expenditure. 
Headcount ratio of impoverishing health 
expenditure 
This is the proportion of the entire population or a sub 
population that impoverishing health expenditures. 
Source: Adapted from WHO (2015b). 
4.2.4 Conclusion: Identification of outcomes 
In this section, the three UHC goals, which are the outcomes for QCA application, were 
discussed. These outcomes are utilisation/need, quality of care and financial protection. The 
main objective in this section was to identify the indicators that measure the different UHC 
goals, which are shown in Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.4. 
4.3 Causal condition selection: Financial arrangements 
Again, this section, discusses the health financial arrangements (revenue raising, risk pooling, 
purchasing and benefits design) with the aim of identifying the respective indicators that 
measure them. As highlighted before, they originate from Figure 4.2. 
4.3.1 Revenue raising 
Revenue raising refers to the manner in which health systems raise money from businesses, 
governments, external sources and households (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). This involves the 
identification of sources of funds and the methods according to which funds will be 
contributed. Furthermore, it involves the collection mechanism to be used, with equity and 
efficiency considerations being relevant (Carrin Mathauer, Xu & Evans, 2008; Kutzin, Yip & 
Cashin, 2016a). Sources of funds for health financing include public sources, private sources 




and external aid. The potential and the choice of revenue collection methods rely on several 
factors, including: absolute income, effectiveness of the tax collection systems, the labour 
market (formal or informal), social solidarity and cohesion, population size, and revenues 
from natural resources (Kirigia, Carrin, Mwikisa & Diarra-Nama, 2006).  
OECD, Eurostat & the WHO (2011) clearly divide the sources of revenues into defined groups. 
In their description, these groups are termed “institutional units”. Examples of such 
institutional units include the government, households, corporations, non-profit 
organisations supporting households with healthcare, as well as foreign entities. The roles of 
institutions that collect revenues and those that provide them should be distinguished. An 
example is the role of governments in National Health Insurance Schemes (NHIS) as a 
collecting agent, and that of households and companies as the providers. This section 
discusses the revenue types and the institutions involved in them, as well as their roles. It is 
important to note that Section 4.3.2.1, which discusses the different risk pooling mechanisms 
that are available, links the revenue sources as discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 to the four most 
common risk pooling mechanisms.  
4.3.1.1 Types of revenue 
This section serves to provide clarity on the available types of revenues, as well as how 
revenues are raised and flow in different health financing schemes. The aim for revenue 
raising is not only limited to increasing health-related revenues, but it is also to be sustainable 
and equitable for specific contexts. Classification of different revenues for health financing 
schemes is of importance, as it enables easy monitoring and evaluation of the financing 
scheme as far as equity and sustainability are concerned. Each type of revenue category 
comprises subcategories that describe them according to who or which institution the 
revenues are from (WHO, 2016b). There have been efforts to systematically collect health 
financial information globally. Examples of such efforts include: A System of Health Accounts 
(SHA 1.0), published by the OECD in 2000, the International Classification of Health Accounts 
(ICHA), and the Guide to Producing National Health Accounts in 2003, which was a joint effort 
from the World Bank, WHO and USAID. A later development is A System of Health Accounts 
2011 (SHA 2011), which was a joint effort from the OECD, WHO and Eurostat. The purposes of 
the SHA 2011, as set out by OECD et al. (2011), are as follows: 




a. Provide a framework containing the core relevant aggregates for the international 
comparisons of health systems and health expenditure patterns. 
b. Provide a tool that produces data for monitoring and analysing health systems and 
is expandable by different countries. 
c. Define coordinated rules for the purposes of tracking healthcare consumption and 
expenditure. 
The SHA 2011 was used as a point of departure for identifying the different sources of revenue 
that a country has for healthcare. The abbreviation FS is used in the SHA and stands for the 
“Classification of Revenues of Health Care Financing Schemes”  (OECD, Eurostat & WHO, 
2011). The SHA presents seven main sources of finances (FS1 to FS7) that each have sub-
categories:  
i. Transfers from government domestic revenues (FS.1). This refers to government 
domestic funds allocated to healthcare. These funds are decentralised in different public 
systems, as governments need to have the ability to distribute the funds in an equitable 
and efficient manner.  According to OECD et al. (2011) these funds include:  
a. Internal transfers and grants (FS.1.1). This includes government revenues 
allocated to healthcare that are transferred from central to local governments, 
funds transferred between governments bodies of the same level , and funds 
from a different unit of the government. This function excludes Social Insurance 
contributions by the government as an employer. 
b. Government transfers on behalf of other specified groups (FS.1.2). These 
payments are made by the government for healthcare on behalf of specific 
groups in society (for example pregnant women, the elderly, the poor and 
disabled persons). The payments include voluntary health insurance (VHI) 
payments and social health insurance (SHI) contributions paid by the 
government. This subcategory does, however, not include any governmental 
contributions that are made by the government as an employer. 
c. Subsidies (FS.1.3). This refers to domestic government revenues allocated to 
institutions other than non-profit institutions and government units. These 
revenues include subsidies for voluntary and compulsory health insurances that 




are managed by private insurers, as well as tax allowances given to households 
with private insurance.  
d. Other government transfers (FS.1.4). Fund transfers from the government to 
non-profit health organisations with the purpose of covering the costs of the 
non-profit organisations or direct transfers to households. 
ii. Foreign funding distributed by governments (FS.2). Funds originating from 
outside the country earmarked or not earmarked for healthcare that are distributed 
by the government. There are two types of transactions from foreign origin: foreign 
revenues earmarked for health, as well as non-earmarked foreign revenues.  
iii. Social insurance contributions (FS.3). The purpose of these contributions are to 
secure social health insurance (SHI) entitlement from employers on behalf of their 
employees, and self-employed or non-employed individuals. The types of social 
health insurance contributions are classified according to the institutions that 
contribute. This category excludes contributions made by the government on behalf 
of specific societal groups (classified as FS.1.2) and credited social insurance 
contributions (OECD et al., 2011). 
iv. SHI contributions from employees (FS.3.1). These contributions are made by 
households and paid directly by the employees or deducted from wages and salaries 
by the employer on behalf of the employees (OECD et al. 2011). 
v. SHI contributions from employers (FS.3.2). These contributions are paid directly 
by employers. The government as an employer falls in this category if the 
government employees form part of the general SHI scheme. The institutions that 
are involved in this category are the government, private and public companies and 
non-profit organisations (ILO, 2008; OECD et al., 2011). 
vi.  SHI contributions from the self-employed (FS.3.3). These contributions are made   by 
self-employed persons paying for SHI (OECD et al., 2011) and may include OOPs and 
premiums for private health insurance (including community-based insurance) (ILO, 
2008). 




vii. Other SHI contributions (FS.3.4). This includes contributions that are not included in 
FS.1.2 and FS.3.1 to FS3.3, for example SHI contributions from pension funds for the 
retired. 
viii. Compulsory prepayments (FS.4). This includes compulsory contributions for 
healthcare that are not included in FS.3. Included are compulsory prepayments into 
medical savings sccounts and private health insurance. The following are different 
subcategories of compulsory prepayments (OECD et al., 2011): 
a. Compulsory prepayments for healthcare from individuals (FS.4.1); 
b.  Compulsory prepayments for healthcare from employers (FS.4.2); and 
c. Other compulsory prepayments from other units other than 
individuals/households and employers (FS.4.3). 
ix. Voluntary prepayment (FS.5). According to OECD et al. (2011) this includes private  
health insurance premiums  that are made by the following: 
a. Voluntary prepaid revenues from households/individuals (FS.5.1); 
b. Voluntary prepaid revenues from employers (FS.5.2); and 
c. Other voluntary revenues apart from individuals and employers (FS.5.3). 
x. Other domestic revenues (FS.6). These are revenues that are from domestic origins 
and are not included in FS.1 to FS.5, namely: 
a. Revenues from households (FS.6.1). This includes out-of-pocket payments and 
other voluntary health transfers from households for healthcare, for example 
transfers to non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) health 
programmes (OECD et al., 2011). OOPs can be full payment for health services by 
the patient, or can be in the form of co-payments. Individuals can pay user fees 
directly to a public health facility, or uninsured individuals can make payments to 
private health providers. OOPs and user fees are the least progressive forms of 
healthcare financing (McIntyre, 2013). 
b. Revenues from corporations (FS.6.2). These revenues are dedicated to 
healthcare from corporations that are not part of FS.3 and FS.5. Companies can 
finance health services for their employees with no involvement of health insurance 
schemes, for example, in the form of occupational health services.  




xi. Direct foreign transfers (FS.7). These revenues are received from foreign bodies directly 
by health-financing schemes. Direct foreign transfers can be divided into subcategories 
(OECD et al., 2011). The subcategories are as follows:  
a. Foreign finances earmarked for healthcare. Examples include foreign 
donations from NGOs, individuals, foreign governments and international grants 
for the purpose of financing domestic healthcare systems; 
b. Foreign aid in kind (i.e. healthcare goods and services). International 
assistance in cash or kind that includes aid in times of emergency; and 
c. Bilateral, multilateral aid. This refers to generic aid that is directly donated but 
not earmarked for healthcare that can also be used in other sectors.   
4.3.1.2 Discussion: Revenue raising 
Health revenue can be collected from different institutions and the extent to which revenues 
are prepaid is of particular importance. Prepaid revenues are more favourable with regards to 
health financial protection than OOP payments. Tax revenue and health insurance are the 
two main sources of prepaid health revenue (McIntyre, 2013). The sum of the general 
government health expenditure (GGHE%THE) and the private prepaid health expenditure 
(VHI%THE) as a percentage of THE constitutes the total prepaid expenditure (WHO, 2010b; 
McIntyre, 2013). GGHE%THE consists of all the compulsory prepaid health revenue, including 
health expenditure through social security and tax funding. Although prepaid sources of 
revenue consist of both mandatory and voluntary prepayments, the domestic mandatory 
prepaid funds are of particular interest on the path to UHC. By definition, mandatory sources 
of revenue are health prepayments that are stipulated by law. Mandatory sources of revenue 
comprise general revenues from local or central government, earmarked revenues and social 
health insurance contributions. General government revenues originate from revenue from 
parastatals, as well as direct and indirect taxes (OECD et al., 2011; WHO, 2016b).  
The progressivity of the revenue-raising mechanisms is also of importance. For example, 
personal income taxes are progressive if the tax rates are incremental according to the level 
of income. In the case of indirect taxes, such as import duty, VAT and excise taxes which are 
charged on a flat rate on goods and services, it is important to identify which goods or services 
are tax exempt. The tax structure is viewed as regressive if a major share of these goods are 
what the poor groups spend on (WHO, 2016b). Although evidence suggest that mandatory 




prepayment (GGHE%THE) is more favourable when moving towards UHC, private prepaid 
revenues (VHI%THE) were also considered when selecting indicators of revenue raising 
mechanisms. 
Table A-5 in Appendix A contains some of the indicators available for revenue raising, and 
indicates the various institutions that report on these indicators. The indicators considered 
for application in QCA are in the form of positive attributes that contribute towards UHC. As 
mentioned above, they indicate the general level of prepayment (both mandatory and 
voluntary) and mandatory prepayment, which are presented in Table 4.5.  
4.3.1.3 Variable selection: Revenue raising 
The revenue raising indicators selected for this study are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Revenue raising indicators when moving towards UHC and their 
definitions. 
Indicator Description 
General government expenditure on health as % 
of total health expenditure (GGHE%THE). 
This includes capital and recurrent government 
expenditure on health. These expenditures can be from 
central and local governments on health and also 
include external grants and loans, donations from 
external NGOs and compulsory health contributions. 
Private prepaid plans as a percentage of 
expenditure on health (VHI%THE). 
This indicator includes voluntary health contributions 
that are not mandated by the government. Included in 
this indicator are expenditures from private bodies, such 
as not-for-profit organisations, households, mutual and 
commercial health insurance, as well as quasi and 
resident corporations aimed at the delivery or financing 
of healthcare. All revenues from donors, which are 
channelled through the above-mentioned organisations, 
are also included. 
Per capita government expenditure on health. 
US$ adjusted for purchasing power (“purchasing 
power parity” [PPP] or $ international. 
This is a measure of the level of public spending on 
healthcare for the population. This indicator measures 
all of the revenues channelled through government 
budgets, expenditure by parastatals, extra budgetary 
units and, most importantly, compulsory health 
insurance. 
Sources: WHO (2017b); World Bank (2017). 
4.3.2 Pooling  
WHO defines risk pooling as “the practice of bringing several risks together for insurance 
purposes in order to balance the consequences of the realization of each individual risk ” 
(WHO, 2000). Healthcare revenues are accumulated on behalf of a population to ensure that 
the whole population has access to sourced funds and that access is not based on ability to 
pay when healthcare is needed (Murray & Frenk, 2000; Kutzin, Yip & Cashin, 2016b). In 




general, health expenditure has two dimensions, namely the magnitude of lifetime 
expenditure and the timing of expenditure. Risk pooling helps to reduce the unpredictable 
nature of the healthcare needed in relation to timing and the magnitude of the necessary 
expenditure (Smith & Witter, 2004). Funds are pooled to address the unpredictable nature of 
sickness at individual level, because the inability to mobilise financial resources at the time of 
need hinders access to healthcare. Therefore, pooling funds spreads the risks over a 
population over time (McIntyre & Van den Heever, 2011). There are three ways in which 
redistribution occurs in risk pools (WHO, 2000; Smith & Witter, 2004):  
i. In a risk pool with members who make equal contributions, the pool enables transfer 
from the healthy to the sick (the risk pooling function); 
ii. In a risk pool that has equal healthcare usage but different levels of financial 
contribution, the pool enables a transfer from the rich to the poor (the income 
redistribution function); and 
iii. In a risk pool where members make equal financial contributions and equally make 
use of health services, the pool enables a transfer made according to age since more 
risk is assumed as people age. 
 For sustainable risk pooling, key considerations are the size, diversity and the nature of 
participation in risk pools, which are intertwined concepts. The risk pool size determines the 
capacity of cross-subsidisation between different socio-economic groups, improving support 
towards those in greatest need of healthcare and sustainability (Smith & Witter, 2001, 2004; 
WHO, 2016b). Larger risk pools are more sustainable than smaller risk pools and larger pools 
have more opportunities for diversity (McIntyre, 2013). For the purposes of cross-
subsidisation, risk pools should be as diverse as possible (WHO, 2016b). The nature of 
participation in risk pools can be either compulsory or voluntary. Differences and 
consequences of each form of participation will be discussed below, although compulsory 
participation is more in line with UHC (WHO, 2016b).  
 
There are four general approaches to risk pooling arrangements, namely: no risk pooling, 
unitary risk pool, fragmented pools and integrated pools (Smith & Witter, 2004). No risk 
pooling, as the term implies, is when no risk pools are created. The population pay for their 
healthcare needs as they occur. Therefore, no risk pooling in its classic form means the 
population pay for healthcare in the form of OOPs (McIntyre, 2013). This does not take into 




account the unpredictable nature of healthcare need and is associated with a lack of financial 
protection. Unitary risk pools are when raised revenues are pooled into a single pool for the 
entire population, regardless of the revenue source. In the case of unitary risk pooling, 
contribution is mandatory for the entire population or segments of the population with a 
defined set of health benefits. Developing a unitary risk pool often proves difficult for 
countries, which is why most countries opt for multiple risk pools.  
 
This leads us to fragmentation. Although it might seem favourable, fragmentation is a 
predominant manner in which problems in risk pooling arise. It is a result of different pool 
fragments in the health system and leads to obstacles in the redistributive capacity of pooled 
resources. This, in turn, results in a low extent of cross-subsidisation in the health system 
(WHO, 2016b). Population groups might be inclined to choose risk pools based on the nature 
of employment, geographical location, personal attributes (such as age, gender and ability), 
and personal choices (such as general preference of specific medical schemes over others). 
Risk pool membership can either be voluntary or mandatory, depending on the health system 
arrangements of the country in question. Integrated risk pools are financial arrangements to 
transfer funds across risk pools in order to curb the problems caused by fragmentation. Risk 
pool integration is often referred to as risk equalisation, which can be achieved through an 
assessment of the available risk pools in terms of factors such as gender, age, disability and 
disease profile (Rice & Smith, 2002; McIntyre, 2013).  
4.3.2.1 Risk pooling mechanisms 
There are four dominant risk pooling mechanisms, namely state-funded systems, social health 
insurance, community-based health insurance and voluntary health insurance. These 
mechanisms differ significantly and perform differently in countries, due to contextual 
differences in factors such as income levels, health needs, employment and administrative 
capacity (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). In this case,  the risk pool mechanisms are described in 
their classic form, but countries often opt for mixed systems (McIntyre, 2013). These 
mechanisms are:  
i. State-funded systems  
State funded systems (tax financed systems) are characterised by funding that is 
predominantly from general revenues through state budget allocations. Health is 




delivered mainly through a network of public providers and covers the whole 
population. Most of the funding comes from budget allocations by the government, 
meaning that the source of healthcare revenues is the same as all government revenues. 
Government sources of revenue include taxes, sale of natural resources, government 
debt, sales of government assets and public tolls (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). For 
feasibility of state-funded systems, governments have to consider the revenue-raising 
capacity of a particular country, as well as the quality of governance, and create more 
focus on the poor in society (WHO, 2004; Gottret & Schieber, 2006).  
The following are some advantages and disadvantages of state funded systems: A 
positive aspect of state-funded systems, is the fact that service coverage is 
comprehensive. Therefore, it is simpler to extend coverage to the entire population 
since the population does not have to make direct contributions. Risk selection 
problems can be avoided because of larger pools and the comprehensive nature of the 
system. The dependence of state-financed systems on tax revenues means that there is 
more room to raise revenues, seeing that the burden can be spread over a large portion 
of the population. The centrality of state-funded systems makes them easier to 
manage, thereby reducing the risk of problems related to administrative efficiency. 
Aside from efficiency, there is more cross-subsidisation between different 
subpopulation groups, because risks are shared amongst a larger diverse population 
(Gottret & Schieber, 2006).  
On the downside, the dependence of state-funded systems on budget allocations and 
their direct government involvement, makes them vulnerable to political pressure – 
meaning, funding is less stable and more unpredictable. This is a major problem, 
especially in low-income countries with  smaller tax bases where different ministries 
have to compete for the limited resources (WHO, 2004). Although risk pooling is 
executed centrally and the entire population is entitled to specific health benefits, the 
reality is that resource utilisation is more inclined towards higher income, 
predominantly urban households. There have been concerns over the efficiency of 
service delivery in countries that operate under state-financed systems, because they 
can fail to effectively influence delivery (Gottret & Schieber, 2006).  
 




ii. Social health insurance (SHI) 
The first SHI originated in Germany as a result of industrialisation and the subsequent 
development of large companies. The workers in these firms started to developing 
sickness funds as a way to improve access to healthcare amongst themselves. This was 
in turn supported by employers who realised the benefits of having healthy workers 
(Normand & Busse, 2002).  
SHI is also referred to as “national health insurance” (NHI). However, SHI and NHI 
differ slightly in their structure. In the case of SHI, only certain groups of the 
population are required to be on insurance, or only those that make contributions have 
coverage entitlement. NHI, on the other hand, covers the entire population. Its 
coverage includes individuals who do not make contributions, although it is 
mandatory for specific groups (mostly employers and employees) of the population to 
make contributions. SHI and NHI are often used interchangeably, but a more inclusive 
term is “mandatory insurance”. It is often difficult to differentiate between state-
funded systems and mandatory insurance, because they are both, in principle, funded 
through payroll taxes (McIntyre, 2013). There is no strict definition of SHI, but the 
dominant features are that the insured make regular payments that are normally wage-
based payments and there is the involvement of independent or quasi-independent 
insurance bodies that manage the risk pools. This is the key distinction between SHI 
and state-funded systems. In the case of the latter, the pooling function is also 
implemented publically (Normand & Busse, 2002; McIntyre, 2013). SHI clearly defines 
the benefits that the insured population are entitled to. Most of the SHI schemes are 
run by sickness funds, which are independent and are often operated by not-for-profit 
organisations. Providers are either part of the sickness funds, or they can be public or 
private entities (Gottret & Schieber, 2006).  
Aside from the dominant features, SHI funds can be structured in different ways 
(Normand & Busse, 2002):  
a. SHI can be compulsory for the whole population, or portions of the 
population.  
b. There are generally four ways in which risk pools are organised in SHI. There 
can be one risk pool for the entire population and risk pools can be organised 




so as to serve populations in different geographical locations. Risk pools can 
also be designed to compete or not compete for insurees in the same 
geographic areas. 
c. Governments often contribute to the risk pools in order to cover people who 
cannot contribute. 
SHI is generally viewed as a simple way of collecting revenues for healthcare. The 
transparent nature of SHI, with defined benefits and a clear destination of funds, 
creates more willingness to pay from the population. In cases where there are 
constraints in revenue sources, countries can resort to diverse earmarked revenues 
for health. Reliance on budgetary negotiations could, however, leave the system 
more vulnerable to political pressure. State funding is mainly required to cover 
students, the unemployed, the poor, and other vulnerable groups. The pay-as-you-
go nature of most SHI systems allows for the accumulation of funds for future 
retirees. The decreased dependency on state funds that is typically associated with 
SHI makes it more resilient to political pressure. Most of the available SHI systems 
have a high redistributive nature, which is due to the cross-subsidisation between 
the rich and the poor and from low-risk to high-risk individuals. The level of health 
risk associated with the population does not influence contributions and 
dependants of contributors are often covered with no increase in levels of 
premiums. In countries with a long history of SHI, such as Germany, the population 
strongly trust and have a somewhat emotional attachment to the system. 
Furthermore, SHI has been a means of fostering solidarity in many countries 
(Gottret & Schieber, 2006). 
Unfortunately, SHI can also lead to the exclusion of the poor groups of the 
population. SHI systems generally start by incorporating formal workers from large 
companies. This leaves out the informal sector and, notably, the poor in society. 
Payroll contributions can occasionally have a negative impact on the economy 
(Gottret & Schieber, 2006). In theory, payroll contributions are the employees’ 
responsibility. In more competitive labour markets, employers cannot, however, 
risk reducing employee wages as a result of increase in payroll contributions. This 
results in employers incurring more costs to cover payroll contributions, leading to 
high labour costs and eventually unemployment. SHI involves complex interactions 




of different stakeholders, which in turn increase administrative costs. Countries 
with weak regulation and low health efficiency have had slow progress towards SHI, 
which is evident in most Latin American countries. Similar to state funded systems, 
SHI can lead to increases in unnecessary health service usage as services are greatly 
subsidised. The political nature of SHI, with a large number of stakeholders, can 
make it difficult to take radical cost containment measures. The sense of ownership 
that comes with the nature of contribution to SHI makes it rather difficult to reduce 
benefits, making it easier to keep the same benefits and increase contributions, 
creating no incentive for efficiency (Gottret and Schieber, 2006). 
iii. Community-based health insurance (CBHI) 
The term “CBHI” is often used to describe a diverse group of health-financing 
mechanisms that are motivated by various interests. Central to this is the idea of 
community. Community is not restricted to geographical proximity, but includes 
CBHI schemes with members from different types of communities that are not 
covered by market-based and government health-financing mechanisms. CBHI 
schemes can be made up of members who share a religion,  craft, profession, or 
have any other type of affiliation and are motivated by financial protection (Jakab 
& Krishnan, 2001; Gottret & Schieber, 2006). Revolving drug funds, rural health 
insurance, mutual health organisations, community health funds, micro-insurance, 
and the involvement of a community in user fees for healthcare have all been 
referred to under the umbrella of CBHI (Jakab & Krishnan, 2001).  
In their systematic literature review, Jakab & Krishnan (2004), identified three 
common features of CBHI: (i) members are involved in designing of rules of 
engagement, collection of revenues, pooling, and resource allocation; (ii) although 
the community is involved, most of the existing schemes are owned by 
governments, NGOs and health providers (Gottret & Schieber, 2006); and (iii) 
members of CBHI schemes are sub-populations that are excluded from other 
health-financing mechanisms in the country. Members of these risk pools often 
share a common set of social values and membership is voluntary in nature and 
driven by solidarity amongst poorer groups in society. 




From their systematic review, including over 45 reports, Jakab & Krishnan, (2001) 
concluded that CBHI plays an important role in improving access to healthcare for 
low-income groups. CBHI is a good complementary financing mechanism to extend 
coverage to more vulnerable groups in society, but cannot serve as the sole 
financing mechanism to provide coverage for the entire population. CBHI generally 
offers low capacity for financial protection and, while  the sizes of CBHI schemes 
vary, the majority of the risk pools are small (ILO & STEP, 2002). When individuals 
choose not to participate in CBHI, it can generally be attributed to a lack of trust in 
pool managers and a general lack of education with regards to the need for health 
insurance (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). As highlighted above, the nature of CBHI 
means that pools are often amongst population segments with a common 
background, which is why these pools are vulnerable to covariant risks. Moreover, 
the voluntary nature of CBHI means that they are susceptible to adverse selection 
problems, which affect financial sustainability (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). Benefits 
are seldom properly defined, which leads to people with existing conditions joining 
the pools without sustainability measures in place. These issues can be addressed 
by combining funds from different CBHI schemes to create larger and more stable 
pools. The poorest in society are often excluded from participation, as they cannot 
afford the smallest contributions and are therefore excluded (Preker et al., 2004). 
The reason for this is the (often) flat-rate nature of the CBHI contribution, which 
is regressive. With regards to provision of care, CBHI has little to no effect on 
quality and efficiency of care (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). 
       iv. Voluntary health insurance (VHI) 
VHI is occasionally referred to as Private Health Insurance (PHI), and is more 
prominent in high income countries as a supplement to the publically financed 
systems (Gottret & Schieber, 2006), and dominant amongst the wealthier 
population groups (McIntyre, 2013). VHI can be a substitute for existing publically 
provided services, as a complement to public services that are not offered by the 
state (Mossialos & Thomson, 2002) or can be the primary source of health 
insurance. These different taxonomies lead to the complexity of VHI, as it is 
involved in various forms of interactions with public health coverage (OECD, 
2004). Although CBHI and VHI are both voluntary in nature, their key difference 




lies in the fact that VHI is provided by private, for-profit organisations (OECD, 
2004; Gottret & Schieber, 2006).  
VHI plays a pivotal role in improving financial protection and access, as well as 
promoting innovation and coverage for services that are not publically offered. VHI 
contributes to a country’s savings rate through their ability to accumulate capital, 
which fosters the development of financial markets (Gottret & Schieber, 2006).  
On the downside, VHI mechanisms are generally subject to high administrative costs, 
which can lead to adverse selection and “cream skimming” (Gottret & Schieber, 2006). 
Adverse selection occurs when the vulnerable groups of the population have a higher 
likelihood of seeking health insurance. Cream skimming is when insurers actively deny 
the less healthy insurance in favour of low-risk (healthy) individuals. This is often done 
by setting high premiums for high-risk individuals, or restricting benefits for pre-
existing conditions (McIntyre, 2013). Due to fragmentation, VHI mechanisms often 
promote dissimilar access to healthcare, especially between high- and low-income 
groups.  
4.3.2.2 Discussion: Pooling 
Countries can structure their risk pooling mechanisms depending on their context. Many 
countries, however, have mixed pooling arrangements where they employ a combination of 
the above-mentioned risk pooling mechanisms. In order to select indicators to assess risk 
pooling mechanisms, the key considerations for risk pooling that were taken into account are: 
the pool size, diversity, the level of fragmentation, and the nature of participation in risk pools 
(voluntary or compulsory). Small risk pools are generally not sustainable. For example, it is 
difficult to predict future healthcare needs and small risk pools are limited in their cross-
subsidisation capability. In most cases where multiple risk pools exist, the majority of the 
pools are voluntary. Voluntary risk pools are more susceptible to adverse selection, cream 
skimming and high transaction costs (Smith & Witter, 2004). 
The health financing diagnostics and guidance document from the WHO (2016b), highlights 
the important aspects to consider for risk pooling. Firstly, the market structure of risk pooling 
has to be considered. This specifically refers to the ratio between OOPs and prepaid revenue. 
Prepaid revenue can be in the form of voluntary or mandatory revenues. Of importance to 
pooling are the prepaid revenues. Secondly, there needs to be an assessment of the level of 




fragmentation of risk pools.  As highlighted in Section 4.3.2, fragmentation of risk pools is a 
major problem in risk pooling. In the case of multiple risk pools in a country,both Carrin & 
James (2004) and theWHO (2016b) recommend assessing whether risk equalisation measures 
are in place to curb fragmentation. Thirdly, with regards to performance,  Carrin & James 
(2004) suggest that there should be incentives for efficiency in risk pooling. Finally, since the 
sole purpose of risk pooling is for financial protection when care is needed due to the 
unpredictable nature of the need for healthcare, it is important to assess the number and 
diversity of population groups that are covered by some form of risk pool. Table 4.6. shows 





















4.3.2.3 Variable selection: Pooling 
The selected indicators for pooling are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Considered indicators for assessing risk pooling mechanisms. 
Reason Indicators 
The level of prepayment 
This refers to the market structure of pooling 
arrangements, the mix between mandatory 
prepayment, voluntary prepayment and OOP. Of 
interest is the proportion of prepaid revenue, both 
mandatory and voluntary. 
 
The level of (GGHE%THE) and VHI%THE) indicate 
the level of prepayment in a country. The former 
indicates mandatory prepayment, while the latter 
represents voluntary prepayment. 
Fragmentation in risk pools  
Countries often opt for a mix of different risk pools. 
In the case of a country having multiple risk pools, a 
qualitative analysis of the level of fragmentation in a 
country’s risk pooling can conducted. If multiple risk 
pools exist, there is a need to assess whether risk 
equalisation between the pools exist, to allow for 
cross-subsidisation between different social groups. 
Management of risk pools 
For either multiple or single risk pool systems, it is 
important for risk pool managers to be financially 
responsible. This is because financial responsibility 
affects health systems’ technical efficiency. For these 
reasons, it is important to determine whether there 
are financial incentives for efficient risk pool 
management. Without adequate regulation, risk 
pool incentives for efficiency can, however, result in 
cream skimming. 
What proportion of the population do the available 
risk pools cover? 
One important feature that improves access to 
healthcare, is promoting use of healthcare according 
to need. It is therefore important to assess if access 
to pooled revenues is based on the ability to pay or 
on need. If a low percentage of the population is 
covered by risk pools, it means that OOPs and 
catastrophic expenditures are highly likely (USAID & 
HFG, 2015). 
Sources: Carrin & James (2005); WHO (2016b). 
4.3.3 Purchasing 
Purchasing involves the transfer of pooled funds to health service providers (private or public) 
on behalf of the population (McIntyre & Van den Heever, 2011; Kutzin et al., 2016a). Purchasing 
differs from procurement, as the latter only refers to the buying of medical supplies and 
medicines (RESYST, 2014). This function involves benefit design policies, healthcare provider 
payment mechanisms, the organisational structure and governance of the purchaser (WHO, 
2016b). Purchasing contributes to health system performance (Robinson, Jakubowski & 




Figueras, 2005), which is aligned with improved equity, better quality care, efficiency, 
transparency, and change in the health sector (Thomson, 2010).  
In a nutshell, health purchasing organisations are responsible for three main decisions 
(Robinson et al., 2005; RESYST, 2014; Honda et al., 2016):  
i. The selection of health services to be purchased according to population needs, cost 
efficiency and national importance (benefits design).  
ii. The selection of service providers under considerations of equity, quality and 
efficiency.  
iii. Determining how the purchasing function is organised, which includes contracting 
and provider payment mechanisms. 
4.3.3.1 Benefit design and rationing 
This function describes the services that can be purchased for a specific group of the 
population from the pooled funds. Two objectives for benefits design are cost containment 
and providing access to necessary health service (Normand & Weber, 2009). Benefits packages 
take the form of health entitlements possessed by population groups, and can be specified as 
a positive list of entitlements and a negative list of services that are not included in the 
package (“benefit rationing”) (WHO, 2016b). When designing the benefits package, the types 
of services being offered, type of providers, the state of service delivery infrastructure, 
affordability and sustainability are key considerations (McIntyre, 2013).  
The first consideration is the types of services to be offered. There are generally two types of 
services: low-frequency, high-cost services and high-frequency, low-cost services. The former 
incudes hospital care, long-term care and terminal illness interventions, while the latter 
includes primary care interventions such as chronic care and acute care. The services offered 
should aim to give financial protection to the population, and should also ensure that the 
costs associated with the packages are contained (McIntyre, 2013). Information is key to 
determining the types of services to be considered in a benefits package. The purchaser should 
continuously gather epidemiological information about the population in order to establish 
awareness of their need (Kutzin, 2001a; Normand & Weber, 2009). Secondly, the purchaser 
should make decisions as to which providers the beneficiaries can use. The purchaser ensures 
that the providers meet specific sets of standards, provide sufficient quality of care, offer an 
adequate range of services and are cost effective. The third consideration points to the 




affordability and sustainability of the benefits package. The benefit package is dependent on 
the available resources, as well as the forecasted resources. This leads to a trade-off between 
the services that are covered and the amount of individuals covered, which are respectively 
referred to as “the depth” and “the breadth”. Lack of clarity when designing health benefits 
leads to uncontrollable expenditure, making the financing mechanism unsustainable  
(Normand & Weber, 2009; McIntyre, 2013). Finally, there should be adequate infrastructure 
that is accessible to cater for the services that are defined in the benefits package (McIntyre, 
2013).  
4.3.3.2 Payment, organisational structure and governance 
In the purchasing function, it is not sufficient to design benefits packages for the population 
without also designing the associated payment mechanisms (WHO, 2016b), which leads to 
the distinction between passive and strategic purchasing. “Passive purchasing implies a 
predetermined budget or simply paying bills when presented. Strategic purchasing involves a 
continuous search for the best ways to maximise health system performance by deciding 
which interventions should be purchased, how and from whom” (Musgrove, Creese, Preker, 
Anell & Prentice, 2000; WHO, 2016b).  
Table 4.7. Key differences between strategic and passive purchasing. 
Passive purchasing Strategic purchasing 
Bills paid once presented. Payment systems with deliberate incentives. 
Minimal to no selection of providers. 
Active selection of providers based on service quality, 
efficiency and equity. 
Minimal to no quality monitoring. 
Active quality monitoring with rewards for good 
practise.  
Simply based on available quality and prices. 
Sets quality and price standards by using levers to 
influence provider behaviour. 
 
Purchasers are involved in a three-way (principal-agent) relationship with the government, 
health system consumers, and healthcare providers (Robinson, Jabukowski & Figueras,  2005; 
RESYST, 2014), in line with strategic purchasing. An agent in this context means a body that 
acts as representative of another (the principal). Figure 4.4 shows the relationships between 
purchasers and the rest of the ecosystem. Table 4.8 shows the key purchasing actions in 
relation to purchasers, consumers, governments and providers in line with strategic 
purchasing. In the relationship between purchasers and providers, the purchasing 
organisation acts as the principal. This involves the use of contracting, regulation, financial, 




and monitoring mechanisms as controls to ensure that the provided services are adequate, of 
good quality and are priced as agreed. The second set of relationships involves the government 
and purchasing organisation, where the purchaser acts as an agent to the government. In this 
relationship, the government has a role of stewardship. The last relationship is the purchaser-
citizen relationship, were the purchaser is an agent that purchases care on behal f of the 
insured population. Key to this relationship is the extent to which the purchaser represents 
the needs of the healthcare consumer (Robinson et al., 2005; RESYST, 2014).  
It is important to note that the health providers are agents who are hired to deliver health 
services to defined populations on behalf of a principal. In this context, the principal is the 
purchaser who hires health providers on behalf of an insured population. Several problems 
can arise depending on how the principal-agent relationship between purchasers and 
providers is structured, these include (Lagarde, Powell-Jackson & Blaauw, 2010): 
i. Providers can act in their own interest for a given level of payment, compromising the 
quality and volume of healthcare delivered. 
ii. In the presence of financial incentives that are targeted at cutting costs, providers can 
avoid services that are resource-intensive, therefore opting for cheaper services with 
the aim of cutting costs. This leads to cream skimming, which in turn hinders equity 
in access to healthcare. 
iii. When purchasers require providers to produce good quality health services at the most 
cost efficient price, it can lead to issues related to cost-efficiency if providers do not 
bear the costs of services they provide. 
iv. When providers receive financial incentives for the volume of clinical procedures they 
deliver, it can lead to the overproduction of health services. This is referred to as 














Develop frameworks that are clear for both purchasers and providers. 
Develop and provide infrastructure necessary for service delivery. 
Ensure that enough resources are mobilised with the purpose of meeting service 
demand. 
Enforce accountability of the purchasers. 
Providers  
Ensuring that providers are chosen on the grounds of location, quality and variety. 
Develop service arrangements. 
Develop standards for the delivery of services. 
Determine payment rates. 
Gather and protect information regarding the provided services. 
Auditing of provider claims. 
Performance monitoring and acting in cases of poor performance. 
Monitor for fraud and corruption. 
Regular provider payment. 
Equitable allocation of resources. 
Develop and monitor consumer payment policies. 
Development, management and use of information systems. 
Consumer 
Needs assessment, taking account of the values of the population. 
Raising awareness of the population’s entitlements and obligations. 
Create mechanisms to communicate with the population with regards to 
complaints. 
Reporting of performance and resource usage. 
Source: RESYST (2014). 
Figure 4.4. Relationships between purchasers, citizens, government and providers. 
 
Source: RESYST (2014). 
Purchasing organisational structures can be divided into two groups, namely vertical 
purchasing and horizontal purchasing. These organisational structures are influenced by the 
unique and complex social, economic, historical and cultural settings of a country. In turn, 
these factors drive the sources of funds and jurisdictions (such as religion and geographical 




location), which influence the purchasing function (Robinson et al., 2005). Vertical 
organisation means that the central (“macro”), regional (“meso”) and local (“micro”) levels of 
government have the purchasing power, depending on the context. Macro-level purchasing 
implies a single insurance fund for the entire population and purchasing is done centrally. In 
most cases local and regional authorities are involved in revenue collection. With regards to 
meso-level purchasing, purchasing arrangements are executed by either regional government 
health purchasing organisations or general health funds that are connected to the region. The 
term “meso” is not restricted to geographical location, but to devolved purchasing 
arrangements that cater to a population of 100 000 to 500 000 people. Micro-level purchasing 
is when the decision-making is done locally. Health revenues can be raised locally or devolved 
to local organisations that then allocate funds to providers. This is common amongst Nordic 
countries, where local governments hold responsibility for their communities (Robinson et 
al., 2005). Horizontal purchasing, on the other hand, refers to a market-based system that 
encourages competition between different purchasers (Robinson et al., 2005).   
4.3.3.3 Provider payment mechanisms 
Provider payment mechanisms are the methods which are used to transfer funds from the 
purchasers to health providers (McIntyre, 2013). The manner in which providers are paid plays 
an important role in influencing the way that providers behave in the principal-agent 
relationship. Key questions include which services are offered, how they are delivered and 
what mix of inputs providers use. Good incentives drive providers to behave in line with the 
health system goals such as good quality care, improving access to care, enhanced 
responsiveness to patients and the efficient use of health resources (Cashin et al., 2015). 
Provider behaviour is driven by a number of factors, including, ethics, competition, financial 
incentives, regulation, training, reputation and humanity (Lagarde et al., 2010). In order to 
effectively influence provider behaviour, it is preferable to have as few purchasing 
organisations as possible. A large number of purchasers makes it difficult to influence provider 
behaviour, simply because they have options due to competition (McIntyre, 2013).  
There are different provider payment mechanisms and countries often depend on a 
combination of mechanisms, depending on their context. Each provider payment mechanism 
creates different incentives on service quality, efficiency and cost-containment, and has 
different administrative requirements. Combinations of provider payment mechanisms often 




create a different set of incentives that may complement different payment mechanisms 
(Normand & Weber, 2009).  
The potential benefits and drawbacks associated with each of the provider payment 
mechanisms make it is more favourable to use combinations in a health system, depending 
on the context (Carrin & James, 2004). The main provider payment mechanisms are described 
in Table 4.9, which also highlights their main advantages and disadvantages. One provider 
payment mechanism that was not included in Table 4.9, is “pay for performance” (P4P), 
because there is no accepted definition of the payment mechanism and no well-defined 
models for its application (Lagarde et al., 2010; Cromwell, Trisolini, Pope, Mitchell & 
Greenwall, 2011). This has led to mixed results from P4P payment mechanisms (Lagarde et al.,, 








Table 4.9. The main provider payment methods and their incentives. 
Payment method Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Capitation (per capita 
payment) 
Providers are paid in advance for the defined 
health benefits package for each person. This 
amount is paid for the fixed duration that the 
person is insured for.  
Creates incentives for technical efficiency, 
administrative efficiency and the 
promotion of preventative care.  
Promotes underservice, susceptible to 
cream skimming and cost shifting 





A fixed amount is paid to hospitals depending 
on factors such as diagnosis, where the patient 
was admitted, as well as the patient and clinical 
characteristics. 
Creates incentives for operational 
efficiency. 
May reduce the quality of services, 
increases administration costs, costs are 
unpredictable and there are chances for 
cream skimming.  
Fee-for-service (tariffs 
or fixed fee schedule) 
Tariffs for health services are fixed beforehand 
for each basket of services. Providers are then 
paid for each service that they deliver.  
In the case of a fixed fee schedule, it 
creates incentives for technical efficiency. 
Providers are inclined to overproduce 
services; this is called supplier-induced 
demand.  
Associated with high administration costs, 
overprovision of services and increases in 
costs. 
Global budget A fixed amount is paid to providers per specific 
period to provide a specified set of services. The 
budget is dependent on combinations of inputs 
and outputs, or individually. Then, providers 
can allocate funds as they see fit.  
Administration costs are low and 
expenditure can be forecasted.  
There are little incentives to promote 




Health providers receive fixed amounts for a 
stipulated period for the purpose of covering 
health inputs such as medicines and salaries. 
The budget is fixed and should follow the line 
item. 
Low administrative costs. There is a general tendency to spend all 
funds before the year ends, no incentive 
and mechanisms for efficiency and more 
referrals to other providers.  
 
Per diem Hospitals are paid a fixed amount per day for 
each admitted patient. The rates vary 
depending on factors that include types of 
patients and clinical characteristics. 
There is little incentive for technical 
efficiency. 
Allows for the increase in admissions and 
length of stay. 
Salary Payment of salaries to health providers. This is 
in the form of contractual agreements between 
the provider (staff) and the insurance fund. 
Minimises administrative costs and 
expenditure is predictable.  
There are no incentives for efficiency and 
productivity if payment is not linked to 
performance. There is a risk of under 
provision of health services or poor quality 
care. 
Sources: (Kutzin, 2001b; Carrin and Hanvoravongchai, 2003; Normand and Weber, 2009; Mcintyre, 2013; Boachie, 2014; Cashin et al., 2015).
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4.3.3.4 Discussion: Purchasing 
Purchasing is a key strategic link between mobilised resources for the purposes of UHC to the 
delivery of quality care in an efficient manner. Purchasing can be performed in one of three 
ways according to WHO (2010b). The first approach is integrated purchasing and provision 
where governments allocate budgets directly for healthcare, from government health 
revenues. The second approach entails organisations that are separate from the government, 
purchasing healthcare on behalf of the insured population. Lastly, health consumers can 
purchase healthcare directly in the form of OOPs. Purchasing organisation can either be 
passive or strategic, with strategic purchasing being favourable when moving towards UHC 
(Robinson et al., 2005; Normand & Weber, 2009; McIntyre, 2013; Cashin et al., 2015; WHO, 
2016b). With that notion in mind, health systems should therefore strive to perform strategic 
purchasing, as it maximises the influence of purchasing arrangements mainly in terms of 
equity, quality of care, efficiency and cost-containment. The key considerations when 
evaluating health purchasing arrangements as proposed in the WHO’s Health Financing 
Diagnostics and Guidance (WHO, 2010c), as well as by Carrin & James (2004), were used as 
bases when selecting factors for analysing health purchasing arrangements that can be used 
in the QCA analysis. The proposed qualitative indicators for assessing a country’s benefits 
design are summarised in Table 4.10, while indicators of the extent of strategic purchasing are 
summarised in Table 4.11. 
4.3.3.5 Variable selection: Purchasing 
The selected indicators for benefits design are presented in Table 4.10, where the selected 














Table 4.10. Benefit design indicators. 
Reason Indicator 
Efficiency and equity considerations 
Are benefit packages designed with regards to equity and 
efficiency considerations? This seeks to assess the 
fundamental principles behind benefits design and 
whether benefits are designed according to need or 
ability to pay. Additionally, this indicator seeks to assess 
whether efficiency considerations are taken into account 
when designing benefits for the population. 
Priority setting organisation. 
Do priority setting authorities exist for benefit design 
(Carrin & James, 2005)? This indicator seeks to identify 
whether a country has organisations that are involved in 
priority setting for the benefits that the population might 
attain. This is important for cost-containment purposes. 
Monitoring mechanisms. 
Mechanisms for patient appeals that include claim rights, 
claims reviews and a committee for peer reviews. 
Monitoring is important, as it ensures compliance in 
purchasing.  
























Table 4.11. Strategic purchasing indicators. 
Reason  Indicators 
Do purchasers influence payments rates? 
A qualitative review of the provider-purchaser 
relationship, with the aim of identifying how prices are 
set. In general, purchasing organisations hold more price 
negotiation power when there are as few of them as 
possible. In cases of multiple purchasing organisations, 
providers can be involved in setting prices and cost 
shifting. In cases where there are different purchasers 
e.g., different purchasing organisations in primary and 
tertiary care, there might be tendencies of referring to 
other purchasers to avoid costs. This indicator assesses 
the purchasing dynamics with the aim of identifying 
whom influences payment rates. It is favourable for 
purchasers to have a dominating effect in price setting 
(WHO, 2016b). 
Do robust information systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
A qualitative review of the nature of health information 
systems of cases, as these systems are key to the ability 
to implement strategic purchasing (WHO, 2016b).  
Do provider performance reviews exist? 
A qualitative analysis for the existence of performance 
reviews. Performance reviews on providers are 
important to ensure that providers are acting 
accordingly, especially in terms of quality of care. This 
also seeks to ask if action is taken when there is poor 
performance. 
Do accountability systems exist between 
providers and purchases? 
A qualitative analysis of the level of accountability 
between providers and purchasers, in terms of regular 
public reporting of performance indicators. 
Provider payment mechanisms. 
A qualitative study investigating the provider payment 
mechanisms  that are in place, addressing whether they 
encourage the provision of appropriate care (Carrin & 
James, 2005). As seen in Table 4.9, each provider 
payment mechanism exhibits strengths and weaknesses. 
For those reasons, countries tend to employ a 
combination of provider payment mechanisms. Carrin & 
James (2005) only consider the overproduction or 
underproduction of services when analysing the effects 
of provider payment mechanisms. Here, the appropriate 
level of care, the effects of payment mechanisms on 
quality of care, and cost containment are considered 
(Normand & Weber, 2009).  
Sources: Carrin & James (2005); Normand & Weber (2009); WHO (2016b). 
4.4 Causal condition selection: Contextual factors 
This section discusses the contextual factors that have an influence on UHC and that are 
briefly discussed in Chapter 2. They form part of the causal conditions (variables) for QCA 
application. The aim of the section is, once again, to identify comprehensive indicators to 
measure each of the contextual factors. It is important to note that the structure of public 
administration and public sector financial management forms part of the governance aspect 
of the contextual factors as highlighted in Chapter 2. These were omitted, however, due to 
unclear indicators for assessment. 




Contextual differences affect all four components of health system financing (revenue raising, 
pooling, purchasing and benefits design). For example, differences in available sources of 
funds in countries can affect the strategy that a country chooses for UHC. The same applies 
for pooling, where some countries are faced with a choice between having multiple risk pools 
or a unitary risk pool for the population (Smith & Witter, 2001). Complex historical, economic, 
social and cultural settings influence the choice between horizontal and vertical  purchasing 
strategies. An example of how contextual differences affect UHC can be observed in Ghana, 
where the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was introduced in 2004. Similar to many 
low-to-middle income countries, Ghana faced problems in co-opting the fraction of the 
population that is in the informal working sector (Abiiro & McIntyre, 2012). This was a major 
topic of discussion at the second African Health Economics and Policy Association 
Conference held in Saly, Senegal, in March 2011. Contextual issues discussed ranged from the 
sources of revenues that were suitable to this region, suitable pooling mechanisms and ways 
of improving health system quality (Atim, 2011). Different ways of achieving UHC exist and a 
country pursues a path that is appropriate to its context. Experience from countries that have 
been successful in achieving UHC are useful sources of knowledge for other countries moving 
towards UHC, and this knowledge can guide countries that are pursuing UHC. A selection of 
prominent contextual factors that affect UHC, or the attainment thereof, are discussed in 
more detail in the remainder of this section in order to enable the selection of indicators that 
can be used to represent these causal conditions in the QCA analysis.  
4.4.1 Fiscal context 
Fiscal context refers to the will and ability of governments to raise revenues that allow them 
to spend on public services, including healthcare. A large fiscal capacity creates potential for 
governments to spend on healthcare (or any other government programme), thereby 
reducing or eliminating financial barriers to healthcare (WHO, 2016b). Fiscal space is the term 
that is commonly used to articulate the budgetary room that a government has to finance a 
purpose they desire, without harming the sustainability of their financial position (Heller, 
2005; WHO, 2016b). Sustainability in the context of fiscal space relates to the ability and 
capacity of a government to finance desired programs, pay debts and to ensure future solvency 
(Heller, 2005). The indicators that give insight into the fiscal context, as defined in the WHO’s 
health financing diagnostics and guidance (WHO, 2016b), are summarised in Table 4.12. 




Table 4.12. Indicators for fiscal space. 
Reason Indicator 
What is the level of government 
spending? 
This is a reflection of the public sector in the economy. In general, 
a governmental expenditure of less than 15% reflects very low 
fiscal capacity, 15%-20% is low, 20%-25% is low to medium, 25%-
35% is medium, 35%-45% is medium to high and above 45% is 
very high (WHO, 2016b). 
What space is available to increase 
government revenue?  
Tax to GDP ratio  
This indicates the tax capacity of the government. It is important  
to know if the government spending by applying the rules 
indicated above as to establish if the ratio is low or high (WHO, 
2016b). 
How is government spending aligned 
with the long-term capacity to spend? 
Debt to GDP ratio  
The debt to GDP ratio is used when a government has been 
operating in a budget deficit over a significant period of time, 
interest rates charged to pay off the debt and the debt itself and 
the GDP growth rates will need to be taken into account. The 
International Monitory Fund (IMF) advices a debt to GDP ratio 
of 60% for high income countries and for developing of low-
middle-income countries, a debt to GDP ratio of 40% (IMF, 2010; 
WHO, 2016b). 
 
Government budget deficit  
 This indicates if the revenue that a government generates is 
exceeded by the expenditure hence it is in line with fiscal  
sustainability, such a situation would mean that the government  
find difficulty in expending in other sectors including health 
(WHO, 2016b). 
What capacity is available from overseas, 
mainly for developing countries? 
 
Gross National Income per capita PPP 
GNI is the sum of value added by all producers who are residents 
of a country including any product taxes (less subsidies) not 
included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary 
income (compensation of employees and property income) from 
abroad. 
 
Source: WHO (2016b). 
4.4.2 The structure of public administration 
Decision-making is one of the core facilitators of UHC reforms and goals. The manner in 
which political-administrative decision making responsibilities at diverse levels are structured 
and the extent to which the government is decentralised, are therefore important. This 
influences priority making at different sectors especially in public spending. Healthcare 
system inequalities across regions in a country at national and sub-national levels can be 
indicative of the effects of the public administration structure. Fragmentation in pooling 
arrangements can be influenced by the extent to which the government influences 
redistribution and equalisation through geographies in the healthcare sector and public 
financing at large. The way that public administration is structured influences the central 
health financing system, especially pooling arrangements (WHO, 2016b). Examples can be 




seen in Canada where each province is responsible for delivering healthcare to its population. 
Fragmentation is a serious issue in Canada, because funds are distributed by the central 
government according to the population sizes of the provinces as opposed to the need for 
healthcare. This has led to provinces merging to form larger regional risk pools to mitigate 
the effects of fragmentation (Britnell, 2015a). Italy also collects health revenues centrally and 
then redistributes them to the country’s regions. The country has faced inequality in the 
regions where the southern parts of the country generally has poor healthcare compared to 
the northern parts. Italy has made efforts to reduce the inequalities in the form of a risk 
equalisation fund (Fondo Perequativo Nazionale; Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
4.4.3 Public sector financial management 
Public financial arrangements (PFM) are the rules and processes that govern the public 
sector’s expenditure reporting, budgeting, financial control and distribution. They have 
important implications for health system reforms. It is important to understand the budgeting 
process with regards to the actors, their powers, roles and responsibilities. On the health 
sector level, it is important to assess the extent of autonomy that health sector managers have, 
as it is a crucial determinant of efficiency that allows them to implement new initiatives at 
facility level (WHO, 2016b).  
4.4.4 Education 
Education and health are key to human capital (Groot & Van den Brink, 2006) as they have 
significant effects on productivity. Groot & Van den Brink (2006) describe the three ways in 
which education and health are involved in a positive relationship. Firstly, the healthier 
people are, the more they invest in education. Secondly, both education and health are 
similarly affected by factors such as wealth and social status. Thirdly, education translates into 
good health. Van der Heide et al. (2013), studied the relationship between education and 
health by using health literacy as a proxy for education and concluded that poor health is 
related to poor education. In a policy brief for the National Poverty Centre based at the 
University of Michigan, Ford (2007) highlights the relationship between education and health, 
stating that strengthening educational policies would in turn have a positive impact on health. 
Table 4.13 shows the indicators for education that are considered for use in the QCA analysis. 
These indicators consider the level of education in a country, as well as the level of investment 
that the country makes in education. 




Table 4.13. Indicators for country education. 
Indicator Description 
Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both 
sexes. 
The percentage of the population aged 15 and above 
that is able to read and write. They should also be able 
to comprehend a simple statement about their daily 
life. 
Educational attainment, at least Bachelor's or 
equivalent, population 25+, total (%) 
(cumulative). 
The percentage of people above the age of 25 that 
have attained a Bachelor’s or the equivalent. 
Government expenditure on education total (% of 
GDP). 
General government expenditure on health, including 
transfers from international organisations for the 




Section 4.3.2.1 discusses the dominant risk pooling mechanisms for healthcare, namely state 
funded-systems, SHI, CBHI and VHI. They are predominantly financed through payroll 
contribution and general government taxes. Employment therefore plays a vital role in 
creating capacity to collect health revenues. Low employment levels (or high unemployment) 
means that a large portion of the population are not able to contribute to healthcare funding. 
Low availability of funds leads to inequality in the use of health services, as well as shortages 
in available resources for healthcare (Steenekamp, 2016). In a policy brief, targeted at the 
effects of the ageing population on the health systems in Europe, the two dominant factors 
affecting healthcare were determined to be expenses in relation to long-term care and a 
declining working population. 
The employment indicators that are considered for use in the QCA analysis are given in Table 
4.14.  
Table 4.14: Indicators for the level of employment. 
Indicator Description 
Employment to population (15+ years), total 
(estimated ILO) 
This is the proportion of the working population (15+), 
who have been involved in for profit activities to 
produce goods or services for at least an hour. 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 
(modelled ILO estimate) 
This is the proportion of the working population 
(labour force) that is looking for employment, available 
and seeking. 
Source: World Bank, 2017). 
 
 




4.4.6 Poverty and inequality  
Poverty leads to the deprivation of five basic human capabilities:  
i. Economic deprivation. This includes income levels, livelihood and decent jobs.  
ii. Human capabilities. This includes education and health. Poverty deprives people 
politically as they are less empowered with regards to their voices and rights.  
iii. The socio-cultural dimension. This includes status and dignity. 
iv. Protection. Poverty has negative effects on security, risk and vulnerability. Regarding 
healthcare, the poor in society generally have the worst health statistics, including high 
mortality rates, disease prevalence and low access to healthcare. The poor are the most 
vulnerable to the unpredictable nature of the need for healthcare because, in most 
cases, they are unable to make prepaid contributions for future health needs. WHO & 
OECD (2003) and Pickett & Wilkinson (2015) conducted a literature review with the 
aim of unpacking the causal relationships between income inequality and health, 
concluding that income inequality has significant effects on health and wellbeing.  
Table 4.15. Indicators for poverty and inequality. 
Indicator Description 
Poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day (PPP) (% of 
population). 
This is the proportion of the population that live on 
less than US$3.10 a day. 
The Gini Index. 
The Gini Index is a measure of income distribution in 
a country or consumption expenditure. A Gini Index of 
100 represents total inequality and 0 represents perfect  
equality. 
Source: World Bank (2017). 
4.5 Conclusion: UHC landscape 
In this chapter, the outcome and causal conditions for QCA were defined and discussed. The 
outcome conditions manifested as UHC goals, which are utilisation/need, quality of care and 
financial protection. The causal conditions were divided into health financing arrangements 
and contextual factors. The health financing arrangements under consideration included 
revenue raising, pooling, purchasing and benefits design. The contextual factors included 
fiscal space, employment, education, poverty and inequality.  
In this chapter, the main objective was to identify comprehensive indicators for the purposes 
of measuring each of the conditions (constructs). This work then flows into Chapter 5, where 




cases for QCA are selected, respective data is collected and the set membership scores are 
obtained for QCA purposes.  
 




Chapter 5  CASES AND DATA PROCESSING 
In this chapter, the data collection and processing are discussed with the aim of creating the 
set membership scores3, in line with QCA. The highlighted processes in Figure 5.1 are also 
addressed in line with QCA. For this study, the csQCA variant was selected. This in not only 
because it resonates with the nature of decision making (in the context of priority setting), 
but also because it offers clarity, compared to continuous values (Blackman, 2013). Finally, 
because parts of the constructs are defined in terms of qualitative indicators, there is a 
preference for the dichotomous nature of csQCA to reduce ambiguity. 
 
Figure 5.1. QCA flow diagram, which shows the processes addressed in this chapter.  
 
 
The chapter begins with a description of the case selection process and the key considerations. 
This is followed by a discussion on the data gathering, including data sources and inclusion 
and exclusion of indicators discussed in Chapter 4. Thirdly, the quantitative data (for pooling 
and purchasing constructs) is presented. Then, the standardisation methods considered to 
create the constructs are discussed, namely service coverage, quality of care, financial 
protection, revenue raising, pooling, purchasing, fiscal space, employment, education and 
                                                 
3 This is the definition of thresholds between values in QCA (Sehring, 2013). For csQCA, there is full set  
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inequality. Finally, there is a discussion on how the set membership scores for csQCA were 
determined, together with a presentation of the set membership scores. 
5.1 Cases and data collection 
This section discusses the data collection process, with motivations for including and 
excluding certain cases and indicators. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, a key consideration for 
selecting cases is the number of causal conditions under consideration (Gross, 2010). For the 
csQCA variant of QCA applied in this study, the minimum number of cases amounts to 2𝑘 =
24 = 16 cases.  
Another key consideration was the variety of configurations in the conditions (health financial 
arrangements and contextual factors) and outcomes (UHC goals). According to Bergschlosser 
& De Meur, (2009), it can be viewed as inappropriate for a researcher to select cases they 
would like to include and exclude in the study. It is, however, acceptable in QCA studies, 
because QCA research seeks to determine whether certain combinations of conditions and 
outcomes exist, rather than to investigate the frequency of occurrences of certain 
characteristics (QCA is not probabilistic). In the case of QCA, a more heterogeneous set of 
outcomes and conditions is more favourable as it produces rich explanations for phenomena 
(Gross, 2010; Jordan et al., 2011). 
The unit of analysis in this study was a country, meaning that the cases to be considered are 
countries, hence country-level data was considered. Figure 5.2 shows the process of case 
selection in a linear form. It is important to note that this process was iterative but is presented 
in linear form for the sake of clarity of the narrative. The first step in case selection was to 
collect data relating to the outcomes of interest, as outlined in Section 4.2, namely service 
coverage, quality of care and financial protection. A total of 100 countries (at different 
developmental levels) as shown in Table B-6 in Appendix B were considered. Data were also 
collected as per the indicators in Table 5.1. Table B-6 in Appendix B also shows data for the 
indicators for the QCA outcome conditions, namely service coverage, quality of care and 
financial protection. For case selection; data availability and a focus on a combination of well- 
and poorly-performing cases were used as filters. The first consideration was the availability 
of data on the three outcome constructs (service coverage, quality of care and financial 
protection). Then, cases with missing data from any of the indicators representing the 




outcome variables were removed. This filtering process reduced the cases to a total of 59 
countries, as shown in Figure 5.2. The 59 cases are presented in Table B-9 in Appendix B.  
Secondly, z-score transformations, which are discussed in Section 5.4, were applied to the 
data relating to the three QCA outcomes. The reason for this was to be able to clearly 
distinguish between well- and poorly-performing cases. Cases with z-scores above the mean 
were considered to be well-performing, whereas cases with z-scores below the mean were 
considered to be poorly-performing. The primary motivation for this is that the nature of QCA 
requires a combination of well-performing and poorly-performing cases (Jordan et al., 2011). 
The third filter in the process was to select cases based on the availability of quantitative data 
for the input variables, namely revenue raising, fiscal space, employment, inequality and 
education. After this process, a total of 40 cases were available. They are presented in Table 
Table B-10 in Appendix B. The final filter was to consider the availability of qualitative data 
(for pooling and purchasing). This filter reduced the cases to 17, as presented in Table B-11 in 
Appendix B, which also shows the abbreviations that were used for these countries’ names.  
The 17 countries that were selected for inclusion as cases in this research are Australia, 
Botswana, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic, Haiti, India, Italy, Thailand, Nigeria, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Armenia, the United States of 
America and Canada. 
Table 5.1, shows how the different constructs were formed, the indicators considered, the 
indicators applied, their data sources, and descriptions of how the constructs were developed. 
The constructs are the variables for the QCA analysis and are formed through the construction 
of composite indices from the indicators that represent them. The indicators tab shows the 
indicators identified in Chapter 4. The indicator inclusion/exclusion tab shows the indicators 
that were applied. Changes or exclusions were due to data unavailability or lack of 
comprehensiveness. The data source tab shows the sources where data were gathered and the 
nature of the data (qualitative or quantitative). The variable processing tab describes how 
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Table 5.1. Construct formation. 
Construct Indicators Indicator inclusion/exclusion4 Data source
5 Variable processing 
Service 
coverage 
Antenatal care (4+ visits) 
Antenatal care coverage; at least 
four visits (%)  
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from (WHO, 
2017b). 
Z-scores were calculated for each of the 
indicators with the purpose of 
standardisation. The resulting z-scores 
were then added to form a composite z-
score. In order to form the set 
memberships, z-scores above zero were 
valued at binary “1”. Z-scores below zero 
were valued at binary “0”. 
Child full immunisation 
Diphtheria tetanus toxoid and 
pertussis (DTP3) immunisation 
coverage among one year olds (%)  
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from (WHO, 
2017b). 
Measles-containing-vaccine first-
dose (MCV1) immunisation 
coverage among one year olds (%) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from WHO 
(2017b) 
Polio (Pol3) immunisation coverage 
among one year olds (%) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from WHO 
(2017b) 
Breast cancer screening (women 
aged 40-49) 
N/A N/A 
Cervical cancer screening 
(women aged 18-49) 
N/A N/A 
Skilled birth attendant at 
delivery 
Births attended by skilled health 
staff (% of total)  
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017), in collaboration with 
the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
State of the World’s Children, 
ChildInfo and demographic 
and health surveys (DHS) 
Child treated for acute 
respiratory infection 
N/A N/A 





                                                 
4 N/A means that the data was not available. 
5 N/A means that the data was not available. 
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Table 5.1. continued… 
 
Construct Indicators Indicator inclusion/exclusion Data source Variable processing 
Service 
Coverage 
Inpatient admission in the last 
year 
N/A N/A 
Z-scores were calculated for each of the 
indicators with the purpose of 
standardisation. The resulting z-scores 
were then added to form a composite z-
score. In order to form the set 
memberships, z-scores above zero were 
valued at binary “1”. Z-scores below zero 
were valued at binary “0”. 
Quality of 
care 
Perioperative mortality rate N/A N/A 
Obstetric and gynaecological 
admissions owing to abortion 
N/A N/A 
Institutional maternal mortality 
ratio 
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled 
estimate per 100 000 live births)  
Data was quantitative and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017) in collaboration with 
WHO, UNICEF, United 
Nations Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA) and  
United Nations Population 
Division (UNPD) 
Maternal death reviews N/A N/A 
ART retention rate N/A N/A 
TB treatment success rate 
Tuberculosis treatment success rate 
(% of new cases) 
Data was quantitative, and 




Headcount ratio of catastrophic 
health expenditure 
Risk of catastrophic expenditure for 
surgical care (% of people at risk) 
Data was quantitative and 
originated from The Lancet 
Commission (2015) via 
World Bank (2017) 
Headcount ratio of 
impoverishing health 
expenditure 
Risk of impoverishing expenditure 
for surgical care (% of people at 
risk) 
Data was quantitative and 
originated from The Lancet 
Commission (2015) via 




expenditure on health as % of 
total health expenditure 
(GGHE%THE) 
General government expenditure 
on health as % of total health 
expenditure (GGHE%THE) 
Data was quantitative and 
originated from WHO, 
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Table 5.1. continued… 
 
Construct Indicators Indicator inclusion/exclusion Data source Variable processing 
Revenue 
raising 
Private prepaid plans as a 
percentage of expenditure on 
health (VHI%THE) 
Private prepaid plans as a 
percentage of private expenditure 
on health 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from WHO 
(2017b) 
Z-scores were calculated for each of the 
indicators with the purpose of 
standardisation. The resulting z-scores were 
then added to form a composite z-score. In  
order to form the set memberships, z-scores 
above zero were valued at binary “1”. Z-
scores below zero were valued at binary “0”. 
Per capita government 
expenditure on health, US$ 
adjusted for purchasing power 
(“purchasing power parity” 
[PPP]) or $ International 
Per capita government expenditure 
on health, US$ adjusted for 
purchasing power (“purchasing 
power parity” [PPP]) or $ 
International 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from WHO 
(2017b) 
Fiscal space 
The ratio of government 
spending to GDP (fiscal 
envelope) 
General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017) 
Tax to GDP ratio Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017) 
Debt to GDP ratio 
Central government debt, total (% 
of GDP) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017) 
Gross National Income per 
capita PPP 
GNI per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017) 
Education 
Adult literacy rate, population 
15+ years, both sexes 
Government expenditure on 
education, total (% of GDP) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from United 
Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) 
Institute for Statistics via 
World Bank (2017) 
Educational attainment, at least 
Bachelor's or equivalent, 
population 25+, total (%) 
(cumulative) 
Government expenditure on 
education, total (% of GDP) 
Employment 
Employment to population (15+ 
years), total (estimated ILO) 
Employment to population (15+ 
years), total (estimated ILO) 
Data was quantitative, and 
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Table 5.1. continued… 
 
Construct Indicators Indicator inclusion/exclusion Data source Variable processing 
Employment 
Unemployment, total (% of 
total labour force) (modelled 
ILO estimate) 
Unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force) (modeled ILO 
estimate) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from 
International Labor 
Organization via World 
Bank (2017) 
Z-scores were calculated for each of the 
indicators with the purpose of 
standardisation. The resulting z-scores 
were then added to form a composite z-
score. In order to form the set 
memberships, z-scores above zero were 
valued at binary “1”. Z-scores below zero 
were valued at binary “0”. 
Poverty and 
inequality 
Poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 
a day (PPP) (% of population) 
N/A N/A 
The Gini Index  Gini index (World Bank estimate) 
Data was quantitative, and 
originated from World Bank 
(2017) and Statistica (2017). 
Pooling 
The level of prepayment The level of prepayment Qualitative sources. (The 
data sources will be 
presented in Section 5.3.) 
Each of the indicators was first evaluated 
according to presence or absence, 
meaning that, good performance was 
awarded with a one (“1”) and poor 
performance was awarded with a zero (“0”). 
A total score was calculated for each 
country by adding the respective indicator 
scores. Z-scores were then calculated for 
each country, from the total scores. These 
were then used to determine, well- and 
poorly-performing cases. A positive z- score 
means above average performance, relative 
to the other countries (a score of "1”). A 
negative z-score means below average 
performance (a score of “0”).  
Fragmentation in risk pools Fragmentation in risk pools 
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Table 5.1. continued… 
 
Construct Indicators Indicator inclusion/exclusion Data source Variable processing 
Pooling 
What proportion of the 
population do the available risk 
pools cover? 
What proportion of the population 
do the available risk pools cover? 
Qualitative sources. The 
data sources will be 
presented in Section 5.3. 
Each of the indicators was first evaluated 
according to presence or absence, 
meaning that, good performance was 
awarded with a one (“1”) and poor 
performance was awarded with a zero (“0”). 
A total score was calculated for each 
country by adding the respective indicator 
scores. Z-scores were then calculated for 
each country, from the total scores. These 
were then used to determine, well- and 
poorly-performing cases. A positive z- score 
means above average performance, relative 
to the other countries (a score of “1”). A 
negative z-score means below average 
performance (a score of “0”). 
Purchasing 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do purchasers influence payments 
rates? 
Do robust information systems 
exist to support strategic 
purchasing? 
Do robust information systems 
exist to support strategic 
purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do provider performance reviews 
exist? 
Do accountability systems exist 
between providers and 
purchases? 
Do accountability systems exist 
between providers and purchases? 
Provider payment mechanisms Provider payment mechanisms 
Benefits 
design 




Priority setting organisation N/A N/A 
Monitoring mechanisms N/A N/A 
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5.2 Quantitative data 
This section presents the quantitative data and clarifies the inclusion and exclusion of the 
indicators presented in Table 5.1. The quantitative data gathered for this study are presented 
in Table B-6 and Table B-7 in Appendix B.  
i. Service coverage  
The first construct is service coverage. According to WHO (2001) and Lakew, Bekele & 
Biadgilign (2015), full immunisation coverage constitutes BCG vaccination against 
tuberculosis, three doses for  the prevention of diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus 
(DPT3), at least three doses of the polio vaccine (Pol3) and at least a dose of a measles 
vaccine (MCV1). BCG vaccination was not considered, due to the lack of data. Breast 
and cervical cancer screening indicators were not considered because of the lack of 
credibility of the available data from the WHO (2017b). Child treatment for acute 
respiratory infection was not considered, because the available data were on deaths 
caused by the disease, rather than the treatments offered (WHO 2017b). Child 
treatment for diarrhoea was not included in the study, as it is dependent on the 
context. The need for diarrhoea treatment is more prevalent in developing countries 
than developed countries (WHO, 2017a). Lastly, the lack of available and 
comprehensive data led to the omission of inpatient admissions as an indicator. 
ii. Quality of care 
TB treatment success rate and institutional maternal mortality ratio were applied for 
the quality of care construct. It is important to note that a proxy was used for the 
institutional maternal ratio that was used for the maternal mortality ratio, due to 
insufficient data for the former. The two differ slightly in their definition: institutional 
maternal mortality ratio refers to maternal mortality in health institutions (WHO, 
2015b), whereas maternal mortality refers to maternal mortality in the case of both 
maternal mortality in and outside of health institutions (World Bank, 2017). The rest 








iii. Financial protection 
For financial protection, two proxy indicators were considered due to the unavailability 
of data for headcount ratio of impoverishing health expenditure and headcount ratio 
of catastrophic health expenditure. The proxy indicators were risk of catastrophic 
expenditure for surgical care (% of people at risk), as well as risk of impoverishing 
expenditure for surgical care (% of people at risk). Note that the fundamental principle 
of the indicators still holds, but the applied indicators measure the risk of catastrophic 
expenditure and impoverishment only for surgical care. 
iv. Fiscal space 
In the case of fiscal space, data were gathered for all of the proposed indicators. 
v. Education 
Data were gathered for the adult literacy rate in the population (15+ years) for both 
sexes and for the level of education (at least Bachelor's or equivalent) in the population 
population (25+). The total percentages (cumulative) were not comprehensive across 
countries and were therefore not included. 
vi. Employment 
For this construct, all data were obtained. 
vii. Poverty and inequality 
Data for the poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day (PPP) (% of population) and the 
poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) were not 
comprehensive across countries and were therefore not included. Only data for the 
Gini coefficient were included, which reduced this construct to inequality. Note that, 
from this point onwards the construct will be referred to as “inequality” as only the 
Gini coefficient, which is a measure of inequality, was considered. 
5.2.1 Conclusion: Quantitative data 
In this section, the data collected for this study were presented, including explanations for 
including and excluding certain indicators. The data was further processed in Section 5.5 to 
calculate set membership scores.  




5.3 Qualitative data  
In this section, qualitative information for the pooling and purchasing constructs is presented. 
The information was collected from readily available literature sources through an exploratory 
literature search. Here, indicators for benefits design were not included due to the lack of 
comprehensive data across countries.  
5.3.1 Pooling  
The data for the pooling construct is presented here. Due to the lack of meaningful data, the 
management of risk pools indicator was omitted. In order to distinguish between good and 
poor performance, a score was awarded for each of the qualitative criteria. Table 5.2 shows 
the calibration criteria for risk pooling indicators. For the risk pooling indicators, as for all 
other indicators for which qualitative data was considered, a score of “1” was awarded for good 
performance and “0” for poor performance for each indicator. 
Table 5.2. Calibration criteria for risk pooling indicators. 
Indicator Scoring 
The level of prepayment. 
For this indicator, the key consideration was the level 
of prepayment in a country’s health system. A score of 
“1” was awarded if the majority of the health revenue 
in a country was from prepaid revenue. According to 
Mathauer & Carrin (2010), the level of prepayment 
should be above 70% of the total health Expenditure 
(THE). 
Fragmentation in risk pools. 
The existence of multiple risk pools was investigated 
here. If a country had a unitary risk pool, a score of “1” 
was awarded. In the event of multiple risk pools with 
risk equalisation mechanisms in place, a score of “1” 
was also awarded. A score of “0” was awarded if a 
country had multiple risk pools without risk 
equalisation between the different pools. 
What proportion of the population do the available 
risk pools cover? 
If access to pooled revenues was according to ability 
to pay and a generally low level of prepayment 
existed, then a score of “0” was awarded. A score of “1” 
was awarded if the access was not according to ability 
to pay and a general high level of prepayment existed. 
 
Qualitative data on the risk pooling arrangements for each of the 17 cases is summarised in 








Table 5.3. Risk pooling arrangements for Australia. 
Australia 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
Government expenditure on 
healthcare accounts for 67% of 
THE in Australia for the years 
2014-2015, whereas PHI accounted 
for 8.7% of THE (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017).  
Medicare, which is funded by the 
federal government and provides 
universal access to all Australian 
citizens, enrolled New Zealand’s 
citizens and other residents 
holding permanent visas. 
 
There are differences in care 
between rural and urban areas in 
Australia. This is evident through 
the publicly funded Public Health 
Development Unit, which was 
established in 1999 and publishes 
differences in access to healthcare 
between rural and urban areas. 
These disparities are mainly 
between the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander population 
and the rest of the country. 
 
Although PHI is supplementary to 
the universal Medicare. There are 
over 30 PHI funds in Australia 
(Australian Governemnt, 2017). 
There are differences in access to 
PHI across socioeconomic groups. 
Only 22.1 % of the most 
economically disadvantaged 
quintile has access to PHI 
compared to 57.2% of the 
advantaged quintile (Osborn and 
Sarnak, 2017). 
The federal government offers 
universal access to all Australian 
citizens, permanent visa holders 
and New Zealand citizens who are 
enrolled for Medicare.  
 
PHI, on the other hand, provides 
more choice of providers, refunds 
for specific health services and 
provides quicker access to non-
emergency health services. PHI 
offers general treatment coverage, 
hospital care and ambulance 
services. Patients have an option 
to use public or private treatment 
for hospital services, with full 
coverage offered for public care 
and 75% fee coverage when 
accessing private care (Osborn 
and Sarnak, 2017).  















Table 5.4. Risk pooling arrangements for Botswana. 
Botswana 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
General government expenditure 
on healthcare accounts for 57.1% 
of THE, whereas private pooled 
funding accounts for 39% of THE. 
OOP expenditure accounts for 
5.4% of THE (Health Policy 
Project, 2016b). 
The main source for a healthcare 
in Botswana is the publicly funded 
system, which is operated by the 
Ministry of Health and covers 
above 80% of the population (Cali 
& Avila, 2016). The country is 
making efforts to increase access 
to healthcare through the 
implementation of PHI.  
 
17% of the population in Botswana 
are covered via PHI. There are 
nine PHI pools in the country, but 
three of the nine cover 88% of the 
population under PHI. This 
means that the other risk pools 
are insufficiently small for 
sustainable risk pooling. In 
addition, the PHI mainly serves 
individuals with formal 
employment, primarily medium-
to-high-income individuals in 
urban areas (Health Policy 
Project, 2016b).  
The publically financed system 
provides most of the health 
coverage, and covers over 80% of 
the population and only 5.4% of 
OOP payments. The government-
financed system is open to all, but 
disparities exist in rural areas 
where there need to be 
improvements in access and 
quality of health services (Health 
Policy Project, 2016b). 




















Table 5.5. Risk pooling arrangements for Cameroon. 
Cameroon 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
General tax revenues account for 
33% of THE. CBHI schemes cover 
about 1.3% of the population. PHI 
covers about 190 408 individuals, 
which is approximately 1% of the 
population (Wright, Bhuwanee, 
Patel, Holtz, Bastelaer & Eichler, 
2017). 
Access to healthcare in Cameroon 
is provided through government-
subsidised services (Régime 
d’Assistance Sociale), CBHI, PHI, 
social security and OOPs. The 
country has 16 registered private 
health insurances, which are 
affordable to wealthy groups in 
the country.  
 
PHI is mostly purchased by 
employers on behalf of their 
employees, and covers only 1% of 
the population. Members in these 
private insurances are subject to 
co-payments that are 
approximately 25% of the cost of 
care.  
 
There are about 158 CBHI 
schemes in the country that cover 
approximately 1.3% of the 
population. Disparities can be 
observed in the premiums for PHI 
and CBHI where the average 
annual premiums for the former is 
(US $265 per year per adult) and 
the latter is (US $ 26 per year per 
adult) (Wright et al., 2017). 
There are generally low levels of 
prepayment in Cameroon with the 
largest proportion of prepaid 
revenues originating from General 
tax revenues at 33% of THE. Both 
PHI and CBHI cover as little as 
2.3% of the population and access 
to them is based on the ability to 
pay.  
 
The bulk of the health 
expenditure is OOPs, signifying a 
low level of population coverage 
and access to healthcare in the 
country (Wright et al., 2017). 

















Table 5.6. Risk pooling arrangements for Croatia. 
Croatia 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
The key sources of health finance 
in the Croatian health system are 
the state budget (tax revenue) 
allocation and the Croatian 
Health Insurance Fund (CHIF). 
The CHIF contributes 
approximately 75% of health 
expenditure. The State budget 
allocation contributes 
approximately 15% of the CHIF’s 
revenues. The CHIF is a quasi-
public body, which is responsible 
for administering the universal 
health care system in Croatia. It is 
the primary source of health 
financing in the country. 
 
Mandatory prepayments for 
healthcare in Croatia originate 
from the employed population, 
employers, the self-employed and 
farmers (Džakula, Sagan, Pavić, 
Lončarek & Sekelj-Kauzlarič, 
2014).  
Croatia’s health financing system 
is based on funds from both 
private and public sources. The 
public sources are from both 
mandatory insurance and tax 
revenues where public sources are 
PHI and OOPs.  
 
Mandatory insurance 
contributions constitute the 
majority of the health revenues 
and are collected via the State 
treasury accounts. The CHIF is 
also responsible for collecting 
revenues from VHI contributions 
although other private insurers 
exist. These revenues are however 
separate to the Mandatory Health 
Insurance (MHI) revenue. 
 
VHI contribution in the Croatian 
health system acts as 
complementary cover and is 
mainly used to cover co-
payments. OOPs are also used to 
cover co-payments.  
 
The CHIF represents a 
consolidated risk pool for the 
entire Croatian population, this 
was in effect from 2002 (Džakula 
et al., 2014).  
Virtually, the whole Croatian 
population and foreigners holding 
permanent residence are covered 
according to the Croatian Health 
Care Act through the MHI system. 
 
Only about a third of the Croatian 
population, who are those who 
are economically active are 
mandated to make contributions 
in the MHI. Vulnerable 
population groups are exempted 
from making contributions. These 
include the disabled, war veterans 
and military personnel, low 
income groups, the unemployed, 
old aged, people under the age of 
18, and students between the ages 
of 18 and 26. 
 
The main purpose of the only 
supplementary health insurance 
(collected via private insurers and 
the CHIF) is to cover user charges 
in the MHI system. Although 
supplementary insurance is 
voluntary, only the disabled, 
organ donors, blood donors 
students between 18 and 26 years 
old and people who earn less than 
45.59% of the government defined 
salary base, have the right to free 
supplementary health insurance 
(Džakula et al., 2014). 















Table 5.7. Risk pooling arrangements for Czech Republic. 
Czech Republic 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
The SHI financing mechanisms 
(wages and general taxation) 
contribute the majority of health 
expenditure. The other two main 
sources of finances are from state 
and territorial budgets (general 
taxation) and private expenditure. 
 
Public expenditure on health as a 
percentage of THE in Czech 
Republic is about 84%, whereas 
private prepaid expenditure on 
health is about 1% of THE. OOPs 
contribute about 14% of THE 
(Alexa et al., 2015).  
All of the SHI contributions are 
redistributed according to a risk 
adjustment formula with the aim 
of reducing the chances of risk 
selection. A capitation formula, 
which takes into account age and 
gender across five-year categories, 
was introduced in 2014, which 
resulted in 36 groups. In Czech 
Republic, health insurance funds 
are quasi-public entities that 
operate independently and are 
subject to the law of the country. 
These funds are not allowed to 
make profit and all legally 
qualifying applicants are entitled 
to insurance. The government 
prohibits any form of risk 
selection and cream-skimming 
behaviour (Alexa et al., 2015). 
All permanent residents of Czech 
Republic are entitled to benefit 
from SHI contribution. Access is 
therefore not based on the ability 
to contribute and virtually 
everyone in the population are 
covered (Alexa et al., 2015). 


















Table 5.8. Risk pooling arrangements for Haiti. 
Haiti 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
Haiti’s government expenditure 
on healthcare has decreased 
dramatically over the years. In 
1995 government expenditure on 
health was at about 41% of THE, 
compared to only 7% in 2013. 
Some of the changes can also to a 
certain extent be attributed to the 
earthquake that devastated the 
country in 2010. 
 
Currently, donor funding 
contributes the largest proportion 
of THE, 64%. OOPs contribute 
30% of THE (Health Policy 
Project, 2016c).  
Publically, the Office d’Assurance 
Accident du Travail, Maladie et 
Maternite (OFATMA) offers 
health insurance and social 
protection to employees in the 
private and the public sectors. 
Contribution to OFATMA is 
mandatory for formal employees 
and voluntary for those in the 
informal sector. OFATMA 
however only covers 2% of the 
population. 
 
The elderly and disabled are 
covered through the Office 
National d’Assurance Vieillesse 
(ONA), which covers less than 1% 
of the population. 
 
The country has nine private 
health insurances, which cover 
only approximately 4% of the 
population and are largely 
fragmented. 
 
Both public and private 
companies provide health 
insurance to their employees and 
their dependants, this has led to 
small fragmented risk pools 
(Health Policy Project, 2016c). 
 
Approximately 90% of Haiti’s 
health budget is spent on paying 
health workers. This is one of the 
major hindrances to access, 
leaving little to no revenue 
allocated to improving access to 
healthcare. Risk pooling in Haiti is 
close to non-existent, with the 
major pooling agents OFATMA, 
ONA and private insurances, 
covering less than 10% of the 
population (Health Policy Project, 
2016c).  













Table 5.9. Risk pooling arrangements for India. 
India 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
Evidence suggests that less than 
20% of the Indian population had 
any form of health coverage by 
2014. OOPs contribute the bulk of 
India’s health expenditure at 
about 69% (Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017).  
India has at least 16 publically 
funded insurance schemes. The 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) was introduced in 2008 
with the aim of improving access 
to healthcare and reducing the 
high levels of OOPS in the 
country. 
 
The health system is highly 
fragmented with the Employees 
State Insurance Scheme designed 
for factory workers. The Central 
Government Health Scheme is for 
civil servants. Railway and 
defence forces employees also 
have their own separate risk pools 
and individual states run risk 
pools for their employees as well. 
 
Uptake for VHI has generally been 
slow amongst Indians, with the 
majority of the population opting 
for OOPs other than VHI (Health 
Policy Project, 2016a; Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
In principle, all Indian citizens 
have health insurance that is 
financed via the tax financing 
system. Several bottlenecks in the 
public health system has, 
however, led to the majority of 
the population seeking private 
care, hence high levels of OOPs 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 















Table 5.10. Risk pooling mechanisms for Italy. 
Italy 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
About 75% of Italy’s THE is 
publically financed. The bulk of 
public health financing is from 
corporate tax. Public health 
revenues are pooled nationally 
and are then reallocated back to 
the respective regions of 
collection, typically according to 
the proportions of contribution. 
Private health insurance only 
covers 1% of THE. An estimated 6 
million people (approximately 
10% of the population) in Italy 
make use of some form of VHI 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
The regional nature of the health 
contributions for healthcare, lead 
to interregional gaps in the 
capacity to raise health revenue. 
The gaps are more evident in the 
differences in cooperate tax each 
of the regions are able to raise 
(corporate tax contributes the 
bulk of the funding). 
 
The government also allows 
regions to raise additional health 
revenues for themselves, which 
leads to more disparities as some 
regions have higher capacity 
compared to others. 
 
The government created a risk 
equalisation fund called the Fondo 
Perequativo Nazionale, which 
aims at mitigating the financial 
inequalities between the 17 
regions in the country. The 
capitation-based formula used by 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
is adjusted for demographics in 
the form of age and gender 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
  
All Italian citizens and legal 
foreign residents have universal 
coverage. Since the year 1998 all 
undocumented immigrants could 
access urgent healthcare (Osborn 
& Sarnak, 2017). 














Table 5.11. Risks pooling arrangements for Thailand. 
Thailand 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
An estimated 77% of THE comes 
from public health expenditure in 
Thailand. There has been a 
significant jump from 2002 when 
the same proportion was about 
63% of THE. In the same period, 
there have been notable changes 
OOPs as a percentage of THE as 
well, from about 27% to about 
12%. Prepaid private revenues for 
healthcare have also been 
increasing over the years and are 
currently around 45% of THE 
(Jongudomsuk et al., 2015). 
 
The major pooling agencies in 
Thailand are the Comptroller 
General Department (CGD) for 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit 
Scheme (CSMBS), the Social 
Security Office (SSO) for SHI, the 
National Health Security Office 
(NHSO) for UHC and private 
insurance companies for VHI. 
The above-mentioned agencies are 
responsible for both pooling and 
purchasing arrangements. The 
public insurers in the above list do 
not compete for members as each 
has a defined set of beneficiaries. 
This is because coverage on the 
CSMBS and SHI are based on 
employment, whereas the rest are 
covered under the Universal 
Coverage Scheme (UCS) 
(Jongudomsuk et al., 2015). 
Coverage in Thailand is 
Universal to all regardless of 
ability to pay (Jongudomsuk et 
al., 2015).  

















Table 5.12. Risk pooling arrangements for Nigeria. 
Nigeria 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
The bulk of Nigeria’s health 
revenues originates from private 
sources, making up approximately 
76.1% of THE. However, 
approximately 95 % of the private 
expenditure originates from 
OOPs. General government 
expenditure on health only make 
up about 24% of THE (USAID, 
2016). 
The National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) is a single pool 
that only pools revenues for about 
4% of the Nigerian population. 
The NHIS covers formally 
employed people with the 
majority being employees of the 
federal government. The NHIS 
was established by law in 1999 
and launched in 2005 and was due 
to efforts from the government to 
achieve UHC. 
The implementation of the NHIS 
started through the Formal Sector 
Social Health Insurance 
Programme (FSSHIP), which is 
only available to formally 
employed individuals (Usoroh, 
2012; Onoka, Onwujekwe, 
Uzochukwu & Ezumah, 2013; 
USAID, 2016). The bulk of the 
Nigerian population depend on 
OOPs for healthcare access, with 
over 70% of the population not 
under health insurance (USAID, 
2016). 
Only about 5% of the Nigerian 
population has health coverage. 
The majority are those under 
formal population (Usoroh, 2012). 
0 0 0 
 
Table 5.13. Risk pooling arrangements for Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
OOPs constitute the bulk of THE 
in Bangladesh as about 64% of 
THE. About 27% of THE 
originates from general 
government revenues, with 
prepaid private revenues playing a 
minute part in the country’s 
health expenditure (Ahmed et al., 
2015). 
 
The main risk-pooling agent is the 
government through the country’s 
state-financed system. There are 
public and private risk pooling 
funds that play a minor role 
(Ahmed et al., 2015).  
Although the constitution of 
Bangladesh stipulates that access 
to healthcare is not based on the 
ability to pay (Ahmed et al., 2015), 
the majority of the population pay 
for healthcare via OOPs at about 
66% of THE. The government 
only covers approximately 34% of 
THE (Islam & Biswas, 2014).  
 








Table 5.14. Risk pooling arrangements for Cambodia. 
Cambodia 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
The majority of health 
expenditure in Cambodia is 
through OOPs, which comprises 
approximately 60% of THE. Both 
government expenditure and 
official developmental assistance 
(ODA) comprise approximately 
20% of THE each. PHI contributes 




There are low levels of risk 
pooling in the country, because of 
the high OOPs. The majority of 
the risk pooling is from the 
Health Equity Fund (HEF) 
(Annear et al., 2015). 
HEFs are a mechanism that is 
aimed at promoting access to 
healthcare, which make use of 
demand-side financing for 
improved equity. HEFs are mainly 
dependent on donor funding. 
Their primary aim is to cover full 
or partial health costs for the 
needy, which includes other 
expenses related to acquiring care, 
such as transportation (Peat, 
2013). In essence, HEFs are not 
regarded as risk pools, since their 
primary aim is to subsidise user 
fees, hence more of a risk 
equalisation measure (Annear et 
al., 2015).  
The country has few and quite 
small PHI and CBHI funds  
(Annear et al., 2015).  
As the main source of health 
cover, the HEF only cover about 
16% of the population. PHI and 
CBHI coverage only cover a small 
proportion of the population 
(Annear et al., 2015).  















Table 5.15. Risk pooling arrangements for Germany. 
Germany 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
Through the SHI system, health 
insurance is compulsory in 
Germany. Approximately 72% of 
THE in Germany originates from 
public sources, whereas PHI 
contributes about 9% of THE 
(Britnell, 2015a).  
Health insurance is in the form of 
sickness funds, which are not for 
profit, competing non-
governmental health funds, and 
PHI, which acts as a substitute. 
There are 132 sickness funds 
(Britnell, 2015a)  and 42 PHI 
companies (24 of the PHI 
companies are for profit)(Osborn 
& Sarnak, 2017). 
People who are exempt from SHI 
(civil servants, self-employed and 
those who opt out of SHI and earn 
above a certain amount) of 
income are allowed to join PHI 
funds. PHI is used as both 
complementary and 
supplementary insurance (Busse & 
Blümel, 2014; Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). It is compulsory for 
individuals who are employed and 
earn less than US$71 564 per year 
to be part of the SHI system 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
Each sickness fund collects health 
revenues and transfers them to 
the Central Reallocation Pool, 
which then redistributes funds 
according to risk profiles of the 
individual risk pools (Busse & 
Blümel, 2014; Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). 
The publically financed SHI 
allows access to all legal residents 
of Germany. This includes 
refugees and undocumented 
immigrants, as well as excludes 
visitors.  
The strong sense of solidarity in 
the German SHI system allows all 
eligible individuals to access the 
same level of care, regardless of 
their ability to pay (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017).  












Table 5.16. Risk pooling arrangements for The Republic of Korea. 
The Republic of Korea 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
The Republic of Korea utilises the 
NHI financing mechanism, which 
covers the entire population. 
Public expenditure on healthcare 
is about 55% of THE, whereas VHI 
only contributes about 5% of 
THE. OOPs make up about 35% of 
THE (Kwon, Lee, Kim & Kwon, 
2015).  
Before the year 2000, the country 
had three different types of health 
insurance:  
i. The first type was a single 
pool for teachers, civil 
servants and their 
dependants. 
ii. The second type comprised 
approximately 140 risk pools, 
and was dedicated to 
industrial workers and their 
dependants. 
iii. The third type was for self-
employed individuals and 
those employed by small 
firms. These comprised some 
230 risk pools and were 
termed “regional health 
insurance”. 
 
Currently, the pooling function is 
performed by a single insurance 
entity for the entire population 
(Kwon et al., 2015). 
The NHI covers the entire 
population in the Republic of 
Korea and it is mandatory for 
individuals who earn above a 
certain income to contribute. 
Impoverished individuals are 
exempted from making 
contributions and any co-
payments they are required to 
make at the point of care (Kwon 
et al., 2015). 
0 1 1 
 
Table 5.17. Risk pooling arrangements for Armenia. 
Armenia 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
OOPs are the dominant source of 
health revenues, contributing 
about 57% of THE, whereas 
general government expenditure 
is about 36% of THE (Richardson, 
2013).  
OOPs are high in Armenia and 
have led to a number of 
households in the country facing 
catastrophic and impoverishing 
expenditures on health. OOPs 
represent high levels of 
fragmentation (Richardson 2013). 
The OOPs in Armenia are in the 
form of formal and informal 
payments. Informal payments in 
the health system are due to 
varied and rather complex 
reasons. The high levels of OOPs 
have a detrimental effect on the 
breadth and depth of health 
coverage in Armenia. 
Approximately 82% of the 
Armenian population is excluded 
from access to the nominal basic 
benefits package (BBP) 
(Richardson 2013). 
0 0 0 
 
 




Table 5.18. Risk pooling arrangements for the United States of America. 
United States of America 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
General government expenditure 
on health is about 48% of THE. 
About 32% of THE originates from 
private prepaid revenue (WHO, 
2017b).  
The USA introduced the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which 
is rooted in the principle of shared 
responsibility between 
individuals, government and 
employers, with the aim of 
providing all American citizens 
access to healthcare. Yet, the 
American health system remains 
fragmented, comprising a number 
of both private and public risk 
pools. 
 
Medicare, Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) are the three 
main public sources of cover. 
Medicare is a federal program that 
is designed for individuals who 
are 65 and older, including some 
with disabilities. Medicaid and 
CHIP are a collection of federal 
state programs that are tailored 
for specific low income groups 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
During the first quarter of 2016, 
approximately 8.6% of the 
American population did not have 
health insurance. This was an 
improvement on the state of the 
coverage at the beginning of the 
ACA’s major coverage expansion 
programmes in 2014. 
This expansion in coverage is 
likely to stall due to the new 
congress and administration to 
repeal and replace ACA (Osborn 
& Sarnak, 2017). 
 
















Table 5.19. Risk pooling arrangements for Canada. 
Canada 
The level of prepayment Fragmentation in risk pools Proportion covered 
Public sources contribute 69.8% 
of Canada’s THE, whereas 12% of 
THE comes from PHI (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
Canada’s health system is based 
on a statutory health insurance 
model. Each province and 
territory has the responsibility to 
provide universal coverage to its 
population.  
 
Authorities in these territories 
and provinces are responsible for 
the funding and delivery of care. 
 
The majority of health funds in 
Canada originate from these 
provincial and territorial revenues 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
 
Fragmentation is a major problem 
in Canada’s health system. The 
problem stems from the nature in 
which the health revenues are 
distributed. In a nutshell, the 
federal government distributes 
revenues for the purposes of 
healthcare according to the 
population of the respective 
regions, rather than the need 
attributed to each province. 
Provinces have made efforts to 
integrate provincial pools to form 
regional pools as a form of risk 
equalisation (Britnell, 2015a).  
Essentially, everyone, including 
immigrants, have coverage for 
necessary care. Coverage is based 
on need for care and not the 
ability to pay. This stems from 
Canada’s principle of 
comprehensiveness under the 
Canada Health Act (Marchildon, 
2013).  
 













The data for the purchasing construct is presented here. A lack of meaningful data meant that 
the administrative efficiency indicator was omitted. Indicators for benefits design as shown 
in Table 5.1 were also not included, due to the lack of comprehensive information for all 
countries considered. Table 5.20 shows the calibration criteria used for purchasing indicators. 
For each indicator, a score of one (“1”) was awarded for good performance and zero (“0”) for 
poor performance. 
Table 5.20. Calibration criteria for purchasing indicators. 
Indicator Scoring 
Do purchasers influence payment rates? 
This indicator assesses the provider, government 
and provider relationship discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
A score of one was awarded when the purchaser 
and government controlled pricing for health 
services and products. A score of zero was awarded 
when the providers has more effects on the pricing.  
Do robust information systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
For this indicator, a value of one was awarded when 
the health system’s information system was 
electronic and had some level of integration. A zero 
was awarded when the system was not integrated 
and not electronic. 
Do provider performance reviews exist? 
Here, a score of one was awarded if the purchasing 
organisations conducted a performance review and 
took action when poor service was provided. A 
score of zero was awarded if the purchasing 
organisations merely paid bills without reviewing 
the performance of their respective providers. 
Do accountability systems exist between 
providers and purchases? 
A score of one was awarded when either the 
government or the purchasers required the 
providers to report performance information. A 
zero was awarded if no system of accountability 
existed. 
Provider payment mechanisms. 
The scoring criteria for this indicator will be 
discussed in Section 5.3.2.1. 
 
Qualitative data on the purchasing indicators for each of the 17 cases is summarised in Table 








Table 5.21. Purchasing arrangements for Australia. 
Australia 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The Australian federal 
government controls the 
health expenditure growth 
through the Medicare Benefits 
Scheme (MBS) and the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS). The 
government has an expert 
panel that is responsible for 
controlling expenditure 
growth in the MBS. The panel 
is also responsible for 
reporting the entire health 
plan for budgetary purposes. 
 
The federal government 
influences the price of 
pharmaceuticals through the 
PBS by negotiating with 
suppliers, as well as through 
priority setting for essential 
pharmaceuticals and supports 
the professional programmes 
that deal with the whole 
supply chain. The government 
also reduces costs by putting 
constraints on the health 
system. An example is 
reducing the number of health 
workers (Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). 
8900 providers in Australia use 
the interoperable national e-
health information system, 
with two-thirds of the usage 
existing among primary health 
facilities. To date, about 4 
million patients are part of the 
system, which records medical 
notes, referrals, diagnostic and 
imaging reports, and 
prescriptions. Furthermore, 
the system allows patients to 
enter any allergy information, 
adverse reactions to treatment 
and their suggestions for the 
system (Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). 
Measures of equity, 
effectiveness and efficiency are 
reported through a national 
reporting framework. This 
reporting framework was 
agreed upon by the Council of 
Australian Governments 
(COAG), which comprises the 
prime minister and first 
ministers of each state in 
Australia.  
The reporting body is the 
National Performance 
Authority and it reports data 
originating from public and 
private hospitals, local hospital 
networks (LHNs) and other 
important health providers 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017).  
The discussion on provider 
performance reviews also 
serves as proof of the existence 
accountability systems 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
Australia utilises DGRs, FFS 
and global budgets as payment 
mechanisms (Healy & 
Sharman, 2006; Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
1 1 1 1 1 
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Table 5.22. Purchasing arrangements for Botswana. 
Botswana 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




Botswana mainly utilises FFS 
and line item budgets as 
provider payment mechanisms 
(Health Policy Project, 2016b). 
These two payment 
mechanism require a fixed 
price for both goods and 
service. This price is set by the 
purchasing organisation. For 
example, with regards to FFS, 
the purchaser sets tariffs for 
each health service beforehand 
and then pays for each service 
that is provided by the 
provider.  
The Ministry of Health in 
Botswana has made efforts to 
improve the use of 
Information and 
Communications Technology 
(ICT). This was evident 
through the implementation 
of patient management 
systems in some hospitals in 
the country. A few hospitals 
have an Integrated Patient 
Management System, and 
national referral hospitals are 
now equipped with tele-
radiology technology.  
 
There is, however, limited 
interoperability amongst the 
few systems that are available 
(Seitio-kgokgwe, Gauld, Hill & 
Barnett, 2014).  
According to Mogwe (2014), 
only a handful of hospitals in 
Botswana report any quality 
management activities. The 
lack of clinical governance 
structures and strategies was 
also evident.  
The health inspectorate plays 
the role of regulation in the 
country’s health system. The 
inspectorate’s mandate is to 
inspect health personnel and 
facilities with the aim of 
quality improvement.  
The inspectorate has the 
capacity to impose 
accountability in the health 
system but although the 
National Health Plan (NHP) of 
2011 highlighted that 
accountability is key to the 
success of the health system. 
The Plan does not mention 
accountability in the aims and 
objectives of the NHP 
(Adekunle, 2015). 
Botswana utilises FFS and line 
item budgets. 
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Table 5.23. Purchasing arrangements for Cameroon. 
Cameroon 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The high OOPs in the health 
system make households the 
main purchaser in the health 
system (about 52% of THE) 
(Wright et al., 2017). High 
OOPs represent a fragmented 
system and reduces the power 
of the purchaser (Mcintyre, 
2013). 
 
As is the case with the 
majority of African countries, 
health system records are 
paper-based and fragmented 
(Ngwakongnwi, Atanga & 
Quan, 2014).  
 
Cameroon’s health system is 
dysfunctional with minimum 
levels of vertical and 
horizontal diffusion of 
information. 
 
The government and 
development partners are, 
however, making an effort to 
clearly map the health 
information system. They are 
still to create a clear 
framework for action (IFORD 
& World Bank, 2013). 
Although the government is 
increasing performance-based 
financing through the support 
of the World Bank and the 
Global Financing Facility, 
there is little evidence of 
performance-based financing 
(Wright et al., 2017).  
The high levels of OOPs in the 
country can further support 
this. 
The main issues in the 
Cameroonian health system 
result from inefficient health 
financing. These issues are 
systematic.  
Due to poor governance and 
corruption, the impact of the 
available finances is 
undermined. The corruption 
also stems as far as the 
pharmaceutical industry, 
which in turn has contributed 
to low levels of access and 
quality of care.  
Approximately 10% of health 
payments made by households 
are for informal payments 
(IFORD & World Bank, 2013). 
Cameroon utilises global 
budgets and P4P payment 
mechanisms (Wright et al., 
2017). 
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Table 5.24. Purchasing arrangements for Croatia. 
Croatia 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The Croatian government’s 
National Health Plan (NHP) 
stipulates guidelines according 
to which contracts are 
designed, as well as 
mechanisms for ensuring 
conformity to the above-
mentioned. Providers have to 
compete for contracts through 
the CHIF. In turn, the CHIF 
has the responsibility of 
paying for health services as 
per contractual agreement 
(Džakula et al., 2014). 
The Official Statistics Act of 
2003 sets the requirements on 
how data should be collected 
and which data is reported in 
Croatia. For example, it is 
mandatory for primary care 
facilities and specialists who 
are treating diabetes to report 
data to the Vuk Vrhovac Clinic 
for diabetes, endocrinology 
and metabolic diseases at the 
Medical Faculty at Zagreb 
University. 
 
The Croatian healthcare 
system has about 60 registers 
for information. The registers 
are however not integrated, 
nor standardised, and the bulk 
of the data is based on manual 
entry (Džakula et al., 2014).  
The CHIF is responsible for 
the supervision of compliance 
to contractual agreements 
from suppliers, 
pharmaceuticals, medical 
insurance, health institutions 
and private medical 
professionals (Džakula et al., 
2014). 
According to Džakula et al. 
(2014), Croatia’s health system 
lacks transparency and 
accountability. 
Croatia utilises capitation, 
DRGs, FFS, per diem, salaries 
and P4P payment mechanisms 
(Džakula et al., 2014). 
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Table 5.25. Purchasing arrangements for the Czech Republic. 
Czech Republic 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The Ministry of Health is 
responsible for facilitating the 
negotiations between 
providers and purchasers. The 
payment rates for both goods 
and services in the health 
system are based on the 
agreement between purchasers 
and providers with the 
supervision from the ministry 
(Alexa et al., 2015). 
The majority of the health care 
providers make use of digital 
electronic systems. There is, 
however, minimal exchange of 
information between different 
healthcare system 
stakeholders (Alexa et al., 
2015). 
The Ministry of Health sets 
minimum requirements 
regarding medical staff’s 
qualifications and the quality 
of medical equipment 
available. Lack of continuous 
compliance to the above, leads 
to the providers forfeiting 
their licences. 
The above-mentioned are the 
only categories in which the 
government sets quality 
standards, which means that 
there is no comprehensive 
system for quality 
measurement and 
accreditation (Alexa et al., 
2015). 
Providers are obliged to follow 
specific rules and standards of 
providing care. Despite this, 
the accountability in the 
Czech health system is low 
(Alexa et al., 2015). 
Czech Republic utilises 
capitation, DRGs, FFS, global 
budgets and per diem payment 
mechanisms (Alexa et al., 
2015). 
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Table 5.26. Purchasing arrangements for Haiti. 
Haiti 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 
exist between providers and 
purchases. 
Provider payment mechanisms 
The Haitian government 
spends most of its health 
budget on curative care, with 
the bulk being spent on 
pharmaceuticals and medical 
products. OFATMA, ONA and 
private insurers are the main 
purchasers in Haiti, covering 
only 5% of the population.  
 
Although 29.7% of health 
payments is from OOPs, with 
about 95% of the population 
without coverage, it is evident 
that there is lack of access due 
to the inability to pay (Health 
Policy Project, 2016c).  
 
Due to the high levels of the 
uninsured population, Haiti’s 
purchasing organisations do 
not have enough power to 
influence payment rates 
(McIntyre, 2013).  
Haiti’s health system involves 
a number of stakeholders, 
making it difficult to create a 
centralised information 
system. This was amplified 
when the country suffered an 
earthquake in 2010. 
 
Available health information is 
rather inaccurate, not timely, 
incomplete and fragmented 
(PAHO & WHO, 2011). 
NGOs are a major source of 
health finances in Haiti and 
they implement performance-
based financing (Eichler et al., 
2013; Health Policy Project, 
2016c).  
About 90% the health budget 
in Haiti is used to pay salaries. 
Health workers are paid low 
salaries with limited facilities, 
which is trumped up by weak 
accountability systems in the 
healthcare system (Durham et 
al., 2015). 
Haiti makes utilises salaries 
and P4P payment mechanisms 
(PAHO & WHO, 2011; Eichler 
et al., 2013). 
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Table 5.27. Purchasing arrangements for India. 
India 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The Indian health system 
generally makes little to no 
effort to contain costs or 
improve efficiency. A number 
of studies have reported 
inefficiencies in hospitals 
across the country (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
In 2008, India launched the 
Health Management 
Information system for 
monitoring purposes. Of the 
667 districts in the country, 
633 report data by facility. 
Surveys are also occasionally 
conducted on district, state 
and national levels. 
 
Private and public providers’ 
health information systems 
are, however, fragmented. This 
has led to the proposal to 
create a National eHealth 
Authority for the purposes of 
setting up regulations and 
standards (Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). 
India’s health system lacks a 
coherent system to ensure 
quality of care. The country 
does not have a quality 
assurance authority(Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017) . The problem is 
evident in both the private and 
public sectors, as  both have 
weak regulatory systems, 
quality assurance and cost 
containment structures 
(USAID, 2015). 
One of the main hindrances to 
access to care to the Indian 
population are the high levels 
of mismanagement, 
corruption and bureaucracy in 
the health system (Britnell, 
2015a). 
India utilises FFS, global 
budgets and salaries as 
payment mechanisms (Osborn 
& Sarnak, 2017). 
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Table 5.28. Purchasing arrangements for Italy. 
Italy 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




Prices for pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment are set 
according to studies 
conducted by the National 
Committee for Medical 
Devices and the National 
Drugs Agency. 
 
Prices for reimbursable drugs 
are set through negotiations 
between the government and 
pharmaceutical companies, 
whereas the market 
determines the prices of non-
reimbursable drugs. 
 
The National Pharmaceutical 
Formulary makes drug 
coverage decisions based on 
cost and clinical effectiveness 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
 
The country is largely 
following a cost-cutting 
programme, which has 
resulted in reduced wages for 
health workers, reduced 
payments for supplies and 
vacancy freezes (Britnell, 
2015a). 
The Nuovo Sistema 
Informativo Sanitario, which 
can be translated as “The New 
Health Information System”, 
was established in 2002 and 
implemented incrementally. 
The goal was to create an 
electronic system that 
connects all the levels of care. 
 
The biggest achievement thus 
far is the implementation of a 
universal clinical coding 
system called mattoni, which 
translates as “bricks”. This 
system allows for sharing of 
information between national 
and regional authorities. 
 
By the end of 2014, 
approximately 80% of all 
prescriptions were made using 
the electronic system. 
It is mandatory for all public 
healthcare providers to 
present information (through 
health service charts) 
regarding patients’ complaints, 
waiting times, quality of care 
indicators, service 
performance and quality 
assurance strategies. This 
information should be 
presented on a yearly basis. 
 
Private providers are also 
required to present service 
charts and this forms part of 
accreditation. This is as per 
National legislation (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
The country has high levels of 
corruption, which is evident 
from the frequency of bribing 
with the aim of skipping 
waiting lists, the outsourcing 
of contracts, fraudulent 
accreditation, and prices for 
drugs and healthcare devices, 
amongst others (Britnell, 
2015a). 
The country utilises capitation, 
DRGs, FFS, global budgets and 
P4P  (Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
1 1 1 0 1 
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Table 5.29. Purchasing arrangements for Thailand. 
Thailand 
Do purchasers influence 
payment rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




There are no set mechanisms 
to control retail and set prices 
and margins. Price 
negotiation, however, occurs 
daily at different levels of the 
health system. The levels 
include the Subcommittee for 
the Development of the 
National List of Essential 
Medicines (NLEM), the 
National Health Security 
Office (NHSO) and the 
Pharmacy and Therapeutic 
Committee in individual 
hospitals.  
 
The NLEM’s subcommittee, 
the National Drug System 
Development, sets the 
reference price for drugs. This 
reference price only applies to 
drugs that are purchased by 
government hospitals 
(Jongudomsuk et al., 2015). 
The country makes use of 
electronic records, but there is 
a lack of health information 
system standards. For 
example, health facilities 
under the Ministry of Public 
Health report data on both 12 
and 18-file standards of 
electronic data.  
 
An effort is however being 
made to create universal 
electronic data reporting 
standards (Jongudomsuk et al., 
2015). 
For all the public health 
facilities, the local government 
is responsible for regulation in 
that region. All the public 
facilities are not subject to 
licencing, although 77% of the 
hospitals are public entities.  
 
Private health institutions 
must be relicensed annually 
under the Medical Premises 
License Act of 1998, under 
specific quality and health 
standards (Jongudomsuk et al., 
2015). 
 
From 1990 to 2002, increasing 
demand for accountability by 
the public led to the formation 
of the Universal Coverage 
Scheme (UCS). The UCS 
involves different stakeholders 
and was a good response to 
problems in relation to 
accountability (Jongudomsuk 
et al., 2015). 
Thailand utilises capitation, 
DRGs and FFS (Jongudomsuk 
et al., 2015). 
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Table 5.30. Purchasing arrangements for Nigeria. 
Nigeria 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




Nigeria has low levels of 
financial protection with the 
bulk of health payments 
originating from OOPs. The 
NHIS pool only covers 3% of 
the population(USAID, 2016). 
According to (McIntyre, 2013), 
purchasing organisations lose 
their power to influence 
providers. High OOPs 
represent a fragmented health 
financing and less power for 
purchasers. 
Nigeria is plagued by 
insufficient electricity supply, 
little technological 
development and corruption. 
These are the some of the 
reasons behind a poor health 
information system in the 
country (Benson & Bch, 2011). 
Health providers in Nigeria 
often underperform, which 
lead to poor quality health 
services. The health workforce 
in Nigeria is in need of proper 
training and capacity building. 
The country’s health providers 
lack knowledge, which can be 
observed in 42% diagnostic 
accuracy and 11% of maternal 
and neonatal care resulting in 
complications (Kress et al., 
2016). 
The country has widespread 
levels of corruption. The 
corruption is evident in 
fraudulent drugs, intentional 
misdiagnosis, inflation of 
contracts, favouritism in 
treatment based on political 
patronage (Obansa, 2013). 
Nigeria utilises capitation and 
FFS as their payment 
mechanisms (USAID, 2016). 







Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za




Table 5.31. Purchasing arrangements for Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The National Drug Policy of 
1982 managed to control drug 
prices of quality essential 
drugs. This led to the creation 
of a committee that was 
formed of different 
stakeholders. The committee’s 
duty was to decide on prices 
for both local and imported 
drugs. The policy managed to 
keep drug prices low, with 
only an increase of 20% in 
prices from 1981 to 1991. This 
trend was then discontinued 
with the revision of the 
essential drugs list in 1993. 
From that point onwards, 
there was more involvement 
from pharmaceutical 
companies, which led to 
inflated drug prices. The 
government also imposes a 
15% VAT on all 
pharmaceuticals (Ahmed et 
al., 2015).  
The Management Information 
System-Health (MIS-Health) is 
responsible for measuring and 
reporting health information. 
They report data in 
publications that include the 
Health Bulletin, Year Book on 
Health and the Voice of MIS-
Health.  
 
MIS-Health places emphasis 
on measuring supply side data. 
This includes information on 
the input that facilities used 
and what they have done. Data 
from the MIS-Health are often 
not used for planning, also the 
data are of poor quality 
regarding timeliness, accuracy 
and completeness (Ahmed et 
al., 2015).  
The Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (MOHFW) are both 
the purchaser and provider of 
health services, which means 
that there is no purchaser-
provider split. 
 
Salaries from the MOHFW are 
fixed to both the health 
workers and MOHFW 
personnel. For those reasons, 
there are no opportunities to 
make performance based 
payments (Ahmed et al., 2015). 
The current structure and 
management does not account 
for accountability. This is 
evident form the high levels of 
corruption, doctor 
absenteeism, poor service 
quality and poor performing 
providers. 
The problem also stems from 
poor performance in 
fundamental aspects of 
management. These include 
poor monitoring systems, 
inaccurate job descriptions 
and subjective performance 
evaluation (Ahmed et al., 
2015). 
Bangladesh utilises FFS and 
global budgets as payment 
mechanisms.  
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Table 5.32. Purchasing arrangements for Cambodia. 
Cambodia 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




In 2009 the MOH 
decentralised healthcare 
governance to the districts and 
now function as Special 
Operating Agencies (SOAs). 
 
The SOA gives more 
autonomy to the Cambodian 
district health managers with 
regards to decision making 
and financing. SOAs play a 
vital role in the MOH and are 
designated to service delivery.  
 
They manage contractual 
agreements. The contractual 
agreements include quality 
(the SOAs expect specific 
results for resources used) and 
service delivery, as well as 
organisation (which includes 
monitoring, control and 
evaluation) (Annear et al., 
2015). 
The Health Management 
Information System (HMIS) of the 
MOH was launched in 2010 and 
reports health information on web 
based platforms. 24 of the 
country’s provincial hospitals, 55 
referral hospitals, eight national 
hospitals, two NGO hospitals and 
all the Operational District (OD) 
officers manually enter data on 
the internet. Currently, 163 private 
providers and NGO facilities also 
submit their respective data. 
Some of the health centres that do 
not have access to electricity; they 
record their data on paper and 
then complete their reports. 
Submission rates have been close 
to 100%. 
The HMIS focuses on 
standardisation, integration, 
simplicity, incorporation of new 
information, reliability, and 
computerisation of all health 
facilities. On a routine basis, it 
receives reports from all centres 
and each one is expected to 
maintain recorded aggregated 
data for outpatient consultations, 
referrals and hospitalisations, 
immunisations, birth spacing, 
prenatal consultations, deliveries 
and laboratory examinations 
(Annear et al., 2015). 
Only the HEF makes 
performance-based payments, 
but contributes little to the 
THE (Annear et al., 2015). 
The Cambodian health system 
suffers from lack of 
transparency and 
accountability. Systems of 
accreditation and the 
enforcement of standards are 
still in the initial stages of 
development. 
The private health providers 
are also unaccountable, 
working in self-interests rather 
than the demand of the 
population (Annear et al., 
2015). 
Cambodia utilises capitation, 
FFS and line item budgets as 
payment mechanisms (Annear 
et al., 2015).  
1 1 0 0 0 
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Table 5.33.Purchasing arrangements for Germany. 
Germany 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The Institute for Quality and 
Efficiency (IQWiG), which is a 
foundation responsible for 
cost efficiency of drugs and 
therapeutic benefits, as well as 
the Institute for Quality and 
Transparency (IQTiG), which 
is responsible for quality 
assurance, supports that 
Federal Joint Committee. The 
Federal Joint Committee 
comprises 13 members, each 
with the right to vote. Five 
from the Federal Association 
of Sickness Funds, two each 
from the Federal Association 
of SHI Physicians and the 
German Hospital Federation, 
one from the Federal 
Association of SHI Dentists 
and three with no affiliation. 
There are five patient 
representatives who have no 
voting right but rather an 
advisory role.  
These bodies play different 
roles to ensure that priorities 
are set for essential drugs and 
reduced prices for drugs in the 
health system (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
From 2015, all individuals 
ensured by the SHI were 
issued medical chip cards that 
carry information that 
includes the person’s name, 
address, date of birth, the 
name of their sickness fund 
and information regarding 
their coverage. 
 
As of 2015, the Federal Cabinet 
passed a bill as way of 
improving data security. 
Physicians will be incentivised 
for transmitting electronic 
medical records, collecting 
and documentation (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). 
 
The IQTiG has set indicators 
that all hospitals are required 
to report on for comparison 
and system improvement 
purposes. At the same time, it 
is mandatory to report on 
certain measurements of 
quality regarding process and 
outcome quality attributes. 
 
Under the new Hospital Care 
Structure Reform Act, there 
will be a focus on quality 
related payment and 
accreditation for hospitals. 
All the hospitals in Germany 
are required by the IQTiG to 
publish their findings 
concerning specific health 
indicators. The IQTiG also 
monitors if the hospitals do 
not exceed the volume 
threshold for certain complex 
health procedures. 
Germany utilises DGRs and 
FFS as payment mechanisms. 
1 1 1 1 0 
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Table 5.34. Purchasing arrangements for the Republic of Korea. 
Korea Republic 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




In the single payer system, no 
selective contracting is 
practiced. Once contracted, 
providers are guaranteed a 
contract unless they commit 
serious misconduct. The 
government enforces all fee 
schedules for providers.  
 
The NHIS and associations 
representing providers 
negotiate annually for the 
pricing of health services that 
are contained in the benefits 
package. In cases where no 
agreement is reached, the 
Health Insurance Deliberation 
Policy Committee decides on 
the fee schedule. The NHI also 
negotiates prices of 
pharmaceuticals with 
manufacturers (Kwon et al., 
2015). 
 
The Korean health system is, 
however, dependant on high 
OOPs made at FFS bases and 
no chance to negotiate prices. 
For those reasons, prices for 
patient costs have been 
increasing (Britnell, 2015a). 
The Government has made 
considerable investments in 
IT, leading to outstanding 
achievements in the NHI’s 
electronic records.  
 
The country has a centralised 
database that contains every 
person’s comprehensive 
information, including 
employment, payrolls and all 
insurance claims (Kwon et al., 
2015).  
As indicated, there is no 
selective contracting in the 
single payee system. The 
government automatically 
offers contracts to current 
providers, unless they commit 
serious misconduct. 
 
There are no criteria to 
consider quality and cost 
performance. 
 
 All providers are mandated to 
attend to patients on the SHI 
system (Kwon et al., 2015). 
 
 
General social pressure and 
the government itself have 
driven for transparent policy 
making in the health sector. 
This has led to the National 
Assembly taking a stronger 
stance in enforcing 
transparency and 
accountability. 
In addition, the National 
Assembly is watched closely by 
Civil society organisations, 
which go as far as evaluating 
individual performance of 
National Assembly publically.  
Civil organisations are also 
involved in the decision 
making process as advisors on 
a discretionary role (Kwon et 
al., 2015). 
Korea Republic utilises DRGs, 
FFS and salaries as payment 
mechanisms (Kwon et al., 
2015). 
1 1 0 1 0 
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Table 5.35. Purchasing arrangements for Armenia. 
Armenia 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The majority of 
pharmaceuticals are purchased 
by individuals through OOP 
payments. The MOH makes 
global budget payments for 
global drugs and fixed prices 
for these items.  
 
A limited range of these 
essential drugs is available for 
vulnerable groups such as 
children, the elderly and 
individuals with specific 
diagnosis. The MOH fixes 
expenditure of each group 
without equalisation between 
the groups (Richardson, 2013).  
The country suffers from 
serious data gaps and 
limitations, hindering the use 
of the planning and 
development of health 
information.  
 
Presently, the use of IT is 
limited to vertical programmes 
with little coordination of the 
different health information 
systems in the country. Parts 
of the health system are not 
yet integrated with IT. 
Therefore, electronic health 
records are not widely used 
(Richardson, 2013).  
The State Health Agency 
(SHA) is responsible for 
monitoring the effective 
utilisation of health resources. 
Its role includes the allocation 
of health financial resources 
on the basis of contractual 
agreements.  
 
However, the SHA  remains a 
payer and not an active 
purchaser of health services 
(Richardson, 2013). 
The prevalence of informal 
health payments is a key 
challenge for transparency and 
accountability in the 
Armenian health system. 
Informal transactions, 
however, stem from a broader 
issue in the country’s context. 
11.2% of GDP originates from 
informal activities, since a 
portion the Armenian 
population depends on 
informal activity to 
supplement their formal 
income.  
There has been increased 
focus on improving 
transparency and 
accountability through the 
National Health Strategy. The 
strategy seeks to facilitate 
monitoring performance and 
strengthening accountability 
(Richardson, 2013).  
The country utilises 
capitation, FFS and global 
budgets as payment 
mechanisms (Richardson, 
2013).  
1 0 0 0 1 
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Table 5.36. Purchasing arrangement for the United States of America. 
United States of America 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information 
systems exist to support 
strategic purchasing? 
Do provider performance 
reviews exist? 
Do accountability systems 




The USA has the highest 
health expenditures in the 
world. Some interventions to 
reduce healthcare costs have 
been put in place by the payers 
through selective provider 
selection, managed care, price 
negotiations and controls and 
value based financing (Osborn 
& Sarnak, 2017). Some of the 
reasons for the high 
expenditures include 
administration costs, fraud, 
abuse, less focus on prevention 
and excessive prices (Britnell, 
2015a).Through the ACA, the 
government has attempted to 
curb the high healthcare costs 
through rewarding efficiency. 
Some of the reforms 
implemented include using 
the P4P payment mechanism, 
shared savings, global budgets 
and the integration of 
healthcare providers (Osborn 
& Sarnak, 2017). Less than 20% 
of the changes made by the 
ACA are, however, reflective of 
the changes it proposes 
(Britnell, 2015a).  
The use of electronic records 
has been on the rise in the 
USA. The Electronic Incentive 
program has managed to 
increase the use of electronic 
records, resulting in 84% of 
physicians and 76% of 
hospitals using some form of 
electronic record as of 2015 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017).  
The Centres of Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) have 
driven public reporting of 
provider performance 
information. An example of 
such an initiative is the 
Hospital Compare service, 
which reports measures of 
patient experience, process 
and outcome quality attributes 
for over 4 000 hospitals. The 
intention is to improve both 
quality of care and 
transparency.  
 
In addition, individual states 
and consumer led groups, and 
the Leapfrog group has also 
implemented public reporting 
systems for quality of care and 
safety (Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). 
According to Britnell (2015a), 
fraud is one of the major 
reasons for excessive 
healthcare costs in the USA’s 
health system. This signals low 
accountability levels. 
The USA utilises capitation 
and FFS payment mechanisms 
(Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). 
The dominant payment 
mechanism is FFS, but the 
government is incentivising 
more quality-based payment 
mechanisms through the ACA.  
0 1 1 0 0 
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Table 5.37. Purchasing arrangements for Canada. 
Canada 
Do purchasers influence 
payments rates? 
Do robust information systems 





Do accountability systems 




Healthcare costs are mostly 
controlled through the single 
payer system. Some the 
measures used to control costs 
are mandatory health budgets, 
fee schedules for providers, 
technology assessment and 
resource restriction. The latter 
includes restriction in new 
technology and equipment. 
The Federal Patented Medical 
Review Board, an 
independent, quasi-judicial 
body, regulates prices of 
patented medicines. 
 
Provinces are responsible for 
controlling generic medicines 
and purchasing for public 
drugs. Occasionally, this leads 
to disparities in provincial 
prices.  
Individual territories and 
provinces are responsible for 
developing their own electronic 
health systems. These systems are 
supported by Canada Health 
Infoway, but the country does not 
have a national plan for 
comprehensive electronic health 
records.  
 
Canada Health Infoway reports 
that provinces have implemented 
electronic records national, but 
patient identifiers do not yet 
exist. This is due to low levels of 
interoperability in the system. 
In 2014, 42% of GPs reported that 
they exclusively used electronic 
records to enter and access 
patient data, 87% reported that 
their patients were not able to 
retrieve their information and 
only 6% reported that their 
patients could make online 
appointments. 
The bulk of performance 
monitoring takes place 
through agencies on both 
territorial and provincial 
levels. Performance 




organisations mainly aim 
to support good 
performance by 
disseminating information 
that supports providers, 
rather than performance 
monitoring. 
 
There is also revalidation 
programmes for physicians, 
including peer reviews and 
requirements for 
education. 
The Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute is responsible for 
promoting best practices and 
the development of new tools 
and strategies. The Canadian 
agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health 
recommends appropriate 
prescribing practices, 
purchasing and medication 
use. The Canadian Institute for 
Health Information regularly 
publishes health performance 
reports. However, to date, no 
doctor performance data has 
been published. The Canadian 
Foundation for Healthcare 
Improvement helps provinces 
and territories to improve 
performance. Accreditation 
Canada, a not-for-profit 
organisation, offers non-
compulsory provider 
accreditation services to about 
1 200 providers in Canada’s 
health system. 
There are no real 
accountability measures, but 
provider support is prevalent.  
The country utilises FFS and 
global budgets as payment 
mechanisms (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017).  
1 0 1 1 0 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za




5.3.2.1 Provider payment mechanisms scoring 
In this section, the scoring criteria that was applied for country payment mechanisms will be 
discussed. The scoring criteria focus on the properties of provider payment mechanisms used 
by the countries, and not the proportions in which they are applied in the countries. For 
example, countries make use of certain payment mechanisms more than others.  
This elaborates on what was presented Table 4.9 in Section 4.3.3.3, which shows the main 
provider payment mechanisms, and also takes into account P4P (discussed in Section 4.3.3.3). 
The latter is a less prominent payment mechanism, but is used by some countries including 
Croatia and Czech Republic (Džakula et al., 2014; Alexa et al., 2015). Due to lack of evidence, 
P4P mechanisms were scored based on the results from systematic reviews from Lagarde et 
al. (2010); Cromwell et al. (2011); Serumaga et al. (2011); Werner et al. (2011); and Eijkenaar et 
al. (2013).  
In their framework to analyse the key performance considerations related to health financing, 
Carrin & James (2005) recommend analysing whether the payment mechanisms encourage 
the appropriate level of care. In their framework, they consider the dimension of over- or 
underproduction of health services across the available payment mechanisms. The 
importance of healthcare costs and quality of care means that, in this case, dimensions of 
quality and cost control were also included in the analysis of the appropriate level of care. The 
dimensions of quality and cost containment were derived from Normand & Weber (2009). 
Table 5.38, shows the implications of each of the provider payment mechanisms on service 
provision, cost containment and quality. As mentioned above, over- and underproduction 
represent the service provision dimension, whereas “poor”, “good” and “fair” are 











Table 5.38. Provider payment mechanisms and their effects on service provision, cost 
containment and quality of care. 
Payment mechanism Service provision Cost containment Quality 





















Fee-for-service (tariffs or 




































Pay for performance 
Underproduction 
(Lagarde et al., 2010; 
Serumaga et al., 2011; 
Eijkenaar et al., 2013) 
Good  
(Eijkenaar et al., 2013) 
Fair  
(Lagarde et al., 2010) 
Sources: Carrin & James (2005); Normand & Weber (2009) 
Table 5.39 shows the scoring criteria for country provider payment mechanisms. In the 
assessment it was assumed that a combination of under- and overproduction is preferable. It 
was also assumed that overproduction perpetuates the unnecessary use of health services, 
which in turn raises costs. On the other hand, underproduction was assumed to limit access 
to healthcare. For those reasons, a score of one (“1”) was allocated to mechanisms that 
promoted a certain degree of under- and overproduction. With regards to cost containment, 
scores of negative one (“-1”), zero (“0”), and positive one (“1”) were allocated to poor, fair and 
good performance, respectively. The same scoring criteria was applied for effects of payment 
mechanisms on quality of care as well. Table 5.40. shows the results of applying the proposed 
scoring criteria to the 17 cases, as well as the calibrated result. Note that the “score” was 
calculated using the criteria in Table 5.39. For the “calibration” value, a value of one was 
awarded if the score was three and above (zero was awarded to scores below three). This was 
because the highest attainable score was six.




Table 5.39. Scoring criteria for provider payment mechanisms. 
  
Service provision Cost containment Quality Highest 
possible 
total 
Underproduction Overproduction Poor Fair Good Poor  Fair  Good 
Capitation (per capita payment) 
A score of 1 was given for a combination of 
under- and overproduction A score of 0 
will be given for mechanisms that 
perpetuate only over- or 
underproduction.  
  1  0  
 
Case-based (diagnostics-related 
groupings [DRG])   1  0  
Fee-for-service (tariffs or fixed fee 
schedule) -1     1 
Global budget   1  0  
Line-item budget   1  0  
Per diem  0  -1   
Salary  0   0  
Pay for performance   1  0  
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Table 5.40. Scores and calibration for country provider payment mechanisms. 
  AUS BOT CAM CZR CRO HAI IND ITA THA NIG BAN CMB GER KOR ARM USA CAN 
Capitation (per capita 
payment) 
   
1 1 
  















1 1 1 
   
Fee-for-service (tariffs 





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
















         
1 
     
Per diem 
   
-1 -1 
            
Salary 




      
0 
   







         
Score 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 5 3 2 2 4 2 2 3 2 2 
Calibration 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
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5.3.3 Conclusion: Qualitative data 
In this section, the indicators for pooling and purchasing were discussed and the scoring 
criteria applied. The result can be seen in Table 5.41. Also included in the table, are the 
resultant scores that were obtained by summing the individual scores. These will be used to 
formulate the set membership scores for QCA in Section 5.5. 
 




5.3.3 Scoring: qualitative data 
The scores allocated for pooling and purchasing are presented in Table 5.41. 
Table 5.41. Scores for pooling and purchasing. 
  
Pooling Purchasing 
The level of 
prepayment. 
Fragmentation 

































AUS 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 
BOT 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 
CAM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZR 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 3 
CRO 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 3 
HAI 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
IND 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
ITA 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
THA 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 3 
NIG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BAN 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
CMB 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
GER 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 0 4 
KOR 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 3 
ARM 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
USA 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 
CAN 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 3 




5.4 Construction of composite indices  
In Chapter 4, the QCA causal conditions and outcomes are described, including the indicators 
that represent them. Here, the aim was to create a composite index for all the causal 
conditions and outcomes from their respective indicators. Each causal condition and outcome 
is formed by a set of indicators that are measured at different scales. The first reason for 
normalisation, is that it helps to convert the indicators to comparable standards, by 
converting them to pure numbers that are dimensionless. The second reason for 
normalisation, is polarity of indicators (Mazziotta & Pareto, 2013). For example, for the 
employment construct, unemployment has negative polarity, whereas employment has 
positive polarity.  
There are a number of normalisation methods available, including: Min-Max, distance to a 
reference, indicators above or below the mean, methods of cyclical indicators and percentage 
of annual difference over consecutive years, standardisation (z-scores) (OECD & European 
Commission, 2008), and averages and ranking (Du Plessis, 2016). The normalisation technique 
that suits the context of this study should not distort the data when aggregating, and should 
be easily transformed according dichotomous values for csQCA. 
Table 5.42, shows the common normalisation methods and includes descriptions for each to 













Table 5.42. Common normalisation methods. 
Normalisation technique Description  
Re-scaling (Min-Max) 
The numerator is the subtraction between the value and the minimum 
value of the dataset, where the denominator is the distance between the 
maximum and minimum value of the dataset. This results in a value 
between zero and one. 
 
This technique is more useful when there are small intervals in the dataset, 
to create a wider range. The disadvantage with this technique is that it 
may produce distorted outcomes when the data contains outliers. 
Distance to a reference 
This involves the use of a benchmark value as a reference. When dealing 
with positive values, the value in the dataset is divided by a reference value, 
preferably a value that normalises the dataset between zero and one. For 
negative values, the inverse is applied. 
 
The definition of benchmarks is based on targets in a specific field, set 
targets, regulations and values reported in the specific field. 
Indicators above or below a 
mean 
Here an arbitrary proportion around the mean of the dataset is defined. If a 
value in the dataset is above the defined threshold above the mean, then a 
value of one is assigned. If a value is below the defined threshold, then a 
value of negative one is assigned. Lastly if the value lies in the region defined 
around the mean, then a zero is assigned. 
 
One of the major critiques of this method is the loss of raw data integrity 
and arbitrary nature of the threshold. 
Methods of cyclical indicators 
This technique applies to time series data, in which the mean is subtracted 
from the value in the dataset and the dividing by the mean of the difference 
of the values from the mean. 
Percentage of annual 
difference over consecutive 
years 
For time series data, data is normalised by subtracting the value at the 
previous data point and then dividing by the value of the indicator. 
Standardisation (z-scores) 
This calculates the average and standard deviations for a specific indicator 
across cases. The normalised value is then the difference between each 
indicator raw value and the average and then dividing by the standard 
deviation across cases.  
 
The normalised values will have a common scale with an average of zero and 
a standard deviation of one. Having a mean at zero, avoids distortion when 
aggregating which are as a result of difference in the means of the individual  
indicators. Dividing by the standard deviation allows the normalised value 
to reward good performing cases.  
Averages  
Averages involve the division of each indicator by the average over a period 
of time. 
Ranking  
This allows for the ranking of indicator values across cases. One major 
drawback is that, it allows for the loss of information, which makes it hard 
to make conclusions in analysis. 
Sources: OECD & European Commission (2008); Du Plessis (2016)  
From the considered normalisation methods, z-scores were deemed appropriate for this 
study. In line with QCA, and specifically the csQCA variant, which is applied in this study, z-
scores provide a favourable method of calibration that is transparent.  As mentioned in 
Section 3.2.1, in csQCA, a condition is either present (binary one) or absent (binary zero). 
Since z-scores have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, values above the mean 




can be considered as well-performing, whereas values below the mean can be considered 
poorly-performing (OECD & European Commission, 2008). As indicated in Table 5.42, 
dividing by the standard deviation rewards good performance, which is ideal for the 
application in this study, as the distinction between “good” and “poor” performance is key. 
Due to the nature of this study, z-scores are also advantageous when aggregating the 
normalised values.  
Aggregation can be compensatory, non-compensatory or partially compensatory. 
Compensation implies that indicators forming a construct can be substituted by another. The 
choice between compensatory and non-compensatory aggregation methods stems from the 
nature of the selected indicators. Indicators can be substitutable or non-substitutable. 
Substitutable means that a shortage in an indicator can be compensated for by an excess in 
another (Mazziotta & Pareto, 2013). 
The other key concern when aggregating, is the allocation of weights. The reason for weighing 
is to express different levels of importance of the individual indicators, which can be 
subjective or objective. Some of the ways in which subjective weighing can be conducted, are 
by consulting subject matter experts and through social surveys. Objective weighing uses 
methods that assign weights according to the erraticism of an indicator (indicators that vary 
less are weighed less) (Mazziotta & Pareto, 2013).  
To avoid bias and to allow for fair comparability for the purposes of QCA, equal weights were 
applied, and compensation6 between indicators that form the same construct was allowed. 
The reason for this is because countries tend to focus on different options due to context. An 
example is with the revenue-raising construct: Here, it is inappropriate to award different 
weights to private and public expenditure on healthcare, because countries opt for an option 
(or a combination) that works in their context. In the context of revenue raising, the 
important concept, rather, is the level of prepayment. With regards to weights, Mazziotta & 
Pareto (2013) also state that, in the case where equal weights are awarded to all indicators, z-
scores are the most appropriate normalisation method, because they produce values with the 
same variance.  
                                                 
6 To further motivate the choice of compensatory aggregation Mazziotta and Pareto 2013) state that “if the 
phenomenon to be measured is according to different dimensions that are each represented by a subset of 
individual indicators, it is possible to adopt a compensatory approach”. 




5.5 Set membership score calculation 
This section describes the process of creating the set membership scores for QCA purposes.  
Figure 5.3. The process of obtaining the set membership scores 
 
 
The first step was to normalise data, since indicators for constructs were not on the same 






where z is the resulting normalised value, 𝜇 is the mean of the sample and 𝛿 is the sample 
standard deviation. First, z-scores were calculated for each indicator. Secondly, the 
aggregation was calculated by adding the indicators of the resulting z-scores to form 
composite indices. This is possible, since values were now on a normalised scale (the result is 
shown in Table 5.43)  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the aggregation process and the formation of constructs. It is important 
to note that constructs are the QCA causal conditions and outcomes as discussed in Chapter 
4. The third step was to calibrate the composite z-scores in order to create csQCA membership 
scores. Z-scores have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, which means that a 









Commission, 2008). A positive value is also a certain number of points above the mean. For 
the purposes of csQCA, z-scores were calibrated to logic one for positive z-scores and zero for 
negative z-scores. This conversion resulted in the set membership scores presented in Table 
5.44. 






















AUS 1.805711425 0.508747 1.886484 3.1046137 0.442491916 -0.23576132 0.57306117 2.76598 0.511162 1.794247 
BOT 2.079152172 0.508747 0.428746 3.02101915 -1.625397893 2.236029217 2.860068099 1.504896 -0.27878 -0.5339 
CAM -2.871304692 -1.063744 -1.75786 -0.758269 1.924445498 0.887779831 -0.56610945 -4.24586 -1.3403 -2.03936 
CZR 0.85462206 1.2949924 0.428746 1.55660988 0.337793554 -1.08907146 -0.016553029 4.555242 0.121352 1.85972 
CRO 1.922727304 1.2949924 0.428746 0.56913271 -2.659187832 -1.08907146 0.239037277 2.856054 -0.5596 1.346894 
HAI -3.03428711 -1.063744 -1.02899 -1.777603 -1.258697149 2.267992026 -1.580992796 -8.8713 -1.12657 -1.41431 
IND -2.503335081 -1.063744 -1.02899 -2.3681231 -0.097728696 -0.21542135 -0.144539934 -2.546 -0.86897 -2.20326 
ITA 0.997559513 1.2949924 1.157615 0.31652635 -2.562706519 -0.21445278 -0.021310944 2.108946 -0.14421 1.743665 
THA 1.161497024 0.508747 0.428746 0.99099732 2.433764389 0.046092535 0.004124475 2.7001 0.584255 0.643906 
NIG -2.70387097 -1.063744 -1.75786 -3.37511 -0.201820002 0.542000355 -0.548576548 -14.1702 -1.87136 -2.28544 
BAN -2.726522571 -1.063744 -0.30012 -3.0400312 0.61999558 -0.50792948 -1.138725116 -3.47898 1.645306 -3.05982 
CMB -2.957480118 -1.063744 -0.30012 -2.3820377 3.564669138 -0.64062357 -1.151370207 -1.21296 1.709256 -2.84817 
GER 3.453014115 1.2949924 1.157615 1.63007025 0.360307457 -0.70164347 0.431329015 3.791506 -1.6133 1.960316 
KOR -0.254171537 0.508747 0.428746 0.91235034 0.581504363 -0.71423488 0.483175683 4.575489 0.755404 1.842579 
ARM -1.768168928 -1.063744 -0.30012 0.20732547 -2.431861045 -0.57088653 -0.678390042 3.611397 0.29738 -0.48898 
USA 3.616209568 -0.277498 -0.30012 -0.29753 0.386949936 0.357003493 0.653716106 3.239992 1.27373 1.815174 
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Table 5.44. Set membership scores. 
  Causal conditions UHC goals 
  Revenue 
raising  




AUS 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
BOT 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
CAM 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
CZR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
CRO 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
HAI 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ITA 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
THA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NIG 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
BAN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
CMB 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
GER 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
KOR 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
ARM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
USA 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CAN 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
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5.6 Conclusion: Cases and data collection 
In this chapter, the case selection and data collection process were discussed. The chapter 
also presented the data used in the study and revealed the set membership scores for QCA 
purposes. The work in Chapter 6 is based on the set membership scores presented in this 
chapter. These set membership scores are instrumental in creating the truth tables for 
analysis. 
  




Chapter 6 RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
The three outcomes identified in Section 4.2 included service coverage, quality of care and 
financial protection. The outcomes stem from the UHC goals as articulated in Section 4.2. In 
this chapter, the casual pathways7 to two UHC goals (as outcomes) are discussed, namely 
quality of care and financial protection. The third goal, namely utilisation/need, is replaced 
with health service coverage because of the reasons articulated in Chapter 4. The causal 
conditions that are considered are financial arrangements and contextual factors. Financial 
arrangements are specific to health system financing, whereas contextual factors describe the 
broader country-specific factors that are outside the jurisdiction of the health system. The 
financial arrangements that are investigated are: (i) revenue raising; (ii) pooling; and (iii) 
purchasing. The contextual factors that are investigated are: (i) fiscal space; (ii) employment; 
(iii) inequality; and (iv) education. The set membership scores table in Chapter 5—Table 5.44, 
was applied into QCA-related software for analysis.Figure 6.1 highlights the QCA processes 
addressed in this chapter. 
Figure 6.1. QCA flow diagram, highlighting the processes addressed in this chapter.  
 
Software for QCA analysis can be used in order to obtain the causal pathways. There are a 
number of software programs available for conducting QCA analysis. Each differs in their 
capabilities in relation to the QCA variants and procedures that they are able to perform, as 
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well as the types of solutions that they offer. Of the six main software programs, three offer a 
graphical user interface (GUI) and three are based on a command line interface (CLI).  The 
programs that offer GUI include: (i) Tosmana; (ii) fs/QCA; and (iii) KirqST  (Dusa & Thiem, 
2012; Thiem & Du, 2013). QCA software programs can be found on Compasss (2017). The 
programs that are based on a CLI include: (i) Fuzzy; (ii) QCA3; and (iii) QCA. In general, all 
of the available programs are capable of running the csQCA variant, which was applied in this 
study. The fs/QCA8 software package was chosen for this study, as it offers a GUI and is the  
most commonly used software amongst researchers (Thiem & Du, 2013).  
The first step in the QCA analysis, is the identification of necessary conditions, followed by 
the identification of causal pathways to the outcome. The three outcomes (service coverage, 
quality of care and financial protection) are initially discussed separately, followed by a 
holistic discussion of the findings. The second step in the analysis was to identify and analyse 
the different causal pathways to the above-mentioned outcomes.  
Two parameters of fit, consistency and coverage, were used evaluate the strength of the 
findings. As highlighted in Section 3.2.2, consistency measures to what extent the cases 
support the existence of set relationships between conditions and outcomes (Devers et al., 
2013). This has a similar statistical significance (Siebrits, 2014). High consistency scores 
indicate that more cases involved in a causal pathway were equally successful in producing 
the outcome. On the other hand, low consistency scores indicate that the cases involved in a 
causal pathway were, to some extent, successful in producing the outcome (Kane et al., 2014). 
In the case of csQCA, consistency can be calculated as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
. (5.6.1) 
Values of consistency range from zero to one, with one (“1”) representing high consistency 
and zero (“0”) being associated with no consistency. Consistency scores of at least 0.9 are 
recommended for necessity assessment, and at least 0.8 for sufficiency (Jordan et al., 2011; 
Devers et al., 2013). In this study, the consistency threshold is therefore set at 0.9 for necessity 
and 0.8 for sufficiency. 
The other parameter of fit is coverage, which assesses the relevance of causal recipes. In other 
words, it is the extent to which outcomes are accounted for by configurations of causal 
                                                 
8 Note that, fs/QCA refers to a software package, which is different to the fsQCA QCA variant. 




conditions. Coverage allows for the identification of conditions, or combinations thereof, that 
are empirically important when compared to others. Similar to consistency scores, coverage 
scores/measures also range from zero to one, with one representing full coverage and zero, or 
low scores, representing low coverage (Devers et al., 2013; Siebrits, 2014). The formula for 
coverage for csQCA is: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑠)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
. 
(5.6.2) 
In summary, consistency measures inclusion and coverage measures relevance (Dusa, 2017). 
In the following sections, terminology that is specific to the analysis is used. These terms and 




















Table 6.1 A brief overview of selected terms and their definitions. 
Term Definitions 
Consistency 
Measures to what extent the cases support the existence of set 
relationships between conditions and outcomes. 
Coverage Measures the relevance of findings. 
Frequency threshold The minimum number of cases allowed for in a configuration. 
Solution  An expression containing all the causal pathways to an outcome. 
Configuration Combination of multiple dimensions.   
Complex solution 
Originates from configurations that are represented by the cases in the 
study. 
Parsimonious solution 
Includes counterfactual configurations that are generated by the QCA 
software. 
Intermediate solution 
Utilises counterfactuals to populate configurations, but the researcher 
inputs the counterfactuals. 
Causal pathway  A process that brings about the outcome. 
Presence  Binary “1” in csQCA terms or full membership. 
Absence  Binary “0” in csQCA terms or full non-membership. 
Necessity  
A cause is necessary for an outcome if it has to be present for the 
outcome to occur. 
Sufficiency A causal is sufficient if, it can produce the outcome by itself. 
Condition  The input variable under study. 
Outcome The output variable under study. 
Service coverage One of the three outcomes under investigation. 
Quality of care One of the three outcomes under investigation. 
Financial protection One of the three outcomes under investigation. 
Revenue raising 
One of the input variables and forms part of the UHC financial 
arrangements. 
Pooling  
One of the input variables and forms part of the UHC financial 
arrangements. 
Purchasing  
One of the input variables and forms part of the UHC financial 
arrangements. 
Fiscal space  
One of the input variables and forms part of the contextual factors 
affecting UHC. 
Employment  
One of the input variables and forms part of the contextual factors 
affecting UHC. 
Education  
One of the input variables and forms part of the contextual factors 
affecting UHC. 
Inequality  
One of the input variables and forms part of the contextual factors 
affecting UHC. 
 
6.1 Identification of necessary conditions 
The identification of necessary conditions is the first step in the QCA analysis, and the aim is 
to identify the key conditions that are linked to the outcomes defined in Section 4.2. As 
highlighted in Section 3.2, a cause is necessary for an outcome if it has to be present for the 
outcome to occur. In other words, the outcome is a subset of the causal condition, thus a 
superset relationship exists between the causal condition and the outcome (Ford, Duncan & 
Ginter, 2005;Weiner et al., 2012; Devers et al., 2013). In Table 6.2, the results from the necessity 
analysis, which was conducted using the fs/QCA software, are presented.  








Coverage Quality Financial protection 
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Revenue raising 0.818182 1.000000 0.555556 0.555556 0.888889 0.888889 
Pooling 0.818182 1.000000 0.555556 0.555556 0.888889 0.888889 
Purchasing 0.818182 1.000000 0.555556 0.555556 0.888889 0.888889 
Fiscal space 0.909091 1.000000 0.666667 0.600000 0.888889 0.800000 
Employment 0.636364 0.700000 0.888889 0.800000 0.777778 0.777778 
~Inequality 0.727273 0.727273 0.777778 0.636364 0.777778 0.636364 
Education 0.727273 1.000000 0.555556 0.625000 0.777778 0.777778 
 
With regards to service coverage output, revenue raising, risk pooling and purchasing have 
high consistency values, but do not surpass the recommended consistency threshold of 0.9. 
Fiscal space exhibits a stronger superset relationship with service coverage and has a value of 
0.91. Revenue raising, risk pooling and purchasing all have consistency scores of 0.82.  
From the cases that were evaluated and/or selected and discussed in Chapter 5, Australia, 
Botswana, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Thailand, Germany and Canada have a strong 
revenue raising, risk pooling and purchasing consistency that correlates with the presence of 
service coverage.  
These country references originate from the set membership scores in Table 5.44 presented 
in Chapter 5. On the other hand, Armenia, the Republic of Korea and the USA scored high on 
coverage, despite not scoring high on all of the four constructs (fiscal space, revenue raising, 
risk pooling and purchasing). Armenia relies heavily on OOPs for their health financing,  
which accounts for about 57% of THE (Richardson, 2013). The country’s economy leans heavily 
on the informal sector. This is related to the high prevalence of informal payments for 
healthcare, which comprises approximately 45% of THE (Richardson, 2013). The Republic of 
Korea scores high on pooling and purchasing, and low on revenue raising. The single risk pool 
in the country covers the entire population and it is mandatory for individuals who are above 
a certain income bracket to contribute. Individuals who are unable to pay for health services 
are exempt from making contributions and any co-payments  at the point of care (Kwon et 
al., 2015). This contributes to the high levels of coverage in the Republic of Korea. There have 
been major reforms to improve service coverage of health services in the USA through the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). This includes mandating most of the American population to 




purchase health insurance, promoting access to health insurance markets that subsidise 
premiums for those in need and expansion programmes for Medicaid (Osborn & Sarnak, 
2017). The robust superset relationships between service coverage and revenue raising, risk 
pooling, and purchasing and fiscal space, respectively, highlight the importance of these 
constructs when improving population health service coverage. These findings are consistent 
with the health financing diagnostics and guidance document from the WHO (2016b). 
For the quality of care construct, employment and ~inequality (the opposite of inequality), 
scored closest to the consistency threshold at 0.89 and 0.78, respectively. This shows a more 
robust superset relationship between employment and quality of care compared to 
~inequality. 
 The results for Australia, Czech Republic, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Republic of Korea 
showed the presence of employment and ~inequality9, which resulted in the presence of 
quality of care. Thailand, Armenia and the USA, on the other hand, showed the presence of 
quality, but with different configurations in relation to employment and ~inequality. Thailand 
showed high inequality levels and high employment levels. Armenia showed lack of 
employment and high inequality. The USA showed a presence of employment and high 
inequality levels. Both Soares (2007) and Nikoloski & Mossialos (2013) found evidence of a 
relationship between inequality and the quality of care. For example, in a study to determine 
the effect of health care quality on economic inequality across regions in Italy, Soares (2007) 
concluded that regions with income inequalities had lower quality of care.  
For financial protection, all of the causal conditions (revenue raising, pooling purchasing, 
fiscal space, employment, ~inequality and education) had consistency scores that were above 
the threshold. At 0.89, revenue raising, pooling and purchasing had the highest consistency 
scores, which highlights the robust superset relationships. Fiscal space had a consistency score 
of 0.8, with employment, ~inequality and education scoring 0.78, respectively. These findings 
suggest that it is important to focus on improvements on the above constructs for financial 
protection. However, it is more important to establish health financial arrangements and 
fiscal space, due to higher consistency scores. These constructs also had high coverage scores: 
                                                 
9 ~Inequality refers to the lack of inequality. 




Each of the financial arrangements received 0.89 and fiscal space scored 0.8, which suggest 
that the findings have a high empirical importance. 
6.2 Pathways to outcomes 
In this section, sets of pathways that can lead to the outcomes (service coverage, quality of 
care and financial protection) are identified. 
The pathways to the outcomes (service coverage, quality of care and financial protection) 
when moving towards UHC are presented and discussed. Firstly, financial arrangements are 
applied as causal conditions with the purpose of obtaining a solution. Secondly, the contextual 
factors are applied as causal conditions, with the aim of obtaining a solution. Lastly, following 
the logic outlined in Figure 6.2, the conditions in the best-performing pathways (in terms of 
pathway consistency and coverage scores, and with consistency taking priority) are selected 
for further analysis.  
 The term “evaluation”, is given for each analysis, with a set of causal conditions. Solutions are 
then obtained for these conditions, with the aim of investigating how contextual factors and 
financial arrangements interact in relation to the outcomes (service coverage, quality of care 
and financial protection). Consistency and coverage scores are presented for each solution. 
They indicate the significance of the above findings and are discussed in the preceding 
section. Figure 6.2, shows the procedure followed for analysing solutions for each of the three 
outcomes (service coverage, quality of care and financial protection). The resulting 
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1      x x x x   
2 x x x x x    x   
3 x    x   x x   
4 x    x x x  x   
5      x x x  x  
6 x x x x      x  
7    x x   x  x  
8    x x x x   x  
9      x x x   x 
10 x x x x       x 
11 x   x x   x   x 
12 x  x  x   x   x 
13 x   x  x x    x 
14   x x  x x    x 
 
Each QCA analysis involves the creation of a truth table. The truth tables were constructed 
from the set membership scores in Table 5.44. All of the truth tables are presented in 
Appendix C. A truth table is a summary of the relationships that exist between the causal 
conditions and outcomes, and thus also groups together similar configurations (Ford, Duncan 
& Ginter, 2005).  
From the truth table, an analysis of contradicting conditions was conducted. Contradictions 
are when the presence of a particular combination of causal conditions invokes both the 
presence and absence of an outcome. No contradicting configurations were found present in 
all the iterations. The second step is the preparation of the truth table for analysis, using the 
fs/QCA software. This involves the use of frequency thresholds and consistency. Frequency is 
the number of times that a set of combinations is exhibited from the cases. For Small-N 
studies, the recommended frequency threshold is one or two. A frequency threshold of one 




was applied in this analysis, meaning that configurations with zero frequencies were omitted. 
Configurations with consistency score of 0.75 and above were considered, subsets of the 
outcome (Ragin, 2008).  
The fs/QCA software produces three different solutions: (i) complex; (ii) parsimonious and 
(iii) intermediate. 
i. The complex solution originates from configurations that are represented by the cases 
in the study. In other words, only solutions with consistency scores of 0.8 and above 
are taken into consideration; 
ii. The parsimonious solution includes counterfactual configurations that are generated 
by the fs/QCA software. The software’s program makes the assumption that each 
causal condition can lead to the production of the outcome, whether it is present or 
not; and 
iii. The last solution is the intermediate solution, which also makes use of counterfactuals 
to populate configurations.  
 
The difference between the intermediate and parsimonious solution is that the intermediate 
solution’s assumptions regarding how the causal conditions affect the outcome, are provided 
by the researcher based on theoretical evidence (Siebrits, 2014). For this study, only the 
complex and intermediate solutions were considered. The reason for this is that, when case-
orientated research is applied, as was done in this study, it is preferable to consider solutions 
that explain the cases at hand (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). 
Regarding the intermediate solution, the following assumptions were made, based on the 
description of the constructs10 as discussed in Chapter 4: 
i. Revenue raising, pooling purchasing, employment, education and fiscal space were 
considered to positively affect the outcomes (Service coverage, quality of care and 
financial protection); and 
ii. Inequality, however, was assumed to have a negative impact on the outcomes and 
therefore based on the consistency and coverage scores, with consistency as the 
priority indicator. 
                                                 
10 This includes revenue raising, pooling, purchasing, fiscal space, employment, education and inequality. 




6.2.1 Service coverage 
As indicated in Figure 6.2, two evaluations were used to analyse the pathways to achieving 
coverage towards UHC. The first evaluation takes the financial arrangements (revenue raising, 
pooling and purchasing) into account, while the second evaluation takes the four contextual 
factors (fiscal space, employment, inequality and education) into account. The solution 
pathways with the highest consistency and coverage scores from the above-mentioned 
solutions were then used to determine supplementary solutions.  
6.2.1.1 Evaluation 1: Solutions for service coverage with financial arrangements as 
causal conditions 
As indicated in Table 6.4, the solution for the evaluation with service coverage and financial 
arrangements as causal conditions is: 
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 11𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 12 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔. (6.2.1) 
As discussed in Section 6.2, when faced with a choice between the complex and the 
intermediate solution, the intermediate solution was selected, due to superior coverage 
scores. The two solutions were, however, identical.  
Table 6.4. Solutions for the truth table analysis of service coverage, with financial 
arrangements as causal conditions. 
 complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: servicecoverage = pooling*purchasing + revenueraising 
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing 1 0.82 
revenueraising 1 0.091 
solution 1 0.91 
parsimonious solution 
expression: servicecoverage = revenueraising + pooling + purchasing 
pathway terms: 
revenueraising 1 0.82 
pooling 1 0.82 
purchasing 1 0.82 
solution 1 0.91 
intermediate solution 
expression: servicecoverage = pooling*purchasing + revenueraising 
pooling*purchasing 1 0.82 
revenueraising 1 0.82 
solution 1 0.91 
                                                 
11 * Represents logic and Boolean algebra. 
12 + Represents logic or Boolean algebra. 




The solution scored a consistency score of 1 and an impressive coverage score of 0.91. As is 
evident in the solution, there are two possible pathways towards achieving coverage. The first 
pathway comprises a combination of 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  with a consistency score of 1 
and coverage of 0.82. This pathway highlights the importance of prepayment when moving 
towards UHC. Furthermore, it emphasises that good pooling arrangements should be 
accompanied by good purchasing arrangements as per the definitions in Sections 4.3.2 and 
4.3.3. The second pathway is 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, which has the same consistency and coverage 
scores as the first pathway. The solution in equation (6.2.1), suggests that “good” revenue 
raising (as per the definition in Section 4.3.1) is sufficient but not necessary for coverage, 
because, while it is capable of producing coverage, it is not the only cause that can guarantee 
the outcome.  
6.2.1.2 Country discussion: Service coverage, Evaluation 1 
Evaluation 1’s outcome was service coverage and financial arrangements as causal conditions. 
Eleven of the countries in the study showed the presence of coverage and nine showed the 
presence of revenue raising, namely Australia, Botswana, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, 
Thailand, Germany, USA and Canada. Only Armenia and the Republic of Korea achieved the 
presence of health service coverage with an absence of revenue raising as per definitions of 
the concepts in Chapter 4. This is evident from the set membership scores in Table 5.44, in 
Section 5.5. 
During the 1990s, Armenia faced numerous economic, social and political issues. After the 
country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it adopted the Semashko-style 
health system, which was a centralised health system for the Soviet Union. The country 
enjoyed some economic growth at the start of the new millennium, which resulted in 
improvements in the health system. Unfortunately, Armenia’s economic growth was stunted 
by the 2008 global financial crisis. It is estimated that 22-40% of the Armenian population 
emigrated between 1990 and 2005, which led to high remittances. Although there was some 
return migration, the diaspora contributes to a large extent to the country’s GDP (about 19% 
as of the year 2011). The bulk of health payments are through OOPs. The lack of adequate 
documentation of healthcare funding originating from donors and the diaspora, has led to 
possible underestimations of health expenditure from these groups. The country employs the 
Basic Benefits Package (BBP), a publically funded benefits package that is designed for those 
in need. Maternity services, primary care, treatment for selected diseases, sanitary services 




and emergency services are some of the services included in the BBP (Richardson, 2013). 
Certain factors have helped to improve coverage in the Armenian health systems, despite the 
lack of raising revenues practices that satisfy the standards applied in this study. 
According to Britnell (2015a), the Republic of Korea achieved UHC in 1989 within only 12 years. 
This achievement can be attributed to industrialisation over the same period. In 2000, the 
country created the National Health Insurance System (NHIS), which involved merging all of 
the health insurances into one comprehensive, single-payer system. The main contributors to 
the NHIS system are employers, employees and government subsidies. The country faces high 
OOPs that comprise the bulk of the 46% of health finances that originate from private sources. 
As indicated, the country’s health system benefited greatly from the single-minded nature of 
the government and industrial growth was re-invested into social services. The country, 
however, fell into the same pitfall of overreliance on hospitals as Western countries, which 
has led to high costs and, in return, high OOPs.  Hospitals are dominant in the system, which 
leads to a fragmented system. Conversion of the system to interlinked primary, secondary, 
tertiary and community care can significantly reduce healthcare costs and therefore decrease 
OOPs (Britnell, 2015a).  
6.2.1.3 Evaluation 2: Solutions for service coverage with contextual factors as causal 
conditions 
The second solution is shown in Table 6.5 and the intermediate solution is: 
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦13 + 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
(6.2.2) 
The solution consistency and coverage received 1 each. All of the three pathways to the 
solution have high consistency scores and non-zero coverage scores.  The first pathway, 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, had consistency and coverage scores of 1 and 0.73, respectively. 
The second pathway ,𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, had consistency and coverage scores of 1 and 
0.64, respectively. The final pathway, 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, had consistency and coverage 
scores of 1 and 0.55, respectively. The necessity analysis in Section 6.1 shows robust set 
relationships with the coverage outcome, which indicates that fiscal space is key to coverage. 
This can be deduced from the first two pathways, which have the highest two coverage scores 
and where fiscal space is identified as a significant causal condition in combination with a 
                                                 
13 ~ Is a Boolean negation of the construct, ~inequality is the opposite of inequality, as stated in Footnote 9. 




lack of inequality and education, respectively. Of the 11 countries that exhibited a presence in 
coverage, only the USA had an absence of fiscal space.  
Table 6.5. Solutions for the truth table analysis of service coverage, with contextual 
factors as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: servicecoverage = fiscalspace*~inequality + fiscal*education +employment*inequality*education 
fiscalspace*~inequality 1 0.73 
fiscalspace*education 1 0.64 
employment*inequality*education 1 0.18 
solution 1 1 
parsimonious solution 
expression: servicecoverage= fiscalspace + education 
fiscalspace  1 0.91 
education 1 0.73 
solution 1 1 
intermediate solution 
expression: servicecoverage = fiscalspace*~inequality + fiscalspace*education + employment*education 
fiscalspace*~inequality 1 0.73 
fiscalspace*education 1 0.64 
employment*education 1 0.55 
solution 1 1 
 
6.2.1.4 Country Discussion: Service coverage, Evaluation 2 
The USA’s debt is considered to be unsustainable (The White House, 2010), with current 
values of over 97% of GDP as per 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Since 2010, the federal government 
has spent nearly 24% of GDP, with a tax-to-GDP ratio of approximately 15%, which equates to 
a budget deficit of approximately 9%.  Healthcare is the largest contributor to the USA’s fiscal 
challenges over the long term. Current projections state that healthcare spending will reach 
20% of the country’s GDP by 2023 (The White House, 2010). This can be attributed to the high 
inefficiencies that are prevalent in the healthcare system. Some of the sources of inefficiencies 
are administrative costs, unnecessary and inefficient services, overpricing, abuse, fraud, and a 
lack of focus on preventative measures. It is estimated that US$765 billion is lost in the system, 
with the bulk (US$360) arising from administration costs (Britnell, 2015a). Administrative 
costs are mainly due to the presence of multiple payers and providers in the system, which, 
in return, results in high transaction costs. Payers also predominantly make payments based 
on FFS, rather than value (Britnell, 2015a). However, the USA is able to cover approximately 
37% of its vulnerable population through Medicare and Medicaid, which are public 




programmes for the elderly and low-income earners (Osborn & Sarnak, 2017). This has 
contributed to the observed population coverage coupled with insufficient fiscal space. 
From Evaluation 1, it can be deduced that both pathways (𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔) had identical consistency and coverage scores. Further two QCA solutions were 
therefore determined by combining each of the conditions with the highest performing 
consistency and coverage scores in evaluation 1 with those in Evaluation 2. In Evaluation 2 it 
is evident that the pathway (𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦), had the highest consistency and 
coverage scores, which were 1 and 0.73, respectively.  
6.2.2 Coupling financial arrangements and contextual factors  
In this section, financial arrangements are coupled with contextual factors, with service 
coverage as the outcome. 
6.2.2.1 Evaluation 3: Solutions for service coverage with revenue raising, fiscal space 
and inequality as causal conditions 
The solutions for Evaluation 3 are shown in Table 6.6, and were obtained by applying the 
causal conditions (𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦). In this instance, the 
intermediate solution  
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. (6.2.3) 
was selected, because the superior parameters of fit (consistency and coverage) were present. 
This solution shows two different pathways leading to the outcome of service coverage. It is 
important to note that the existence of sources of revenues (which are represented by revenue 
raising and fiscal space), are fundamental to both pathways that lead to the presence of health 











Table 6.6. Solutions for the truth table analysis of service coverage, with revenue 
raising, fiscal space and inequality as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: servicecoverage = fiscalspace*~inequality + revenueraising*inequality 
pathway terms: 
fiscalspace*~inequality 1 0.73 
revenueraising*inequality 1 0.27 
solution 1 1 
parsimonious solution 
expression: servicecoverage = revenueraising + fiscalspace 
pathway terms: 
revenueraising 1 0.82 
fiscalspace 1 0.91 
solution 1 1 
intermediate solution 
expression: servicecoverage = revenueraising + fisclaspace*~inequality 
revenueraising 1 0.82 
fiscalspace*~inequality 1 0.73 
solution 1 1 
6.2.2.2 Evaluation 4: Solutions for service coverage with pooling, purchasing, fiscal 
space and inequality as causal conditions 
The solutions for Evaluation 4 are presented in Table 6.7. The conditions were 
pooling,purchasing, fiscalspace and inequlity and yielded the following solution: 
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒. 
(6.2.4) 
Note that the intermediate solution was selected because of its high consistency and coverage 
scores compared to the complex solution. From the solution in Equation (6.2.4), it is evident 
that fiscal space holds a necessity relationship with the outcome coverage. The consistency 
scores of 1 indicate that all of the cases on the two pathways also produced coverage. The 











Table 6.7.Solutions for the truth table analysis of coverage, with revenue raising, 
fiscal space and inequality as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: servicecoverage = pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace + 
~pooling*~purchasing*fiscalspace*~inequality 
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace 1 0.82 
~pooling*~purchasing*fiscalspace*~inequality 1 0.091 
solution 1 0.91 
parsimonious solution 
expression: servicecoverage = fiscalspace 
pathway terms: 
fiscalspace 1 0.91 
solution 1 1 
intermediate solution 
expression: servicecoverage = fisclaspace*~inequality + pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace 
fiscalspace*~inequality 1 0.82 
pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace 1 0.73 
solution 1 1 
 
6.2.2.3 Conclusion: Service coverage 
It is evident from these results that revenue raising and fiscal space are the two crucial factors 
when improving service coverage in a health system. It is important to note that the pooling 
and purchasing functions have to be performed together in order to successfully achieve 
health service coverage, and they are only effective in the presence of good fiscal health.  
Another robust relationship that was identified, is the one between fiscal space and the lack 
of inequality, which is a driver of health coverage (as deduced from Evaluation 3 and 4). From 
both the parsimonious solutions (which contains the core conditions and combinations) and 
the results of the necessity analysis, it is evident that fiscal space is fundamental in achieving 
health service coverage. This can be deduced from Evaluation 4, where fiscal space holds a 
necessity relationship with the outcome. This is not, however, the case in the presence of 
other contextual factors, nor in the presence of revenue raising. 
6.2.3 Quality of care 
In this subsection, the pathways to quality of care when moving towards UHC is discussed 
and presented. Firstly, in order to arrive at a solution, financial arrangements where applied 
as causal conditions. Secondly, the contextual factors were applied as causal conditions. 
Thirdly, the conditions in the best-performing pathways (in terms of pathway consistency and 
coverage scores) were chosen for further analysis, following the logic set out in Figure 6.2. 




Solutions were then obtained for these conditions, with the aim of investigating how 
contextual factors and financial arrangements interact in relation to quality. 
6.2.3.1 Evaluation 5: Solutions for quality of care, with financial arrangements as 
causal conditions 
The complex and intermediate solutions for pathways to quality of care, with financial 
arrangements as causal conditions were identical and is shown in Equation (6.2.5). The 
solution is identical to the solution for service coverage (discussed Evaluation 1). 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 . (6.2.5) 
The solution consistency and coverage scores are shown in Table 6.8. The solution consistency 
score was accompanied by a solution coverage score of 0.22. Both solution pathways had 
consistency and coverage scores of 1 and 0.11, respectively. It is observed that, although the 
coverage scores are not trivial, they are rather low, which indicates Evaluation 5’s solution has 
a low empirical importance and/or relevance. This will be clarified in subsequent parts of this 
section, with the introduction of contextual factors as causal conditions.  
Table 6.8. Solution for quality of care, with financial arrangements (revenue raising, 
pooling and purchasing) as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: quality of care = pooling*purchasing + revenueraising 
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing 1 0.11 
revenueraising 1 0.11 
solution 1 0.22 
parsimonious solution 
expression: quality of care = revenueraising + pooling + purchasing 
pathway terms: 
revenueraising 1 0.11 
pooling 1 0.11 
purchasing 1 0.11 
solution 1 0.22 
intermediate solution 
expression: quality of care = pooling*purchasing + revenueraising 
pooling*purchasing 1 0.11 
revenueraising 1 0.11 
solution 1 0.22 
 




6.2.3.2 Evaluation 6: Solutions for quality of care, with contextual factors as causal 
conditions 
The solution pathway with contextual factors as causal conditions is shown in Table 6.9. In 
this instance, the intermediate solution was selected due to the presence of superior, 
consistency and coverage scores, and the solution was: 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. (6.2.6) 
Table 6.9. Solutions for quality of care as the outcome, with contextual factors as 
causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: quality of care = fiscalspace*employment*education + employment*inequality*education + 
employment*~inequality 
pathway terms: 
fiscalspace*employment*education 0.8 0.44 
employment*inequality*education 1 0.22 
employment*~education 1 0.33 
solution 0.89 0.89 
parsimonious solution 
expression: quality of care = employment*~inequality + employment*education 
pathway terms: 
employment*~inequality 0.86 0.67 
employment*education 0.83 0.56 
solution 0.89 0.89 
intermediate solution 
expression: quality of care= employment*~inequality + employment*education 
employment*~inequality 0.86 0.67 
employment*education 0.83 0.56 
solution 0.89 0.89 
 
6.2.3.3 Country discussion: Quality of care 
The analysis shows that employment has a necessity relationship with quality of care, as it is 
present in all of the pathways to quality. This is also evident in the necessity analysis presented 
in Section 6.1. In the case of necessity, the threshold for consistency scores should be greater 
or equal to 0.90. The outlier cases are Armenia, Cambodia and Germany. Armenia revealed 
an absence of employment and a presence of quality, whereas Cambodia and Germany 
displayed employment and a lack of good quality care. This can be deduced from the set 
memberships presented in Table 5.44 in Section 5.5. 
As indicted in the Section 6.2.1, Armenia has a significant informal sector (Richardson, 2013), 
which partly explains the low employment rates. A contributor to quality of care in the 
country is the prevalence of the private healthcare sector, which is regarded superior to the 




public healthcare sector in Armenia in terms of quality of care. As of 2009, private expenditure 
was 1.2 times higher than public expenditure. In 2011, co-payments were introduced for health 
services, with the purpose of increasing salaries for health workers and investing in the 
improvement of the quality of care. However, the bulk of the Armenian population are unable 
to pay the co-payments (Richardson, 2013).  
The low quality of care levels in Germany can be attributed to the corporatism culture in the 
health system (Britnell, 2015a), which provides 11% of all the employment in the country. There 
is no competition between providers and sickness funds in the health system. The private 
sector merely covers 12% of the population, meaning that it provides little to no competition 
for the public sector. This lack of competition is one of the main reasons for the low health 
quality levels in Germany’s health system (Britnell, 2015a). 
There poor quality of care in the Cambodian health system can be attributed to numerous 
causes that range from poor infrastructure, a lack of quality equipment, low levels of 
competences for health providers and insufficient medical supplies (Annear et al., 2015). The 
issues with quality are present in both the private and public sectors. The shortage of adequate 
clinical skills are evident amongst medical staff in Cambodia (World Bank, 2014), specifically 
amongst staff who are aged between 45 and 60 (Annear et al., 2015). Approximately 50% of 
the health providers in the rural areas of Cambodia are informal. Approximately 66% of the 
population receive primary care through private providers, but there have been quality 
concerns regarding, for example, incorrect prescriptions and injections (Annear et al., 2015). 
6.2.4 Coupling financial arrangements and contextual factors 
In this section, financial arrngements are coupled with contextual factors, with quality of care 
as the outcome. 
6.2.4.1 Evaluation 7: Solutions for quality of care, with employment, revenue raising 
and inequality as causal conditions 
Subsequently, further analysis was conducted by assessing the relationships between the 
conditions from high-performing pathways identified in the solutions that were presented in 
Evaluation 5 and 6. In other words, the solutions where financial arrangements and contextual 
factors were causal conditions. It can be deduced from Evaluation 5 that both pathways 
(𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔) had identical consistency and coverage scores, 
and therefore two QCA solutions were determined by combining each of the solutions with 




the highest performing causal pathways in the solution in Evaluation 6. The first iteration was 
with the revenue raising performing pathway (𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦), which had a 
consistency score of 0.86 and a coverage score of 0.67 and led to the solution in Table 6.10. 
The intermediate solution was chosen, because superior consistency and coverage scores were 
present, and is as follows: 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
+𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 
(6.2.7) 
In Table 6.10, it is evident that all of the solutions score the same across consistency and 
coverage. Both solution pathways have consistency scores of 1. The coverage scores are 0.33 
and 0.22, respectively. The overall solution consistency and coverage scores are 1 and 0.55 
respectively. The solution suggests that employment is necessary for quality, because it is 
present in both causal pathways. This result can be attributed to the fact that, when the 
population is employed, it increases the ability of the population to contribute towards 
healthcare.  
Table 6.10. Solutions for the quality outcome with revenue raising, employment and 
inequality as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: quality = employment*~inequality +revenueraising*employment*inequality 
pathway terms: 
employment*~inequality 1 0.33 
revenueraising*employment*inequality 1 0.22 
solution 1 0.55 
parsimonious solution 
Expression: quality = employment*~inequality +revenueraising*employment*inequality 
Pathway terms: 
employment*~inequality 1 0.33 
revenueraising*employment*inequality 1 0.22 
solution 1 0.55 
intermediate solution 
expression: quality = employment*~inequality +revenueraising*employment*inequality 
employment*~inequality 1 0.33 
revenueraising*employment*inequality 1 0.22 
solution 1 0.55 
 
6.2.4.2 Evaluation 8: Solution for quality of care, with employment, inequality, 
pooling and purchasing as causal conditions 
The second iteration was conducted with pooling, purchasing, fiscal space and inequality as 
causal conditions. The resulting solutions are shown in Table 6.11. In this instance, the 




intermediate solution was considered, because superior consistency and coverage scores were 
present, and is as follows: 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
(6.2.8) 
As indicated, employment, again, holds a necessity relationship.  
Table 6.11. Solutions for quality, with pooling, purchasing, employment and 
inequality as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: quality of care = pooling*purchasing*employment + 
~pooling*~purchasing*employment*~inequality 
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing*employment 0.83 0.56 
~pooling*~purchasing*employment*~inequality 1 0.22 
solution 0.88 0.78 
parsimonious solution 
expression: quality of care= employment*~inequality + pooling*employment + purchasing*employment 
pathway terms: 
employment*~inequality 0.86 0.67 
pooling*employment 0.83 0.56 
purchasing*employment 0.83 0.56 
solution 0.88 0.78 
intermediate solution 
expression: quality of care = employment*~inequality + pooling*purchasing*employment 
employment*~inequality 0.86 0.67 
pooling*purchasing*employment 0.83 0.56 
solution 0.88 0.78 
 
6.2.4.3 Conclusion: Quality of care 
In conclusion, the results indicate that employment is an important determinant of the 
quality of health services. Employment has important interactions with the financial 
arrangement to promote quality of health services. This evident in Evaluations 7 and 8. From 
these findings, it could be concluded that employment is necessary for quality of healthcare. 
However, from the necessity analysis, it is evident that the consistency score for employment 
was 0.89, which is lower than the threshold of 0.9 for necessity. Nevertheless, these findings 
demonstrate the importance of employment to quality of care, as it is the driver for revenue 
raising, the capacity for pooling and the purchasing function, as revenues mainly originate 
from taxes. Employment increases the tax base. It is also important to note the relationship 
between employment and the lack of inequality. Again, this can be explained by considering 




the broadening of the revenue source base, as a lack of inequality suggests that more people 
are able to contribute to prepaid revenue. 
6.2.5 Financial protection 
In this subsection, the results from the analysis of causal pathways to financial protection are 
discussed. As with the analysis relating to the service coverage and quality of care outcomes, 
the criteria that are outlined in Figure 6.2 were followed. Firstly, to obtain a solution, financial 
arrangements were applied as causal conditions. Secondly, the contextual factors were applied 
as causal conditions. Thirdly, the conditions in the best-performing pathways (in terms of 
pathway consistency and coverage scores) were selected for further analysis. Solutions were 
then obtained for these conditions, with the aim of investigating how contextual factors and 
financial arrangements interact in relation to financial protection. 
6.2.5.1 Evaluation 9: Solutions for financial protection, with financial arrangements 
as causal conditions 
The solution for pathways to financial protection with financial arrangements as causal 
conditions is the same as the one for coverage: 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔. (6.2.9) 
In this instance, the complex and the intermediate solutions were identical, with differences 
in the consistency and coverage scores for the individual solution pathways (as presented in 
Table 6.12). The consistency score for the pathway for the complex solution  (pooling ∗
purchasing) is 089, with a coverage score of 0.89. The other pathway is revenueraising, with 
a consistency score of 1 and coverage score of 0.11. The coverage scores for both solutions are 
not trivial, although the revenueraising pathway scores low. The results show that a country 
can either put emphasis on pooling adequate revenues or on strengthening their risk pooling 
and purchasing functions in order to achieve financial protection. Again, the solution suggests 
that good revenue raising is sufficient, but not necessary for coverage, as it is capable of 
leading to coverage, although it is not the only cause that can guarantee the outcome. From 
the necessity analysis in Section 6.1, it can be deduced that all of the causal conditions 
considered in this study have strong set relationships with financial protection, as evident 
from the consistency scores that exceed 0.75.  




Table 6.12. Solutions for financial protection with financial arrangements as causal 
conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: financial protection = pooling*purchasing + revenueraising 
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing 0.89 0.89 
revenueraising 1 0.89 
solution 1 0.9 
parsimonious solution 
expression: financial protection = revenueraising + pooling + purchasing 
pathway terms: 
revenueraising 0.89 0.89 
pooling 0.89 0.89 
purchasing 0.89 0.89 
solution 1 0.9 
intermediate solution 
expression: financialprotection = pooling*purchasing + revenueraising 
pooling*purchasing 0.89 0.89 
revenueraising 0.89 0.89 
solution 1 0.9 
 
6.2.5.2 Country Discussion: Solutions for financial protection, Evaluation 9 
Of the 17 countries discussed/selected in Chapter 5, 914 showed the presence of the sufficient 
condition of revenue raising. Only Botswana had good revenue raising but did not have the 
presence of financial protection. The Republic of Korea had an absence of revenue raising, but 
a presence of financial protection. Only Botswana had the presence of both pooling and 
purchasing, but did not achieve financial protection. Lastly, the USA had the presence of 
financial protection, with an absence of both pooling and purchasing. 
Botswana has made significant progress towards UHC, which is evident from the promotion 
of Private Health Insurance (PHI) (Health Policy Project, 2016b). The country spends over 17% 
of its annual budget on healthcare, which is more than the Abuja target of 15%. About 84% of 
the country live within 5km radius from health centres (Mbogo & McGill, 2016). However, the 
public sector still dominates the healthcare system. Access to quality care has been slow in 
the country’s rural areas (Health Policy Project, 2016b). Low levels of OOPs (about 4.2%) in 
the health system raise red flags for the utilisation of health services that are pro-rich, as less 
fortunate individuals might not seek care because they lack the financial means to do so. The 
bulk of the population in Botswana rely on the public system and only 17% of the population 
                                                 
14 Australia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Thailand, Germany, United States of America, Canada and the 
Republic of Korea. 




have coverage from PHIs. The government, however, spends the finances unequally: 
Approximately 53% of the government’s expenditure on health is allocated to curative care. 
This leaves the poor population vulnerable to the lack of financial protection because other 
healthcare needs are less catered for. This issue originates from not addressing the WHO’s 
three-dimensional UHC conceptual goals as discussed in Section 2.1.4. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
only Rwanda and Ghana have incorporated the conceptual goals in their designs towards UHC 
(Mbogo & McGill, 2016).  
The presence of financial protection without “good” revenue raising for the Republic of Korea 
can be attributed to the reasons articulated in Section 6.2.1. 
Through its public programmes for the elderly and low income earners, Medicare and 
Medicaid, the USA covers approximately 37% of its vulnerable population. Medicare covers 
services that include hospitalisation, prescription drugs and physician services (Osborn & 
Sarnak, 2017). This sheds light on the presence of some level of financial protection in the 
country despite weak pooling and purchasing arrangements. 
6.2.5.3 Evaluation 10: Solutions for financial protection, with contextual factors as 
causal conditions 
As indicated in Table 6.13, the complex and the intermediate solutions for financial protection 
are identical when only contextual factors were considered as causal conditions: 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
(6.2.10) 
The solution has consistency and coverage scores of 1 and 0.89 (as shown in Table 6.13). The 
table also shows the consistency and coverage scores for all of the pathways to financial 
protection. The importance of fiscal space is highlighted by its presence in two of the causal 
pathways in combination with a lack of ~inequality and education, which has the highest 
coverage scores of 0.56, respectively. Thailand and the USA have high inequali ties, but also 
have financial protection. In the case of the USA, this can be credited to Medicare and 
Medicaid (discussed in the preceding section), which offer protection to the poor and elderly. 
  




Table 6.13. Solutions for financial protection as the outcome, with contextual factors 
as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: financial protection = fiscalspace*employment*~inequality + fiscalspace*~inequality*education 
+ employment*inequality*education   
pathway terms: 
fiscalspace*employment*~inequality 1 0.56 
fiscalspace*~inequality*education       1 0.56 
employment*inequality*education         1 0.22 
Solution  1 0.89 
parsimonious solution 
expression: financial protection = ~inequality*education + fiscalspace*employment + 
employment*education        
pathway terms: 
~inequality*education 1 0.56 
fiscalspace*employment 1 0.66 
employment*education 1 0.66 
solution 1 0.89 
intermediate solution 
expression: financial protection = fiscalspace*employment*~inequality + fiscalspace*~inequality*education 
+ employment*inequality*education  
pathway terms: 
fiscalspace*employment*~inequality 1 0.56 
fiscalspace*~inequality*education 1 0.56 
employment*inequality*education 1 0.22 
solution  1 0.89 
 
6.2.5.4 Country Discussion: Financial protection, Evaluation 10 
Thailand experiences challenges with poverty and income inequality (Asian Development 
Bank, 2011). The country has, however, made significant efforts to alleviate poverty, reducing 
it from over 33% in 1988 to approximately 9% as of 2008. 40% of the poorest of the Thai 
population are concentrated in the country’s northeastern regions. The wealthiest 20% of the 
country earn approximately 50% of the total household income in Thailand and own 
approximately 70% of the country’s financial assets. There are also inter-regional inequalities 
in the country, with approximately 90% of the poor population residing in rural areas. Poor 
Thai households tend to be engaged in the informal sector, were there is in no real growth in 
terms of earnings. In contrast, those in the formal sector enjoy sustained growth in earnings 
(Asian Development Bank, 2011). Thailand has, however, made significant strides in improving 
their health system. This can be credited to the existence of commitment and continuity in 
the health system, amongst other factors. The country has had nine consecutive five-year 
health plans, led by charismatic leaders, highly influential technocrats and leaders in the 
medical field. This sustained vision had its roots in improving health for the poor in the 




society. This implies a focus on the poor, rural communities in the country. Examples of such 
efforts include the Royal Health projects, which focussed on rural development in healthcare 
and other sectors (Patcharanarumol et al., 2011).  
A number of deliberate and continued policies were implemented in Thailand with regards to 
financial protection in the healthcare system. The first, which was implemented in 1975, was 
waiving user fees for low-income groups. This was a tax-based public system and later 
extended to other population groups, such as people with disabilities, children under 12 and 
the elderly. In 1984, those in the informal sectors could obtain health insurance through CBHI 
schemes, which were later developed into a VHI scheme. In 1991, this was followed by the 
creation of a compulsory SHI for private sector employees and employers, which the 
government also contributed towards. Although the country still suffers from inequalities, the 
government has made efforts to improve financial protection for its citizens, which explains 
the simultaneous presence of inequality and financial protection (Patcharanarumol et al., 
2011).  
Further analysis was then conducted by assessing the relationships between the conditions 
from high-performing pathways between the first and second solutions, which are the 
solutions where financial arrangements were causal conditions and contextual factors were 
causal conditions. From the solutions in Evaluations 9 and 10 , it is evident that both pathways 
(𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔) had identical consistency and coverage scores 
of 0.89.  It can also be deduced that the solution pathways (𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗
~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) and (𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) had identical consistency and 
coverage scores of 1 and 0.56, respectively. 
Four further solutions were obtained by combining the highest-performing pathways in 
Evaluation 9 and 10, as stated above.  
6.2.5.5 Evaluation 11: Solutions for financial protection, with revenue raising, 
employment, inequality and fiscal space 
In the first solution revenue raising, fiscal space, employment and inequality were the causal 
conditions, as presented in Table 6.14. The intermediate solution was selected, because it 
revealed superior coverage scores for individual solution pathways. This solution is presented 
in Equation (6.2.11). 




  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 
(6.2.11) 
From observing Equation (6.2.11) and Table 6.14, it is evident that revenue raising is present 
in two of the three pathways. In this instance, consistency values were not considered, because 
all of the pathways have optimal consistency values. Firstly, it is important to note that, in as 
much as revenue raising is an important condition, it cannot produce financial protection 
alone: It needs to exist in combination with other conditions. In the first pathway, revenue 
raising is combined with employment, whereas in the second pathway it is combined with 
both fiscal space and the absence of inequality. Both of these solutions highlight the 
importance of sources of revenue for successful revenue raising. It can be observed that none 
of the conditions, or combinations thereof, are necessary nor sufficient in producing financial 
protection. A condition is necessary if it has to be present for the outcome to occur. Sufficiency 
implies that a condition is capable of producing the outcome by itself.  
Table 6.14. Solutions for financial protection, with revenue raising, fiscal space, 
inequality and employment as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: financial protection =  revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality 
+fiscalspace*employment*~inequality + revenueraising*employment*inequality        
pathway terms: 
revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality      1 0.67 
fiscalspace*employment*~inequality          1 0.56 
revenueraising*employment*inequality        1 0.22 
solution  1 1 
parsimonious solution 
expression: financial protection =  revenueraising*~inequality +  fiscalspace*employment +  
revenueraising*~fiscalspace + revenueraising*employment            
pathway terms: 
revenueraising*~inequality       1 0.67 
fiscalspace*employment           1 0.67 
revenueraising*~fiscalspace      1 0.11 
revenueraising*employment        1 0.67 
solution 1 1 
intermediate solution 
expression: financial protection = revenueraising*employment + revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality + 
fiscalspace*employment*~inequality          
pathway terms: 
revenueraising*employment                   1 0.67 
revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality      1 0.67 
fiscalspace*employment*~inequality          1 0.55 
solution  1 1 




6.2.5.6 Evaluation 12: Solutions for financial protection, with revenue raising, fiscal 
space, inequality and education as causal conditions. 
The second solution was between revenue raising, fiscal space, inequality and education:  
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑜𝑛 + 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 
(6.2.12) 
Equation (6.2.12) and Table 6.15 reveal that the two best-performing pathways are 
(𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) and (𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛). 
Both has consistency scores of 1 and coverage scores of 0.67 and 0.57, respectively. An 
interesting observation is the combination of fiscal space and the lack of inequality. This 
combination is consistent with both Equation (6.2.11) and (6.2.12). Again, no condition is 
necessary or sufficient to produce financial protection. A condition is necessary if it has to be 
present for the outcome to occur. Sufficiency implies that a condition is capable of producing 
the outcome.  
Table 6.15. Solutions for financial protection, with revenue raising, fiscal space, 
inequality and education as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: financial protection =  revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality + 
fiscalspace*~inequality*education  + revenueraising*~fiscalspace*inequality*education                        
pathway terms: 
revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality                1 0.67 
fiscalspace*~inequality*education                     1 0.56 
revenueraising*~fiscalspace*inequality*education      1 0.11 
solution  1 0.89 
parsimonious solution 
expression: financial protection =  revenueraising*~inequality + ~inequality*education + 
revenueraising*fisclaspace 
pathway terms: 
revenueraising*~inequality       1 0.67 
~inequality*education            1 0.56 
revenueraising*~fiscalspace      1 0.11 
solution 1 1 
intermediate solution 
expression: financial protection = revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality + 
revenueraising*~fiscalspace*education + fiscalspace*~inequality*education           
pathway terms: 
revenueraising*fiscalspace*~inequality      1 0.67 
revenueraising*~fiscalspace*education       1 0.11 
fiscalspace*~inequality*education           1 0.56 
solution  1 0.89 
 




6.2.6 Coupling financial arrangements and contextual factors 
In order to arrive at the third and fourth solutions, the pathways in the parsimonious solution 
from Table 6.13 were selected. This was because the number of conditions if the complex and 
intermediate solutions are chosen, surpass the threshold for the QCA with five conditions 
being taken into consideration. To clarify, the solutions in Evaluation 13 and 14 are as a result 
of  the (𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔) pathway from Equation (6.2.9) under Evaluation 9 and the 
(𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) and (𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ ~𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
pathways from Evaluation 10, presented in Equation (6.2.10). It can be observed that the 
number of causal conditions would surpass the threshold, given the number of cases in the 
study. 
The study considers 17 cases, meaning that only a maximum of 4 conditions (resulting in 24 =
16, possible configurations) can feasibly be considered. If 5 conditions were applied, then a 
minimum of 25 = 32 cases would be required. Each pathway in the parsimonious solution 
holds a maximum of two conditions. This means that a total of four possible configurations 
are considered, which is comfortably within the allowable range of conditions when using 
seventeen cases, as in this study.  
The solutions that were obtained from combining financial arrangements and contextual 
factors as causal conditions are displayed in Table 6.16 and Table 6.17.  
6.2.6.1 Evaluation 13: Solutions for financial protection, with pooling, purchasing, 
fiscal space and employment 
As presented in Table 6.16, the complex and the intermediate solutions are identical. The 
complex solution is: 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡. (6.2.13) 
When observing the solution presented in Equation (6.2.13) and Table 6.16, only one pathway 
is evident. This highlights the dependence of pooling and purchasing on fiscal space and 
employment, as they are the sources of healthcare revenues. Once again, none of the causal 
conditions are necessary or sufficient for financial protection. 
 




Table 6.16. Solutions for financial protection, with pooling, purchasing, fiscal space 
and employment as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 Consistency Coverage 
expression: financial protection =  pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace*employment      
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace*employment      1 0.67 
solution  1 0.67 
parsimonious solution 
expression: financial protection =  pooling*~inequality + purchasing*~inequality + pooling*employment +   
purchasing*employment               
pathway terms: 
pooling*employment          1 0.67 
purchasing*employment       1 0.67 
fiscalspace*employment      1 0.67 
solution       1 0.67 
intermediate solution 
 
expression: financial protection = pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace*employment       
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing*fiscalspace*employment       1 0.67 
solution  1 0.67 
 
6.2.6.2 Evaluation 14: Solutions for financial protection, with pooling, purchasing, 
employment and education as causal conditions 
The fourth and final solution indicates pooling, purchasing, employment and education as 
causal conditions. This is presented in Table 6.17 and the complex solution is presented in 
Equation (6.2.14).  
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
(6.2.14) 
Equation (6.2.14) indicates that there are three pathways. All of the solution pathways have 
consistency scores of 1, but, as indicated in Table 6.17, the (pooling ∗ purchasing ∗
employment) pathway scored the highest coverage at 0.67. This solution is therefore 
empirically more significant than the (pooling ∗ purchasing) and the (employment ∗
education) pathways, which have relatively low coverage values of 0.22 and 0.11, respectively. 
It is, however, important to note the close relationship between pooling and purchasing, as 
these causal conditions always exist in combination with one another to achieve the financial 
protection outcome. This relationship is also articulated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 
When comparing the (pooling ∗ purchasing) and the (pooling ∗ purchasing ∗ employment) 




pathways according to coverage scores,  it is evident that the pooling and purchasing fiscal 
conditions must exist in combination with another causal condition that guarantees a source 
of revenue. In this instance, employment guarantees a source of revenue, because the 
population have a relative ability to prepay for healthcare. This phenomenon can also be 
observed in Equation (6.2.13) , where pooling and purchasing exist in combination with both 
fiscal space and employment.  
Table 6.17. Solutions for financial protection, with pooling, purchasing, employment 
and education as causal conditions. 
complex solution 
 consistency coverage 
expression: financial protection =  pooling*purchasing*~education +  pooling*purchasing*employment + 
employment*education                              
pathway terms: 
pooling*purchasing                 1 0.22 
pooling*purchasing*employment                  1 0.67 
employment*education      1 0.11 
solution  1 0.89 
Parsimonious solution 
Expression: financial protection =   employment*education + pooling + purchasing 
Pathway terms: 
employment*education 1 0.67 
pooling 1 0.22 
purchasing 1 0.22 
Solution       1 0.89 
intermediate solution 
Expression: financial protection = employment*education + pooling*purchasing 
Pathway terms: 
employment*education 1 0.67 
pooling*purchasing 1 0.22 
solution  1 0.89 
 
6.2.6.3 Conclusion: Financial protection 
In conclusion, no condition is necessary nor sufficient to produce financial protection. To 
succeed, the health system’s financial arrangements must exist in combination with 
conditions that guarantee sources of revenue. This explains the importance of good fiscal 
space and the availability of employment in a country when it comes to ensuring financial 
protection. Furthermore, an interesting combination was that of fiscal space and the absence 
of inequality. According to Odusola (2017), fiscal policies are vital to the reduction of poverty 
and inequality, because they influence taxes, government spending and transfers. Odusola 
(2017) further states that fiscal space, alone, has led to approximately 16.5% of the poverty 
reduction in Africa. His work is based on the initial work of Kuznets (1955), which theorises 




that the early stages of economic growth promote inequality and eventually close the 
inequality gap. 
6.3 Discussion 
The first theme that originates from the results is that, although it is important to have good 
financial arrangements (revenue raising, pooling and purchasing) in the healthcare system, 
they need to be supported by the broader contextual factors that are not part of the healthcare 
system. In the case of all three of the outcomes investigated in this study, when only financial 
arrangements were taken as causal conditions, the solution that emerged was: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒15 =  𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔.        (6.2.15) 
The results suggest that revenue raising (amongst the financial arrangements) is sufficient for 
coverage, quality and financial protection. From this, it can also be concluded that pooling 
and purchasing should exist in combination to achieve each of the three UHC goals. Countries 
that had the presence of revenue raising, also had strong public investment in healthcare, 
with values ranging from 55%-84% of THE. The only exception to this was the USA, which 
invests 48%. UHC financing is highly dependent on the level of public health spending (Smith, 
2013; Abiiro & De Allegri, 2015), because public sources of health revenues are prepaid. 
Coupling the financial arrangements and contextual factors in which the health system 
operates as potential causal conditions, brings more insight as to how the country’s context 
affects the outcomes.  
In broader strokes, the level of prepayment and the capacity to do so, were key drivers of 
coverage, quality and financial protection. Although the presence of revenue raising, alone, 
was sufficient to achieve coverage according to Equation (6.2.5), the results show that fiscal 
space also plays an important role in achieving population coverage. Employment is a key 
factor in achieving quality of care, as highlighted in Equations (6.2.6), (6.2.7) and (6.2.8). 
Employment is present in each of the pathways to achieving good quality care, suggesting that 
it is a sufficient condition. No conditions were neither sufficient nor necessary in achieving 
financial protection, but the results show that the capacity to raise health revenues through 
high employment and fiscal capacity coupled with good financial arrangements, are key 
                                                 
15 The word outcome was used to represent all the three outcomes investigated in the study—service coverage, 
quality of care and financial protection. 




drivers of financial protection. Financial arrangements alone are not adequate in achieving 
financial protection: Success is achieved when they are coupled with contextual factors that 
guarantee sources of finance. Countries with high public spending on healthcare performed 
well with regards to financial protection. This can be attributed to the presence of mandatory 
revenues and the fact that public risk pools are sustainably large and diverse  enough to 
promote adequate cross-subsidisation amongst different groups. 





Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this concluding chapter, a concise summary of the research conducted throughout this 
study is presented, including: (i) a revision of the stated objectives; (ii) how such objectives 
were addressed; and (iii) an overview of the key findings. The limitations of this study are 
highlighted, and the chapter concludes with recommendations for future continuation of this 
research topic.  
7.1 Research summary 
The aim of this research inquiry was to identify causal pathways in the UHC financing 
landscape and their relationships with specific UHC goals. To achieve this aim, Objectives 1 
to 5 listed in Chapter 1 were addressed as discussed in the following paragraphs. 
In Chapter 2, a literature study was conducted in order to gain an understanding of the 
properties of UHC. This unearthed the key dimensions embedded in the conceptual definition 
of UHC namely: (i) UHC as the right to healthcare; (ii) UHC as access to healthcare; (iii) UHC 
as universal coverage; and (iv) UHC as financial protection. Along with these key dimensions 
of UHC, the key contextual factors that affect UHC were also identified. The contextual factors 
identified are deeply rooted in the social determinants of health and health care service 
provision; the identified contextual factors include: (i) governance; (ii) employment; (iii) 
inequality; and (iv) fiscal context. When considering the social determinants of health, the 
WHO (2017) states that: ‘The social determinants of health are the conditions in which people 
are born, grow, live, work and age. These circumstances are shaped by the distribution of money, 
power, and resources at global, national and local levels’. The identification of the key 
dimensions of UHC and the identification of contextual factors that are likely to impact UHC 
was preceded by a discussion of health systems and the concept of UHC in general. Key 
considerations for methodology selection when assessing causality in the UHC landscape 
were also defined. The required characteristics and functionalities that the method of choice 
should have include: (i) capture multiple causal linkages between contextual factors 
influencing the UHC landscape and respective outputs; (ii) be deeply embedded in the 
context for a richer understanding of causal linkages; (iii) offer a systematic approach that is 
repeatable and reproducible to instil confidence in the findings; (iv) view causality from 





multiple perspectives (quantitative and qualitative) to enrich understanding of the 
phenomena (v) identify necessary and sufficient conditions for UHC; (vi) be transparent and 
adhere to current knowledge; and (vii) allow for counterfactual analysis. Objective 1 of this 
research inquiry was thus addressed in Chapter 2. Objective 1 was to review literature on UHC 
in order to develop a clear understanding of the construct and to identify the key 
requirements for causality assessment in the context of UHC. 
The requirement specifications that was developed in Chapter 2 was subsequently used to 
guide the method selection process, and to ultimately select an appropriate method for 
causality assessment in this research. The method analysis and selection process is discussed 
in Chapter 3, addressing Objective 2 (to identify methods and approaches for establishing 
complex causality and select an appropriate method for application in this research). The 
three key research approaches, namely (i) qualitative-, (ii) quantitative-, and (iii) mixed 
method approaches, were explored in order to evaluate the applicability of each approach 
with reference to the requirements specification defined in Chapter 2. The mixed method 
approach, in general, and comparative methods in particular, were deemed most appropriate. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Mill’s methods are the two most prominent, 
formalised comparative methods available. Based on the method requirement specifications, 
QCA was deemed the most appropriate method to assess causality in this research. 
Specifically, the crisp-set variant of QCA (csQCA), because of its dichotomous nature, this 
was favourable because both qualitative and quantitative indicators were used in the study. 
Hence csQCA is more favourable when calibrating qualitative data. A QCA analysis is 
conducted in three stages, namely: (i) design; (ii) conditioning; and (iii) analysis. Following 
the comprehensive discussion of QCA and csQCA, these QCA stages were systematically 
executed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
In Chapter 4, the outcomes and conditions (variables) of the study were identified, with the 
aim of identifying the indicators to measure each of the outcomes and conditions. The chapter 
thus addressed part of the design stage of the QCA process. The three outcomes identified as 
part of the UHC goals, and as defined by the WHO, include (i) utilisation/need; (ii) quality of 
care; and (iii) financial protection. The conditions (variables) that were identified comprised 
of (i) health financial arrangements; and (ii) contextual factors affecting UHC. The health 
financial arrangements are (i) revenue raising; (ii) pooling; (iii) purchasing; and (iv) benefits 





design. The contextual factors stemmed from the factors identified through the semi-
structured literature review conducted in Chapter 2; the identified contextual factores 
include: (i) the fiscal context; (ii) the structure of public administration; (iii) the public sector 
financial management; (iv) education; (v) employment; (vi) poverty; and (vii) inequality. 
Indicators for each variable (i.e. conditions and outcomes) were then identified, based on the 
definition of each outcome, and on the indicators reported by international organisations 
such as the World Bank and the WHO. Due to the lack of comprehensive indicators for the 
utilisation/need outcome, this outcome was replaced with health service coverage. The 
contextual factors (i) structure of public administration; (ii) public sector financial 
management; (iii) poverty and (iv) one health financial arrangement factor (benefits design), 
were also excluded from the study, due to a lack of comprehensive, publically available 
information. Objectives 3 and 4 (a, b and c); of the study were addressed in Chapter 4. 
Objective 3 was to identify UHC goals and indicators that can be used to assess performance 
in terms of these goals. With Objective 4 being to identify factors that shape the UHC 
financing landscape as well as contextual factors that affect UHC, including indicators that 
measure each factor. 
The last part of the of the design phase of the QCA and part of the conditioning stages were 
conducted in Chapter 5, Objectives 3(d) and 4(d) were addressed in this chapter, these were 
to collect and sort relevant data for each indicator based on the requirements of the method 
selected. Firstly, data for the for each of the conditions and outcomes was collected. A total 
of 17 countries were subsequently selected as cases for the study based on data availability and 
a focus on a mix of ‘poor’ and ‘high’ performing cases as per QCA requirements. Australia, 
Botswana, Cameroon, Croatia, Czech Republic, Haiti, India, Italy, Thailand, Nigeria, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Armenia, the United States of 
America and Canada were the selected cases for the study. Composite indices were then 
created for each of the conditions and outcomes identified. The composite indices were then 
calibrated to form membership scores for csQCA, with binary ‘0’ representing minimal 
membership and ‘1’ representing full membership.  
The last parts of the conditioning phases of QCA and the analysis steps were conducted in 
Chapter 6, addressed Objective 5 of the study. Objective 5 was to identify causal linkages 
between factors that shape UHC financing landscape and contextual factors that affect UHC. 





In Chapter 6, the causal pathways to the UHC outcomes were identified with the aid of the 
fs/QCA software. In keeping with the mixed methods approach employed in this research, 
the quantitative results obtained from the analysis were interpreted. The results indicated key 
policy considerations for countries when moving towards UHC. No single conditions were 
necessary nor sufficient to achieve the UHC goals. The overarching findings are that both 
contextual factors outside the jurisdiction of the health system and prepayment towards 
healthcare, play an integral role when moving towards UHC. In addition, the analysis found 
that only addressing health financial arrangements (which form part of the health system) is 
not sufficient for achieving UHC. Factors outside the health system play a driving role in 
achieving UHC. For health service coverage, fiscal space and the absence of inequality along 
with the health financing arrangements are central to achieving health service coverage. 
Employment, which illustrates the availability of revenue sources is a key component to 
achieving quality of care in health systems. To achieve financial protection, countries need 
the availability of revenue sources in the form of fiscal space and employment combined with 
good financial arrangements. Overall, the findings suggest that countries can follow different 
policy options to achieve UHC, however health policy without addressing other factors that 
are drivers of the social determinants of health is not adequate to achieving UHC. Social 
cohesion, in the form of cross-subsidisation between different socio-economic groups, was 
also found to be key to achieving UHC. 
7.2 Limitations 
A number of limitations played a role in this study. The first limitation is the unavailability of 
comprehensive country-level data. This problem manifests due to the fragmentation of the 
measured indicators across countries, as indicators measured by countries are not often 
aligned. This meant that some of the variables were represented by a limited number of 
indicators, which poses the risk of a lack true representation of the variables under study. The 
unavailability of data also limited the scope of the cases used in the study, implying limitations 
in the analysis of the findings. Another limitation comes with the use of the csQCA variant of 
QCA, which dichotomises the data when calibrating. Although it allows for easily  
understandable results for interpretation, dichotomisation causes nuances in the data to be 
lost.  





7.3  Recommendations for future research 
The recommendations for future research are primarily oriented towards (i) the inclusion of 
a fsQCA analysis; (ii) the inclusion of additional cases; and (iii) theoretical inference, possibly 
extending to policy analysis and policy recommendations as it relates to UHC. These 
recommendations for future research are elaborated on below. 
In order to further verify the findings of this research, multiple regression analysis, coupled 
with the fsQCA variant of QCA are proposed. The fsQCA variant allows one to keep more 
nuances in the data as compared to the csQCA variant. This will allow for refinement of the 
findings, and is envisaged to aid the process of identifying specific policy recommendations 
as they relate to UHC. 
The inclusion of additional cases would allow for more input variables to be included in the 
study; this then allows for the inclusion of other determinants of health for analysis. For 
example, in the context of csQCA, 32 cases would allow for analysis with 5 variables at a time 
and 64 cases would allow for 6 variables at a time. This is because of the nature of csQCA, 
which allows for 2k cases, were k is the number of variables. It is also recommended that 
countries be selected from a country-specific perspective; thus, to consider cases that, given 
certain country characteristics, are similar to South Africa. Continuing the research with an 
increased number of cases, and cases with specific country characteristics, would also serve 
to inform policy recommendations more robustly. 
Ultimately, further research allows for the findings to be applied in policy analysis as policy 
recommendations, based on the causal relationships identified. By allowing for abstraction, 
this will subsequently be considered from a theoretical perspective in order to infer causality 
between factors that affect UHC. 
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APPENDIX A:  UHC LANDSCAPE 




The number of outpatient department visits as a 
percentage of the population. 
Health service access The number of health facilities per 10000 population. 
Hospital bed density 
The total number of hospital beds as a percentage of 
the population. 
Availability of essential medicines and 
commodities 
The proportion of health facilities with essential 
medicines including lifesaving commodities 
Source: (WHO, 2015b). 




Contraceptive prevalence – modern methods (%). 
Contraceptive prevalence –modern and traditional methods. 
Demand for family planning satisfied (%). 
Maternal health 
interventions  
Pregnant women sleeping under insecticide-treated nets (%). 
Antenatal care coverage - at least one visit (in the two or three years preceding the 
survey) (%). 
Antenatal care coverage - at least one visit (in the five years preceding the survey) 
(%). 
Antenatal care coverage - at least four visits (in the two or three years preceding 
the survey) (%). 
Antenatal care coverage - at least four visits (in the five years preceding the 
survey) (%). 
Births attended by skilled health personnel (in the two or three years preceding 
the survey) (%). 
Births attended by skilled health personnel (in the five years preceding the survey) 
(%). 
Births by caesarean section (in the two or three years preceding the survey) (%). 
Births by caesarean section (in the five years preceding the survey) (%). 
New-born child health 
interventions 
Early initiation of breastfeeding (in the two or three years preceding the survey) 
(%). 
Early initiation of breastfeeding (in the five years preceding the survey) (%) 
Children aged 6-59 months who received vitamin A supplementation (%). 
Children aged < 5 years sleeping under insecticide-treated nets (%). 
BCG immunization coverage among one-year-olds (%). 
Measles immunization coverage among one-year-olds (%). 
Polio immunization coverage among one-year-olds (%). 
DTP3 immunization coverage among one-year-olds (%). 
Full immunization coverage among one-year-olds (%). 
Children aged < 5 years with diarrhoea receiving oral rehydration salts (%). 
Children aged < 5 years with diarrhoea receiving oral rehydration therapy and 
continued feeding (%). 
Children aged < 5 years with pneumonia symptoms taken to a health facility (%). 
Source: (WHO, 2016a). 





Table A-3 : Indicators for inequality in healthcare utilization from the World Bank.  
Category Indicator 
Maternal and child health interventions 
Full immunization 
Treatment of diarrhoea 
Medical treatment of ARI 
Skilled antenatal care (4+ visits) 
Skilled birth attendance 
Contraceptive prevalence 
Adult preventive care 
TB screening 
Breast cancer screening 
Adult curative care 
Inpatient or outpatient (12 months) 
Inpatient (12 months) 
Inpatient ( 5 years) 
Outpatient (12 months) 
Utilization of public facilities 
Outpatient health centre and health post 
Outpatient hospital 
Inpatient hospital 
Source: (World bank, 2012; World Bank, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e). 
Table A-4: OECD Access to care indicators. 
Category Indicator 
Out of Pocket medical expenditure. 
Out-of-pocket medical spending as a share of final household 
consumption. 
Shares of out-of-pocket medical spending by services and 
goods. 
Geographical distribution of medical 
doctors. 
Physician density, by Territorial Level 2 regions. 
Physicians density in predominantly urban and rural regions. 
Inequalities in doctor consultations. 
Unmet care needs for medical examination by income level. 
Horizontal inequity indices for probability of a doctor visit in 
the past 12 months. 
Inequalities in dentist consultations. 
Out-of-pocket dental expenditure. 
Probability of a dental visit in the past 12 months, by income 
group. 
Unmet need for a dental examination, by income quintile. 
Inequalities in cancer screening. 
Cervical cancer screening in past three years by income level. 
Breast cancer screening in past two years by income level. 
Colorectal cancer screening once in lifetime by educational 
level. 
Waiting times for elective surgery 
Waiting times for elective surgery. Cataract surgery, waiting 
times from specialist assessment to treatment. 
Hip replacement, waiting times from specialist assessment to 
treatment. 
Knee replacement, waiting times from specialist assessment to 
treatment. 









Table A-5: Healthcare expenditure indicators from various organisations. 
Indicator Organisation  
Total expenditure on health as % of GDP (THE%GDP). 
USAID, WHO, 
Commonwealth fund 100 Core 
Health Indicator list. 
General government expenditure on health as % of GDP (GGHE%GDP). WHO, World Bank.  
Per capita government expenditure on health, US$ adjusted for purchasing 
power (“purchasing power parity” [PPP] or $ International). 
WHO, World Bank. 
General government expenditure on health as % of total general 
government expenditure (GGHE%GGE). 
WHO, USAID, OECD, KPMG. 




Private expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure 
(PHE%THE). 
WHO, USAID, KPMG. 
External resources for health as % of total health expenditure (EXT%THE) 
WHO, USAID, 100 Core 
Health Indicator list. 
Out-of-pocket expenditure as % of total expenditure on health 
(OOPS%THE). 
WHO, KPMG, 100 Core 
Health Indicator list. 
Private prepaid plans as % of total expenditure on health (VHI%THE). WHO. 
Private prepaid plans as a percentage of private expenditure on health. WHO. 
Number of technical resources developed with project assistance to 
support an increase in revenues for health. 
USAID. 
Evidence of use of project-supported technical resources to inform revenue 
generation decisions. 
USAID. 
Per capita total expenditure on health. USAID. 
Health expenditure per capita. OECD, Commonwealth fund. 
Annual average growth rate in per capita health expenditure. OECD. 
Current health expenditure by function of health care (in terms of 
inpatient, outpatient, long term, medical goods care and collective goods). 
OECD. 
Growth rates of health spending for selected functions per capita. OECD. 
Expenditure on health by type of financing (general government, social 
security, private OOP, private insurance and other sources). 
OECD. 
Health expenditure as share of total government expenditure. OECD. 
Growth of health spending by financing, OECD average (in terms of social 
security financing, OOP and private insurance). 
OECD. 
Share of hospital inpatient expenditures by main diagnostic category OECD. 
Share of current health spending by age group. OECD. 
Expenditure per hospital discharge for two diagnostic categories. OECD. 
Gross fixed capital formation in the healthcare sector as a share of GDP. OECD. 
Health expenditure per capita (purchasing power parity) KPMG, World Bank, WHO. 
OOP health expenditure (% of private expenditure on health). KPMG, WHO. 
Current expenditure on health by general government and compulsory 
schemes (% of current expenditure on health). 
100 Core Health Indicator list 
Total capital expenditure on health (% current + capital expenditure on 
health). 
100 Core Health Indicators list 
Average annual growth rate of real healthcare spending per capita. Commonwealth fund 
Out-of-pocket health care spending per capita. Commonwealth fund 
Hospital spending per capita. Commonwealth fund 
Spending on pharmaceuticals per capita. Commonwealth fund 
Private health expenditure, as a percentage of GDP. World Bank 
 





APPENDIX B:  CASES AND DATA COLLECTION 
Table B-6 : Raw data for QCA outcomes. 








olds (%).  
Antenatal 
care 
coverage - at 
least four 












































surgical care (% 
of people at 
risk). 
AUS 93 85 99.3 87 95 94 6 79 4.5 0.6 
BOT 95 73.3 99.9 62 97 96 129 77 27.3 50 
CAM 84 58.8 64.7 53 78 83 596 84 64 57 
CZR 99 98.8 99.8 93 98 96 4 76 2.9 0.3 
CRO 94 93.3 99.9 87 90 93 8 71 15.3 2.8 
HAI 60 67.3 48.6 79 53 56 359 78 30.8 74.5 
IND 87 49.7 81.1 59 88 86 174 74 59.6 67.3 
ITA 93 86.5 99.9 87 85 93 4 74 5.5 1.1 
THA 99 93.4 99.6 53 99 99 20 80 11.9 29.4 
NIG 56 51.1 35.2 15 51 49 814 87 63.7 65.3 
BAN 94 31.2 42.1 57 94 97 176 93 73.6 79.1 
CAM 89 75.6 89 59 81 87 161 93 74 71.8 
GER 96 99.3 98.5 87 97 94 6 63 0.3 0 
KOR 98 96.8 100 94 98 98 11 81 3.3 0.4 
ARM 94 92.8 99.8 89 97 96 25 78 49.7 23.1 
USA 95 96.6 98.5 87 92 94 14 85 3.2 1.4 
CAN 91 98.9 98.4 90 90 91 7 82 2.7 0.3 
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  Table B-7: Raw data for QCA causal conditions. 





on health as 





























(% of GDP) 
Tax revenue 
(% of GDP) 
Central 
government 















ent, total (% 

















25.36 2921.05 17.96313543 22.205661 47.388123 45320 
60.8919982
9 
5.737999916 34.94 5.22533989 
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Table B-7 continued… 





on health as 





























(% of GDP) 
Tax revenue 
(% of GDP) 
Central 
government 















ent, total (% 












total (% of 
GDP) 
BAN 27.901132 0.1 24.57 
5.40424073
8 






CMB 22.04231295 0.23 40.39 
5.39797983
7 









38.8 3989.56 19.24611418 11.4688969 52.233356 49090 
57.6699981
7 
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APPENDIX C:  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this Appendix, the truth tables for the QCA solutions in Chapter 6 are presented. 
Truth table for Evaluation 1 
Figure C-1: Truth table for Evaluation 1. 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 2 










Truth table for Evaluation 3 
Figure C-3: Truth table for Evaluation 3. 
 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 4 













Truth table for Evaluation 5 
Figure C-5: Truth table for Evaluation 5. 
 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 6 












Truth table for Evaluation 7 
Figure C-7: Truth table for Evaluation 7. 
 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 8  












Truth table for Evaluation 9 
Figure C-9: Truth table for Evaluation 9.  
 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 10 













Truth table for Evaluation 11 
Figure C-11: Truth table for Evaluation 11. 
 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 12 












Truth table for Evaluation 13 
Figure C-13: Truth table for Evaluation 13. 
 
Truth table for Evaluation 14  
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